Timothy M Lapira
Biographic Data
| ID | 4122746 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Timothy M Lapira |
| GIVEN NAMES | Timothy M |
| FAMILY NAME | Lapira |
| SIGNATURE | LAPIRA T M |
| AFFILIATIONS | James Madison University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1203-7439 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 153 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Conflating Lobbying and PACs: The Surprisingly Low Overlap in Organizational Lobbying and Campaign Expenditures
This article investigates whether campaign contributions and lobbying are complementary, substitutive, or distinct forms of organizational political engagement. Our study reveals minimal overlap between organizations that engage in lobbying and those that make campaign contributions despite the perception that these activities are interchangeable forms of “money in politics.” Using comprehensive contribution and lobbying report data from 1998 to …
The people think what I think: False consensus and unelected elite misperception of public opinion
Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection‐motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alte…
More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress
Campaign donors and corporate interests have greater access to Congress, and the legislative agenda and policy outcomes reflect their preferences. How this privileged access converts into influence remains unclear because petitioner-legislator interactions are unobserved. In this article, we report the results of an original survey experiment of 436 congressional staffers. The vignette manipulates a petitioner’s identity, the substance of the req…
Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity among Congressional Offices
Since the 1990s, members of the US House have shifted resources away from legislative functions to representational activities. We reveal this decline using an original dataset constructed from 236,000 quarterly payroll disbursements by 1,090 member offices for 120,000 unique staff between the 103rd and 113th Congresses, as well as interviews with former members and staff in Congress. These data allow us to test two plausible alternative explanat…
The lobbying disclosure act at 25: Challenges and opportunities for analysis
Gender Politics in the Lobbying Profession
Although political scientists have increasingly focused on the role of gender in the policy process and the characteristics of individual lobbyists, little is known about the gender politics of the government relations profession. We extend the study of professional women to the unique political context of Washington, DC, lobbying, an important form of political participation that is understudied in terms of gender. Using data from more than 25,0…
The partisan ties of lobbying firms
This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms’ partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority…
Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, Private Influence, and the Unequal Representation of Interests
In recent decades Washington has seen an alarming rise in the number of "revolving door lobbyists" - politicians and officials cashing in on their government experience to become influence peddlers on K Street. These lobbyists, popular wisdom suggests, sell access to the highest bidder. Revolving Door Lobbying tells a different, more nuanced story. As an insider interviewed in the book observes, where the general public has the "impression that l…
How many lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow lobbying and the gray market for policy advocacy
The two worlds of lobbying: Washington lobbyists in the core and on the periphery
Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation
Lobbying after 9/11: Policy Regime Emergence and Interest Group Mobilization
Does the emergence of a new boundary‐spanning policy regime shift the focus of well‐established organized interests, or does it mobilize new ones? In this article, I show that interest groups with a presence inWashington before 9/11 rapidly—but temporarily—shift their attention to the homeland security issues. Established groups' entrenchment in antecedent subsystems appears to buffer against widespread policy disruption and interest upheaval. Ho…
Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation
Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity among Congressional Offices
Since the 1990s, members of the US House have shifted resources away from legislative functions to representational activities. We reveal this decline using an original dataset constructed from 236,000 quarterly payroll disbursements by 1,090 member offices for 120,000 unique staff between the 103rd and 113th Congresses, as well as interviews with former members and staff in Congress. These data allow us to test two plausible alternative explanat…
The two worlds of lobbying: Washington lobbyists in the core and on the periphery
How many lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow lobbying and the gray market for policy advocacy
More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress
Campaign donors and corporate interests have greater access to Congress, and the legislative agenda and policy outcomes reflect their preferences. How this privileged access converts into influence remains unclear because petitioner-legislator interactions are unobserved. In this article, we report the results of an original survey experiment of 436 congressional staffers. The vignette manipulates a petitioner’s identity, the substance of the req…
