Jonghyuk Lee
Biographic Data
| ID | 4099564 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonghyuk Lee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonghyuk |
| FAMILY NAME | Lee |
| SIGNATURE | LEE J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Nanyang Technological University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3308-2316 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Who Represses? Career Incentives and the Geography of Repression in China
Incentivized Inequality: Career Incentives and Investment Allocation in China
Limited Power-Sharing in a Personalized Regime: Xi Jinping’s Strategic Retreat from Local Politics
In an authoritarian regime, the ruler faces a fundamental dilemma whereby the concentration of power increases the likelihood of subordinates distrusting the ruler. This study examines how Xi Jinping in China addresses this dilemma by sharing access-to-power positions with his central subordinates. By analyzing the promotion patterns of provincial officials from 1992 to 2021, this paper identifies Xi’s attempts to personalize provincial leadershi…
Machine-learning applications to authoritarian selections: The case of China
Elite selection in China has drawn significant attention given the importance of the country. Instead of relying on qualitative assessments from historical and personal insights, this study utilized machine-learning techniques to evaluate the promotion prospects of Chinese elites. By incorporating over 251 individual features of 18,179 officials from 1982 to 2020, I built up an ensemble model to calculate the promotion probabilities of the previo…
Economic compensation for elite dismissals in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Chinese provincial officials
Party Adaptation Strategies for Provincial Standing Committees in Post-Mao China
The Chinese Communist Party has been surprisingly successful in carrying out its plans in the face of various challenges in the post-Mao era. Compared to their central counterparts, the operating patterns of local institutions in tackling such difficulties have been less examined. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the party’s management of provincial standing committees (PSCs). As the highest level of local collective leadership, the …
Locking in fair weather friends: Assessing the fate of Chinese communist elite when their patrons fall from power
A growing literature shows robust evidence that patronage by high-level politicians greatly enhanced officials’ chance of promotion in the largest one-party dictatorship in the world, China. There have been few works on whether patrons’ exits, even when they were retirements, had an impact on followers’ career prospects. This question concerns the core theoretical issue of whether factional ties are self-reinforcing mechanisms. That is, patron–cl…
Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Factions in the Reform Period
The literature on faction suggests that patrons in the party may recruit faction members on the basis of a broad range of shared traits and experience. Some scholars argue reasonably that with increasing specialization of officials, factions are increasingly dominated by those with shared work experience in a set of bureaucracies. Although this trend may be true in general, senior leaders may still recruit those with whom they share birth place a…
Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Factions in the Reform Period
The literature on faction suggests that patrons in the party may recruit faction members on the basis of a broad range of shared traits and experience. Some scholars argue reasonably that with increasing specialization of officials, factions are increasingly dominated by those with shared work experience in a set of bureaucracies. Although this trend may be true in general, senior leaders may still recruit those with whom they share birth place a…
Locking in fair weather friends: Assessing the fate of Chinese communist elite when their patrons fall from power
A growing literature shows robust evidence that patronage by high-level politicians greatly enhanced officials’ chance of promotion in the largest one-party dictatorship in the world, China. There have been few works on whether patrons’ exits, even when they were retirements, had an impact on followers’ career prospects. This question concerns the core theoretical issue of whether factional ties are self-reinforcing mechanisms. That is, patron–cl…
Machine-learning applications to authoritarian selections: The case of China
Elite selection in China has drawn significant attention given the importance of the country. Instead of relying on qualitative assessments from historical and personal insights, this study utilized machine-learning techniques to evaluate the promotion prospects of Chinese elites. By incorporating over 251 individual features of 18,179 officials from 1982 to 2020, I built up an ensemble model to calculate the promotion probabilities of the previo…
Economic compensation for elite dismissals in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Chinese provincial officials
Party Adaptation Strategies for Provincial Standing Committees in Post-Mao China
The Chinese Communist Party has been surprisingly successful in carrying out its plans in the face of various challenges in the post-Mao era. Compared to their central counterparts, the operating patterns of local institutions in tackling such difficulties have been less examined. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the party’s management of provincial standing committees (PSCs). As the highest level of local collective leadership, the …
Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Factions in the Reform Period
The literature on faction suggests that patrons in the party may recruit faction members on the basis of a broad range of shared traits and experience. Some scholars argue reasonably that with increasing specialization of officials, factions are increasingly dominated by those with shared work experience in a set of bureaucracies. Although this trend may be true in general, senior leaders may still recruit those with whom they share birth place a…
Locking in fair weather friends: Assessing the fate of Chinese communist elite when their patrons fall from power
A growing literature shows robust evidence that patronage by high-level politicians greatly enhanced officials’ chance of promotion in the largest one-party dictatorship in the world, China. There have been few works on whether patrons’ exits, even when they were retirements, had an impact on followers’ career prospects. This question concerns the core theoretical issue of whether factional ties are self-reinforcing mechanisms. That is, patron–cl…
Party Adaptation Strategies for Provincial Standing Committees in Post-Mao China
The Chinese Communist Party has been surprisingly successful in carrying out its plans in the face of various challenges in the post-Mao era. Compared to their central counterparts, the operating patterns of local institutions in tackling such difficulties have been less examined. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the party’s management of provincial standing committees (PSCs). As the highest level of local collective leadership, the …
Machine-learning applications to authoritarian selections: The case of China
Elite selection in China has drawn significant attention given the importance of the country. Instead of relying on qualitative assessments from historical and personal insights, this study utilized machine-learning techniques to evaluate the promotion prospects of Chinese elites. By incorporating over 251 individual features of 18,179 officials from 1982 to 2020, I built up an ensemble model to calculate the promotion probabilities of the previo…
Economic compensation for elite dismissals in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Chinese provincial officials
Limited Power-Sharing in a Personalized Regime: Xi Jinping’s Strategic Retreat from Local Politics
In an authoritarian regime, the ruler faces a fundamental dilemma whereby the concentration of power increases the likelihood of subordinates distrusting the ruler. This study examines how Xi Jinping in China addresses this dilemma by sharing access-to-power positions with his central subordinates. By analyzing the promotion patterns of provincial officials from 1992 to 2021, this paper identifies Xi’s attempts to personalize provincial leadershi…
Who Represses? Career Incentives and the Geography of Repression in China
Incentivized Inequality: Career Incentives and Investment Allocation in China
China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · China (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Business (3 works)