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Ian Ostrander

Dados Biográficos

ID4123772
NOMEIan Ostrander
PRENOMESIan
SOBRENOMEOstrander
ASSINATURAOSTRANDER I
AFILIAÇÕESMichigan State University
ORCID0000-0001-5248-1780
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS23
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES139
TOTAL COMO AUTOR23
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO2012
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2026
ÍNDICE H8
  • President Biden and Diversity in Executive Appointments

    Open Access•Iliya Liampert, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2026•Referências: 46

    The representativeness of decision-making bodies relative to the population governed is a crucial factor for legitimacy. Most often, this principle is applied to elected bodies, but it equally pertains to appointed public officials. American presidents nominate individuals to lead executive bureaucracies that, in turn, influence and implement policy. However, in order to serve in these positions, nominees must pass through the constitutionally re…

  • Ungoverning

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2025

  • Anchoring or Expanding? Gender and Judicial Nominations

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Jessica A Schoenherr et al.•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2025•Citada por: 9•Referências: 63

    Since both parties committed to adding women to the federal bench in the 1970s, Democratic and Republican presidents have sought out qualified women for judgeships. Diversifying the bench offers symbolic and substantive benefits to both parties, but those benefits come at the cost of finding non-traditional nominees. Presidents can take one of two different approaches to diversification: maintain existing diversity by anchoring women to a seat, o…

  • Quick to Judge? Confirmation by Cloture in the Post-Nuclear Senate

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2025•Referências: 58

    The 2013 Senate rules change transformed the judicial confirmation process by lowering the effective vote threshold for success. Presidents with supportive Senate majorities may now bypass filibusters and confirm nominees without any minority party votes. The change influences how nominations proceed, the speed of confirmation, success rates, and ultimately the composition of every federal court. We must now reevaluate existing intuitions. Using …

  • Analyzing arguments in executive veto messages

    Open Access•Joshua Koss, Ian Ostrander et al.•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 23

    The executive veto is one of the most important instruments of presidential power within the legislative arena. Because of constitutional requirements, every regular veto and many pocket vetoes are accompanied by a short letter to Congress from the president describing—often in detail—the reasoning behind the decision to veto. As such, these messages form a unique window into interbranch and partisan conflict over time. While analyses have been c…

  • Presidential Strategies in Statements of Administration Policy

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2022•Citada por: 4•Referências: 26

    Presidents routinely employ Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) to inform Congress about the executive's thoughts and position on pending legislation. Such statements are used for a variety of purposes, including bill promotion, suggesting changes, issuing veto threats, and addressing perceived threats to traditional powers. While SAPs have been identified as an important vehicle for interbranch communication and a key source of insight in…

  • Prioritizing Judicial Nominations after Presidential Transitions

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 4•Referências: 23

    New presidents now commonly inherit a backlog of judicial vacancies. Lifetime judicial appointments provide presidents with lasting policy influence, but time and energy are rarely more valuable than after transitions while the selection and vetting of new judicial nominations are costly. Attempting to alter the ideological character of the courts could yield opposition that further increases the cost of each nomination. How then do new president…

  • Presidential Communication During the Legislative Process

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 36

    Objective Presidents routinely employ public statements to inform Congress about their position on pending legislation. Position‐taking is strategic, with presidents choosing whether, how, how often, and when to intervene. We move beyond the traditional dichotomies of issuance and position to explore the timing and frequency of presidential position‐taking during the lawmaking process. Method We use Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)–bill…

  • Presidents Abroad

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, Toby J Rider•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2019•Citada por: 14•Referências: 40

    A president’s most precious commodity is time, and nowhere is this scarcity more apparent than with respect to international travel. Personal presidential involvement in diplomatic relations has proven to yield significant benefits, and yet traveling to engage in face-to-face diplomacy is often prohibitively expensive for American executives in time and attention. Given such restrictions, when and where do presidents choose to travel? We use a da…

  • Chafetz, Josh. Congress's Constitution

    Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2017

    Chafetz, Josh. Congress's Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers." Congress & the Presidency, 45(1), pp. 111–112

  • Constraining Presidential Ambition

    Open Access•James Sievert, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2017•Citada por: 10•Referências: 30

    Although signing statements have been touted as a powerful addition to the president's toolkit, their use has dropped off considerably in recent years. We argue that this decrease can be explained by the changing costs of using signing statements. In particular, we posit that Congress' response to signing statements, which included committee hearings on the use of signing statements, raised the costs of this tool above any potential benefits. Inv…

  • No vacancy

    Open Access•Anthony Madonna, Anthony J Madonna et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2017•Citada por: 3•Referências: 28

    Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a…

  • The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

    Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2017•Citada por: 5•Referências: 16

    In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance …

  • The Logic of Collective Inaction

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2016•Citada por: 25•Referências: 30

    While most executive nominees are successfully confirmed, this success masks wide variation in how long it takes the Senate to decide. Delay of critical nominees influences the character and effectiveness of agencies while hampering the policy ambitions of presidents. The exact logic of which nominees are targeted for delay and why, however, remains difficult to uncover. Building on prior literature, this project suggests that delay can be used t…