Gender Politics in the Lobbying Profession
Although political scientists have increasingly focused on the role of gender in the policy process and the characteristics of individual lobbyists, little is known about the gender politics of the government relations profession. We extend the study of professional women to the unique political context of Washington, DC, lobbying, an important form of political participation that is understudied in terms of gender. Using data from more than 25,0…
Lobbying after 9/11: Policy Regime Emergence and Interest Group Mobilization
Does the emergence of a new boundary‐spanning policy regime shift the focus of well‐established organized interests, or does it mobilize new ones? In this article, I show that interest groups with a presence inWashington before 9/11 rapidly—but temporarily—shift their attention to the homeland security issues. Established groups' entrenchment in antecedent subsystems appears to buffer against widespread policy disruption and interest upheaval. Ho…
The partisan ties of lobbying firms
This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms’ partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority…
The lobbying disclosure act at 25: Challenges and opportunities for analysis
The people think what I think: False consensus and unelected elite misperception of public opinion
Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection‐motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alte…
The two worlds of lobbying: Washington lobbyists in the core and on the periphery
Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation
Lobbying after 9/11: Policy Regime Emergence and Interest Group Mobilization
Does the emergence of a new boundary‐spanning policy regime shift the focus of well‐established organized interests, or does it mobilize new ones? In this article, I show that interest groups with a presence inWashington before 9/11 rapidly—but temporarily—shift their attention to the homeland security issues. Established groups' entrenchment in antecedent subsystems appears to buffer against widespread policy disruption and interest upheaval. Ho…
Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, Private Influence, and the Unequal Representation of Interests
In recent decades Washington has seen an alarming rise in the number of "revolving door lobbyists" - politicians and officials cashing in on their government experience to become influence peddlers on K Street. These lobbyists, popular wisdom suggests, sell access to the highest bidder. Revolving Door Lobbying tells a different, more nuanced story. As an insider interviewed in the book observes, where the general public has the "impression that l…
How many lobbyists are in Washington? Shadow lobbying and the gray market for policy advocacy
The partisan ties of lobbying firms
This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms’ partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority…
The lobbying disclosure act at 25: Challenges and opportunities for analysis
Gender Politics in the Lobbying Profession
Although political scientists have increasingly focused on the role of gender in the policy process and the characteristics of individual lobbyists, little is known about the gender politics of the government relations profession. We extend the study of professional women to the unique political context of Washington, DC, lobbying, an important form of political participation that is understudied in terms of gender. Using data from more than 25,0…
Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity among Congressional Offices
Since the 1990s, members of the US House have shifted resources away from legislative functions to representational activities. We reveal this decline using an original dataset constructed from 236,000 quarterly payroll disbursements by 1,090 member offices for 120,000 unique staff between the 103rd and 113th Congresses, as well as interviews with former members and staff in Congress. These data allow us to test two plausible alternative explanat…
More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress
Campaign donors and corporate interests have greater access to Congress, and the legislative agenda and policy outcomes reflect their preferences. How this privileged access converts into influence remains unclear because petitioner-legislator interactions are unobserved. In this article, we report the results of an original survey experiment of 436 congressional staffers. The vignette manipulates a petitioner’s identity, the substance of the req…
The people think what I think: False consensus and unelected elite misperception of public opinion
Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection‐motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alte…
Conflating Lobbying and PACs: The Surprisingly Low Overlap in Organizational Lobbying and Campaign Expenditures
This article investigates whether campaign contributions and lobbying are complementary, substitutive, or distinct forms of organizational political engagement. Our study reveals minimal overlap between organizations that engage in lobbying and those that make campaign contributions despite the perception that these activities are interchangeable forms of “money in politics.” Using comprehensive contribution and lobbying report data from 1998 to …
Law (11 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (11 works) · Political science (11 works) · Law (10 works) · Politics (10 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering (6 works) · Public relations (6 works) · Government (linguistics (5 works)