Wes Morriston
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973528 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wes Morriston |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wes |
| FAMILY NAME | Morriston |
| SIGNATURE | MORRISTON W |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6182-2644 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Infinity, Time, and Successive Addition
According to an influential line of argument, the past must be finite because no infinite series can be formed by successive addition. The present paper pinpoints the non sequitur at the heart of this argument, disentangles the ambiguities that disguise it, and dismantles the misleading picture of ‘traversing the infinite’ that gives the argument so much of its allure. Finally, the paper critically explores the related argument that a beginningle…
Endless and Infinite
It is often said that time must have a beginning because otherwise the series of past events would have the paradoxical features of an actual infinite. In the present paper, we show that, even given a dynamic theory of time, the cardinality of an endless series of events, each of which will occur, is the same as that of a beginningless series of events, each of which has occurred. Both are denumerably infinite. So if (as we believe) an endless se…
‘Terrible’ divine commands revisited
If God commanded something that would ordinarily be classified as a terrible evil, would we have a moral obligation to obey? In two previous articles in this journal, I examined and evaluated several different ways in which a divine command theorist might answer this question. Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul Franks have now provided a vigorous rebuttal, in which they argue that my way of handling the relevant counterpossible conditionals is flawe…
Is faith in the Ultimate rationally required? Taking issue with some arguments in The Will to Imagine
According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive
God and the ontological foundation of morality
In recent years, William Lane Craig has vigorously championed a moral argument for God's existence. The backbone of Craig's argument is the claim that only God can provide a ‘sound foundation in reality’ for morality. The present article has three principal aims. The first is to interpret and clarify the account of the ontological foundation of morality proposed by Craig. The second is to press home an important objection to that account. The thi…
What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics
If God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that …
Power, liability, and the free-will defence
Tim Mawson argues that the ability to choose what one knows to be morally wrong is a power for some persons in some circumstances, but that it would be a mere liability for God. The lynchpin of Mawson's argument is his claim that a power is an ability that it is good to have. In this rejoinder, I challenge this claim of Mawson's, arguing that choosing a course of action is always an exercise of power, whether or not it is good for one to have tha…
Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?
In the present paper, I seek to establish, first, that the a priori arguments against the infinite past are vital to the overall success of the kalam argument.Merely appealing to the big bang theory of the origin of the universe will not do the trick.In the second place, I show that neither of these arguments is at all successful in showing that "metaphysical time" has a beginning.Along the way, various discoveries are made about the relation of …
Are omnipotence and necessary moral perfection compatible? Reply to Mawson
In response to an earlier paper of mine, T. J. Mawson has argued that omnipotence is logically incompatible with wrong-doing, ‘whilst accepting that there is “a genuine, active power knowingly to choose evil” and thus leaving room for a free-will defence to the problem of evil’. Here, I attempt to show that Mawson is mistaken on both counts – that his argument for the incompatibility of omnipotence and wrong-doing is defective, and that the free-…
Craig on the actual infinite
In a series of much discussed articles and books, William Lane Craig defends the view that the past could not consist in a beginningless series of events. In the present paper, I cast a critical eye on just one part of Craig's case for the finitude of the past – viz. his philosophical argument against the possibility of actually infinite sets of objects in the ‘real world’. I shall try to show that this argument is unsuccessful. I shall also take…
Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection
This paper elaborates and defends an argument for saying that if God is necessarily good (morally perfect in all possible worlds), then He does not have the maximum conceivable amount of power and so is not all-powerful. It considers and rejects several of the best-known attempts to show that necessary moral perfection is consistent with the requirements of omnipotence, and concludes by suggesting that a less than all-powerful person might still …
What is so Good about Moral Freedom
Journal Article What is so Good about Moral Freedom? Get access Wes Morriston Wes Morriston University of Colorado at Boulder Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 200, July 2000, Pages 344–358, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2000.00190.x Published: 07 January 2003
What is so Good about Moral Freedom
Journal Article What is so Good about Moral Freedom? Get access Wes Morriston Wes Morriston University of Colorado at Boulder Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 200, July 2000, Pages 344–358, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2000.00190.x Published: 07 January 2003
What is so Good about Moral Freedom
Journal Article What is so Good about Moral Freedom? Get access Wes Morriston Wes Morriston University of Colorado at Boulder Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 200, July 2000, Pages 344–358, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2000.00190.x Published: 07 January 2003
Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection
This paper elaborates and defends an argument for saying that if God is necessarily good (morally perfect in all possible worlds), then He does not have the maximum conceivable amount of power and so is not all-powerful. It considers and rejects several of the best-known attempts to show that necessary moral perfection is consistent with the requirements of omnipotence, and concludes by suggesting that a less than all-powerful person might still …
Craig on the actual infinite
In a series of much discussed articles and books, William Lane Craig defends the view that the past could not consist in a beginningless series of events. In the present paper, I cast a critical eye on just one part of Craig's case for the finitude of the past – viz. his philosophical argument against the possibility of actually infinite sets of objects in the ‘real world’. I shall try to show that this argument is unsuccessful. I shall also take…
Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?
