Kelly Dean Jolley
Biographic Data
| ID | 3955988 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kelly Dean Jolley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kelly Dean |
| FAMILY NAME | Jolley |
| SIGNATURE | JOLLEY K D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Auburn University |
| ORCID | 0009-0009-6665-9055 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Wittgenstein
The Nexus of Unity of an Emerson Sentence
In this essay I investigate the unity of Emerson's sentences. I begin by describing the phenomenology of reading Emerson and use that phenomenology to orient the investigation. I propose to understand the unity of Emerson's sentences by using a variation of Frege's strategy for understanding the unity of sentences generally. I then address how the unity of the Emerson sentence serves to create the unity of the Emerson paragraph and even of the Em…
(Kivy on) The Form-Content Identity Thesis
In his Philosophies of Art Peter Kivy investigates the unity of form and content in the arts, particularly in poetry. While Kivy says much with which I happily agree, I sadly disagree with him about the impossibility of form–content identities. Kivy's arguments fail to compel: there are other ways of understanding form–content identities and the need for them that has been felt by artists and critics
The Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual Investigations (Ashgate Wittgensteinian Studies)
Picturing the Human
Pollyanna Realism
2002). Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 75-85
What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist
In a recent paper, ‘On the Persistence of Phenomenology’ (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the …
Pollyanna Realism
2002). Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 75-85
(Kivy on) The Form-Content Identity Thesis
In his Philosophies of Art Peter Kivy investigates the unity of form and content in the arts, particularly in poetry. While Kivy says much with which I happily agree, I sadly disagree with him about the impossibility of form–content identities. Kivy's arguments fail to compel: there are other ways of understanding form–content identities and the need for them that has been felt by artists and critics
What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist
In a recent paper, ‘On the Persistence of Phenomenology’ (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the …
What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist
In a recent paper, ‘On the Persistence of Phenomenology’ (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the …
Pollyanna Realism
2002). Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 75-85
Picturing the Human
The Concept 'Horse' Paradox and Wittgensteinian Conceptual Investigations (Ashgate Wittgensteinian Studies)
(Kivy on) The Form-Content Identity Thesis
In his Philosophies of Art Peter Kivy investigates the unity of form and content in the arts, particularly in poetry. While Kivy says much with which I happily agree, I sadly disagree with him about the impossibility of form–content identities. Kivy's arguments fail to compel: there are other ways of understanding form–content identities and the need for them that has been felt by artists and critics
The Nexus of Unity of an Emerson Sentence
In this essay I investigate the unity of Emerson's sentences. I begin by describing the phenomenology of reading Emerson and use that phenomenology to orient the investigation. I propose to understand the unity of Emerson's sentences by using a variation of Frege's strategy for understanding the unity of sentences generally. I then address how the unity of the Emerson sentence serves to create the unity of the Emerson paragraph and even of the Em…
Wittgenstein
Art (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Art history (2 works) · Literature (2 works) · Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)