Is faith in the Ultimate rationally required? Taking issue with some arguments in The Will to Imagine
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20312293 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Wes Morriston (0000-0002-6182-2644, University of Colorado Boulder, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 209-220 |
| Publication date | 2013-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412513000085 |
| OpenAlex | W1975105951 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive
Epistemology · Faith · Skepticism · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |