Dynamics of Freedom
Negotiating Constraints
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6071577 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonas Tellefsen Hejlesen (0009-0006-7948-2584, Aalborg University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1914-1929 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1932-4502 • E-ISSN: 1936-3567 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s12124-024-09859-3 |
| PMID | 39093540 |
| OpenAlex | W4401276694 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 33 |
In this paper, I grapple with the question of why we, at times, experience ourselves as not free. In doing so I outline a crude theory of agency (and our experience of ourselves as free) as a dynamic process happening in irreversible time. In attempting to answer this question, I define agency as the ability to pursue our desires, and I claim that we experience ourselves as free as long as we can do this – with the caveat that the ability to reason is a necessary criterion. I show that agency is a sociocultural development that manifests as the ability to reason gradually develops through social interaction during infancy and into adulthood. Crucially, I point out that reason is a double-edged sword: It allows us to question our actions and desires and whether they are worth pursuing, which is what elevates us to agentic beings. However, it also allows us to alienate ourselves from our actions and desires, and thus rob ourselves of our experience of freedom. Lastly, I show how our subjective freedom is lost and gained in a constant process, generated by a reflexive-relating-to ourselves. As we act, we continually encounter constraints (physical and psychological) that bar us from acting upon our desires. This compels us to reflect on our actions and desires, and so, our feeling of freedom evaporates. However, through a retrospective forgetting, or reconstruction, of the constraints we encounter, we may regain our experience of being free
Action (physics · Agency (philosophy · Epistemology · Feeling · Forgetting · Free will · Freedom of choice · Negotiation · Political science · Reflexivity · Self · Sense of agency · Sociology · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · Social Representations and Identity
The principles of psychology, Vol I.
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Rational imitation in preverbal infants
From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice
Lifespan Psychology
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
The psychology of interpersonal relations.
Free Agency
How to Study Meta-intentionality
Meta-intentionality
I Create You to Control Me
When prophecy fails
Needed for cultural psychology
Functional reality of the quasi-real
Where Occidental Science Went Wrong
The Self as Social Construction
Unwilling Versus Unable
Understanding the intentions of others
Culture and the self
Less than nothing
The Dialogical Self
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |