A puzzle about conditionals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11420585 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Murali Ramachandran (0000-0001-5611-518X, University of the Witwatersrand, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 28-36 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | South African Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0258-0136 • E-ISSN: 2073-4867 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/02580136.2015.1109427 |
| OpenAlex | W2955235988 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
This paper examines a neglected puzzle about conditionals: namely, the fact that each of a pair of conditionals with incompatible consequents, [A>C] and [B>C*], may be properly affirmable in circumstances when one does not believe, and is not entitled to infer, the denial of the conjunction of the antecedents, i.e. [¬(A & B)]. The puzzle is why this should be so, since the conditionals entail the denial of the conjunction on the popular accounts of conditionals. I present a pragmatic solution which distinguishes between two levels of affirmability
Denial · Epistemology · Inference · Modus ponens · Psychoanalysis · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|