Valuing and Caring
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8106868 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey Seidman (0000-0002-9415-1840, Vassar College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 272-303 |
| Publication date | 2009-11-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01049.x |
| OpenAlex | W1901037676 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 26 |
What is it to “value” something, in the semi‐technical sense of the term that Gary Watson establishes? I argue that valuing something consists in caring about it. Caring involves not only emotional dispositions of the sort that Agnieszka Jaworska has elaborated, but also a distinctive cognitive disposition – namely, a (defeasible) disposition to believe the object cared about to be a source of agent‐relative reasons for action and for emotion. Understood in this way, an agent's carings have a stronger claim to “speak for” her as her values than do other attitudes that have been proposed for this role. In particular, an agent's carings establish more robust psychological continuities and cross‐temporal connections than do self‐governing policies of the sort that Michael Bratman has described; and they forge diachronic coherence not just in her deliberation and action, as self‐governing policies do, but also in her cognitive and emotional life. An agent's carings thus help to constitute her identity as a temporally persisting subject . Self‐governing policies are at best ersatz ‐values, which an agent may choose to adopt when she finds that her proper values – her cares – leave her course underdetermined
Action (physics · Aesthetics · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy · Defeasible estate · Deliberation · Dialectic · Disposition · Epistemology · Identity (music · Object (grammar · Political science · Politics · Rationality · Self-deception · Sociology · Subject (documents · Value (mathematics · Watson · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Normative Reasons for Love, Part II
Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender
What is social hierarchy
Nudges, Nudging, and Self-Guidance Under the Influence
Reasons Not to Consider Our Options
What is the role of affective forecasting in knowing what we value
Devotion, attachment, and varieties of vulnerability
Valuings as Sentiments
Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value
Does valuing ice cream sandwiches make one a true gourmand and connoisseur of them
Conservatisms about the Valuable
Touching the Good
Meaning in Life and Becoming More Fulfilled
Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities
The Aesthetic Enkratic Principle
Normative Reasons for Love, Part I
Autonomy and Hierarchy
Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency
Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction
Valuing and the Will
Why Be Rational?
Identification and externality
Internal and external reasons
The Sources of Normativity
Necessity, Volition, and Love
Value, Respect, and Attachment
Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation
The Myth of Instrumental Rationality
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Love as Valuing a Relationship
Caring and Internality
Structures of Agency
Emotional Reason
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,23 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |