Jeffrey Seidman
Biographic Data
| ID | 3974021 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeffrey Seidman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeffrey |
| FAMILY NAME | Seidman |
| SIGNATURE | SEIDMAN J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Vassar College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9415-1840 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value
I elucidate a frame of mind that David Wiggins calls respect for nature , which he understands as a special attitude toward a sui generis object, Nature as such . A person with this frame of mind takes nature to impose defeasible limits on her action, so that there are some courses of action that she will refuse even to entertain, except in circumstances of dire exigency. I defend the reasonableness of respect for nature, drawing upon considerati…
Reasons Not to Consider Our Options
I argue that a practical deliberator may have good reasons not to consider some option even though that option is what there is most reason, all things considered, for her to do. The most interesting reasons not to consider an option arise in cases where an agent cannot be compensated in kind for the loss of goods that she values. Where this is the case, an attitude of conservatism is warranted: it is reasonable to begin deliberation by consideri…
Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation
When a reasonable agent deliberates about what to do, she entertains only a limited range of possible courses of action. A theory of practical reasoning must therefore include an account of deliberative attention: an account that both explains the patterns of deliberative attention that reasonable agents typically display and allows us to see why these patterns of deliberative attention are reasonable. I offer such an account, built around two, c…
Valuing and Caring
What is it to “value” something, in the semi‐technical sense of the term that Gary Watson establishes? I argue that valuing something consists in caring about it. Caring involves not only emotional dispositions of the sort that Agnieszka Jaworska has elaborated, but also a distinctive cognitive disposition – namely, a (defeasible) disposition to believe the object cared about to be a source of agent‐relative reasons for action and for emotion. Un…
Two Sides of 'Silencing
John McDowell argues that for virtuous agents the requirements of virtue do not outweigh competing considerations, but 'silence' them. He explains this claim in two different ways: a virtuous agent (a) will not be temptedto act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('motivational silencing'), or (b) will not believe that he has any reason to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('rational silencing'). I identify a small class of ca…
Valuing and Caring
What is it to “value” something, in the semi‐technical sense of the term that Gary Watson establishes? I argue that valuing something consists in caring about it. Caring involves not only emotional dispositions of the sort that Agnieszka Jaworska has elaborated, but also a distinctive cognitive disposition – namely, a (defeasible) disposition to believe the object cared about to be a source of agent‐relative reasons for action and for emotion. Un…
Two Sides of 'Silencing
John McDowell argues that for virtuous agents the requirements of virtue do not outweigh competing considerations, but 'silence' them. He explains this claim in two different ways: a virtuous agent (a) will not be temptedto act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('motivational silencing'), or (b) will not believe that he has any reason to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('rational silencing'). I identify a small class of ca…
Two Sides of 'Silencing
John McDowell argues that for virtuous agents the requirements of virtue do not outweigh competing considerations, but 'silence' them. He explains this claim in two different ways: a virtuous agent (a) will not be temptedto act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('motivational silencing'), or (b) will not believe that he has any reason to act in a way which is incompatible with virtue ('rational silencing'). I identify a small class of ca…
Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation
When a reasonable agent deliberates about what to do, she entertains only a limited range of possible courses of action. A theory of practical reasoning must therefore include an account of deliberative attention: an account that both explains the patterns of deliberative attention that reasonable agents typically display and allows us to see why these patterns of deliberative attention are reasonable. I offer such an account, built around two, c…
Valuing and Caring
What is it to “value” something, in the semi‐technical sense of the term that Gary Watson establishes? I argue that valuing something consists in caring about it. Caring involves not only emotional dispositions of the sort that Agnieszka Jaworska has elaborated, but also a distinctive cognitive disposition – namely, a (defeasible) disposition to believe the object cared about to be a source of agent‐relative reasons for action and for emotion. Un…
Reasons Not to Consider Our Options
I argue that a practical deliberator may have good reasons not to consider some option even though that option is what there is most reason, all things considered, for her to do. The most interesting reasons not to consider an option arise in cases where an agent cannot be compensated in kind for the loss of goods that she values. Where this is the case, an attitude of conservatism is warranted: it is reasonable to begin deliberation by consideri…
Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value
I elucidate a frame of mind that David Wiggins calls respect for nature , which he understands as a special attitude toward a sui generis object, Nature as such . A person with this frame of mind takes nature to impose defeasible limits on her action, so that there are some courses of action that she will refuse even to entertain, except in circumstances of dire exigency. I defend the reasonableness of respect for nature, drawing upon considerati…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Deliberation (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Defeasible estate (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)