Jonas Tellefsen Hejlesen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4095791 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonas Tellefsen Hejlesen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonas Tellefsen |
| FAMILY NAME | Hejlesen |
| SIGNATURE | HEJLESEN J T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aalborg University |
| ORCID | 0009-0006-7948-2584 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Hermeneutic Suspicion in Action: Agency Beyond Causality
In this article, I argue for the use of the hermeneutics of suspicion in the investigation of the conditions of our actions. I claim that by staying suspicious of immediate answers as well as manifest conditions, and remaining curious of other conditions that may influence us, we can come closer to an understanding of our actions and what structures them. By investigating the broad question of why we do what we do, I critically examine the concep…
I Condemn: A Discursive Analysis of Moral Condemnations in the Political Realm
In this paper, I present a crude, provisional theory of moral condemnation based on a discursive analysis of an interaction between two prominent political figures – on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) – in the aftermath of the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1 October 2024. Based on the analysis, I argue that moral condemnations may serve as a tool for regulating action, and I provide a game-based analogy which may hel…
Dynamics of Freedom: Negotiating Constraints
In this paper, I grapple with the question of why we, at times, experience ourselves as not free. In doing so I outline a crude theory of agency (and our experience of ourselves as free) as a dynamic process happening in irreversible time. In attempting to answer this question, I define agency as the ability to pursue our desires, and I claim that we experience ourselves as free as long as we can do this – with the caveat that the ability to reas…
No prominent works on this page.
Dynamics of Freedom: Negotiating Constraints
In this paper, I grapple with the question of why we, at times, experience ourselves as not free. In doing so I outline a crude theory of agency (and our experience of ourselves as free) as a dynamic process happening in irreversible time. In attempting to answer this question, I define agency as the ability to pursue our desires, and I claim that we experience ourselves as free as long as we can do this – with the caveat that the ability to reas…
I Condemn: A Discursive Analysis of Moral Condemnations in the Political Realm
In this paper, I present a crude, provisional theory of moral condemnation based on a discursive analysis of an interaction between two prominent political figures – on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) – in the aftermath of the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1 October 2024. Based on the analysis, I argue that moral condemnations may serve as a tool for regulating action, and I provide a game-based analogy which may hel…
Hermeneutic Suspicion in Action: Agency Beyond Causality
In this article, I argue for the use of the hermeneutics of suspicion in the investigation of the conditions of our actions. I claim that by staying suspicious of immediate answers as well as manifest conditions, and remaining curious of other conditions that may influence us, we can come closer to an understanding of our actions and what structures them. By investigating the broad question of why we do what we do, I critically examine the concep…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works)