In the present paper, I seek to establish, first, that the a priori arguments against the infinite past are vital to the overall success of the kalam argument.Merely appealing to the big bang theory of the origin of the universe will not do the trick.In the second place, I show that neither of these arguments is at all successful in showing that "metaphysical time" has a beginning.Along the way, various discoveries are made about the relation of …
Are omnipotence and necessary moral perfection compatible? Reply to Mawson
In response to an earlier paper of mine, T. J. Mawson has argued that omnipotence is logically incompatible with wrong-doing, ‘whilst accepting that there is “a genuine, active power knowingly to choose evil” and thus leaving room for a free-will defence to the problem of evil’. Here, I attempt to show that Mawson is mistaken on both counts – that his argument for the incompatibility of omnipotence and wrong-doing is defective, and that the free-…
Power, liability, and the free-will defence
Tim Mawson argues that the ability to choose what one knows to be morally wrong is a power for some persons in some circumstances, but that it would be a mere liability for God. The lynchpin of Mawson's argument is his claim that a power is an ability that it is good to have. In this rejoinder, I challenge this claim of Mawson's, arguing that choosing a course of action is always an exercise of power, whether or not it is good for one to have tha…
What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics
If God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that …
God and the ontological foundation of morality
In recent years, William Lane Craig has vigorously championed a moral argument for God's existence. The backbone of Craig's argument is the claim that only God can provide a ‘sound foundation in reality’ for morality. The present article has three principal aims. The first is to interpret and clarify the account of the ontological foundation of morality proposed by Craig. The second is to press home an important objection to that account. The thi…
Is faith in the Ultimate rationally required? Taking issue with some arguments in The Will to Imagine
According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive
‘Terrible’ divine commands revisited
If God commanded something that would ordinarily be classified as a terrible evil, would we have a moral obligation to obey? In two previous articles in this journal, I examined and evaluated several different ways in which a divine command theorist might answer this question. Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul Franks have now provided a vigorous rebuttal, in which they argue that my way of handling the relevant counterpossible conditionals is flawe…
Endless and Infinite
It is often said that time must have a beginning because otherwise the series of past events would have the paradoxical features of an actual infinite. In the present paper, we show that, even given a dynamic theory of time, the cardinality of an endless series of events, each of which will occur, is the same as that of a beginningless series of events, each of which has occurred. Both are denumerably infinite. So if (as we believe) an endless se…
Infinity, Time, and Successive Addition
According to an influential line of argument, the past must be finite because no infinite series can be formed by successive addition. The present paper pinpoints the non sequitur at the heart of this argument, disentangles the ambiguities that disguise it, and dismantles the misleading picture of ‘traversing the infinite’ that gives the argument so much of its allure. Finally, the paper critically explores the related argument that a beginningle…
Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (7 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (7 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Physics (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works)