Murali Ramachandran
Biographic Data
| ID | 3973540 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Murali Ramachandran |
| GIVEN NAMES | Murali |
| FAMILY NAME | Ramachandran |
| SIGNATURE | RAMACHANDRAN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Sussex |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5611-518X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A neglected response to the paradoxes of confirmation
Hempel's paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation, Goodman’s “grue” paradox and the “tacking” (or “irrelevant co…
A puzzle about conditionals
This paper examines a neglected puzzle about conditionals: namely, the fact that each of a pair of conditionals with incompatible consequents, [A>C] and [B>C*], may be properly affirmable in circumstances when one does not believe, and is not entitled to infer, the denial of the conjunction of the antecedents, i.e. [¬(A & B)]. The puzzle is why this should be so, since the conditionals entail the denial of the conjunction on the popular accounts …
How and why I arrived at a topsy-turvy account of Even-Ifs
Most philosophers of logic reject the prima facie plausible view that Even-If conditionals entail their consequents, and settle instead for accounts on which Even-Ifs entail the corresponding If-conditionals. In this paper, I provide fresh motivation for the rejected, consequent-entailing, view and sketch a pragmatic strategy to explain away seemingly proper, but apparently countervailing, uses
Descriptions With an Attitude Problem
It is well known that Russell's theory of descriptions has difficulties with descriptions occurring within desire reports. I consider a flawed argument from such a case to the conclusion that descriptions have a referring use, some responses to this argument on behalf of the Russellian, and finally rejoinders to these responses which press the point home
Descriptions and Presuppositions
A Russellian theory of (defmite) descriptions takes an utterance of the form ‘The F is G’ to express a purely general proposition that affirms the existence of a (contextually) unique F: there is exactly one F [which is C] and it is G. Strawson, by contrast, takes the utterer to presuppose in some sense that there is exactly one salient F, but this is not part of what is asserted; rather, when the presupposition is not met the utterance simply fa…
Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law
André Gallois' recent book Occasions of Identity attempts to defend the coherence of the view that objects may be identical at one time but distinct at another (the occasional identity thesis). The defence requires a special account of rigid designation and a special version of Leibniz' law. This paper shows Gallois' proposals in this regard to be inadequate, and suggests a better line of defence for occasional identity theorists
Contingent identity in counterpart theory
Journal Article Contingent identity in counterpart theory Get access Murali Ramachandran Murali Ramachandran Birkbeck CollegeMalet Street, London WC1E 7HX Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 50, Issue 3, June 1990, Pages 163–166, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/50.3.163 Published: 01 June 1990
Sense and Schmidentity
Journal Article Sense and Schmidentity Get access Murali Ramachandran Murali Ramachandran Birkbeck College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 463–471, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219830 Published: 01 October 1989
Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law
André Gallois' recent book Occasions of Identity attempts to defend the coherence of the view that objects may be identical at one time but distinct at another (the occasional identity thesis). The defence requires a special account of rigid designation and a special version of Leibniz' law. This paper shows Gallois' proposals in this regard to be inadequate, and suggests a better line of defence for occasional identity theorists
Sense and Schmidentity
Journal Article Sense and Schmidentity Get access Murali Ramachandran Murali Ramachandran Birkbeck College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 463–471, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219830 Published: 01 October 1989
Sense and Schmidentity
Journal Article Sense and Schmidentity Get access Murali Ramachandran Murali Ramachandran Birkbeck College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 157, October 1989, Pages 463–471, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219830 Published: 01 October 1989
Contingent identity in counterpart theory
Journal Article Contingent identity in counterpart theory Get access Murali Ramachandran Murali Ramachandran Birkbeck CollegeMalet Street, London WC1E 7HX Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 50, Issue 3, June 1990, Pages 163–166, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/50.3.163 Published: 01 June 1990
Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law
André Gallois' recent book Occasions of Identity attempts to defend the coherence of the view that objects may be identical at one time but distinct at another (the occasional identity thesis). The defence requires a special account of rigid designation and a special version of Leibniz' law. This paper shows Gallois' proposals in this regard to be inadequate, and suggests a better line of defence for occasional identity theorists
Descriptions and Presuppositions
A Russellian theory of (defmite) descriptions takes an utterance of the form ‘The F is G’ to express a purely general proposition that affirms the existence of a (contextually) unique F: there is exactly one F [which is C] and it is G. Strawson, by contrast, takes the utterer to presuppose in some sense that there is exactly one salient F, but this is not part of what is asserted; rather, when the presupposition is not met the utterance simply fa…
Descriptions With an Attitude Problem
It is well known that Russell's theory of descriptions has difficulties with descriptions occurring within desire reports. I consider a flawed argument from such a case to the conclusion that descriptions have a referring use, some responses to this argument on behalf of the Russellian, and finally rejoinders to these responses which press the point home
How and why I arrived at a topsy-turvy account of Even-Ifs
Most philosophers of logic reject the prima facie plausible view that Even-If conditionals entail their consequents, and settle instead for accounts on which Even-Ifs entail the corresponding If-conditionals. In this paper, I provide fresh motivation for the rejected, consequent-entailing, view and sketch a pragmatic strategy to explain away seemingly proper, but apparently countervailing, uses
A puzzle about conditionals
This paper examines a neglected puzzle about conditionals: namely, the fact that each of a pair of conditionals with incompatible consequents, [A>C] and [B>C*], may be properly affirmable in circumstances when one does not believe, and is not entitled to infer, the denial of the conjunction of the antecedents, i.e. [¬(A & B)]. The puzzle is why this should be so, since the conditionals entail the denial of the conjunction on the popular accounts …
A neglected response to the paradoxes of confirmation
Hempel's paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation, Goodman’s “grue” paradox and the “tacking” (or “irrelevant co…
Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Art (3 works) · Ramachandran plot (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Biology (2 works) · Classics (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works)