  • The Value of Time in the US Senate

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2015•Referências: 1

    An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button

  • The Contemporary Presidency

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2015•Citada por: 9•Referências: 10

    While established in the Constitution as a means of filling key posts during long gaps between legislative sessions, recess appointments have recently become a common and essential tool for bypassing procedural hurdles in the Senate and maintaining adequate staffing in federal bureaucracies. Despite being ubiquitous in the past three decades, recess appointments may now be relegated to the status of constitutional relics. This development is due …

  • Presidential Signing Statements and the Durability of the Law

    Ian Ostrander, James Sievert et al.•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2014•Citada por: 5•Referências: 37

    Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to unilaterally move policy closer to their own ideal point after Congress has already voted on and passed a particular bill. Congress, however, retains the ability to revisit and amend the law by passing another bill. A presidential signing statement may thus make a law less durable and more likely to be amended in the future. To investigate this relationship, we examine all laws p…

  • What's So Sinister about Presidential Signing Statements

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 8•Referências: 14

    Presidential signing statements, especially “constitutional” ones, have been characterized as line‐item vetoes and a general abuse of power. But are signing statements so sinister? We suggest that the popular unilateral powers framework, as applied to signing statements, is inappropriate and that signing statements of all types function more like a dialogue with Congress. Using content analysis of all signing statements from 1977 to 2010, we demo…

  • Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S . S enate

    Open Access•Stephanie S Smith, Steven S Smith et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 17•Referências: 15

    While the metaphor of H ouse parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the S enate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the S enate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agen…

  • The Logic of Presidential Signing Statements

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 22•Referências: 16

    Signing statements constitute a salient executive power that has recently captured scholarly and political attention. Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to gain additional policy concessions from Congress. Evidence of policy motivations are, however, difficult to demonstrate and policy motives fail to explain a wide range of existing statements. The authors propose an additional incentive mechanism based on defending…

  • Coming in the Next Issue

    Open Access•J Robinson, Brett Carter et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2012

    A preview of some of the articles in the April 2012 issue

  • Oil Crises and Policy Continuity

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, William R Lowry•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy History•2012•Citada por: 2•Referências: 7

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • White House Politics and the Environment

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2012

  • The Logic of Collective Inaction

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2016•Citada por: 25•Referências: 30

    While most executive nominees are successfully confirmed, this success masks wide variation in how long it takes the Senate to decide. Delay of critical nominees influences the character and effectiveness of agencies while hampering the policy ambitions of presidents. The exact logic of which nominees are targeted for delay and why, however, remains difficult to uncover. Building on prior literature, this project suggests that delay can be used t…

  • The Logic of Presidential Signing Statements

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 22•Referências: 16

    Signing statements constitute a salient executive power that has recently captured scholarly and political attention. Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to gain additional policy concessions from Congress. Evidence of policy motivations are, however, difficult to demonstrate and policy motives fail to explain a wide range of existing statements. The authors propose an additional incentive mechanism based on defending…

  • Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S . S enate

    Open Access•Stephanie S Smith, Steven S Smith et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 17•Referências: 15

    While the metaphor of H ouse parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the S enate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the S enate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agen…

  • Presidents Abroad

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, Toby J Rider•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2019•Citada por: 14•Referências: 40

    A president’s most precious commodity is time, and nowhere is this scarcity more apparent than with respect to international travel. Personal presidential involvement in diplomatic relations has proven to yield significant benefits, and yet traveling to engage in face-to-face diplomacy is often prohibitively expensive for American executives in time and attention. Given such restrictions, when and where do presidents choose to travel? We use a da…

  • Constraining Presidential Ambition

    Open Access•James Sievert, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2017•Citada por: 10•Referências: 30

    Although signing statements have been touted as a powerful addition to the president's toolkit, their use has dropped off considerably in recent years. We argue that this decrease can be explained by the changing costs of using signing statements. In particular, we posit that Congress' response to signing statements, which included committee hearings on the use of signing statements, raised the costs of this tool above any potential benefits. Inv…

  • Anchoring or Expanding? Gender and Judicial Nominations

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Jessica A Schoenherr et al.•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2025•Citada por: 9•Referências: 63

    Since both parties committed to adding women to the federal bench in the 1970s, Democratic and Republican presidents have sought out qualified women for judgeships. Diversifying the bench offers symbolic and substantive benefits to both parties, but those benefits come at the cost of finding non-traditional nominees. Presidents can take one of two different approaches to diversification: maintain existing diversity by anchoring women to a seat, o…

  • The Contemporary Presidency

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2015•Citada por: 9•Referências: 10

    While established in the Constitution as a means of filling key posts during long gaps between legislative sessions, recess appointments have recently become a common and essential tool for bypassing procedural hurdles in the Senate and maintaining adequate staffing in federal bureaucracies. Despite being ubiquitous in the past three decades, recess appointments may now be relegated to the status of constitutional relics. This development is due …

  • What's So Sinister about Presidential Signing Statements

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 8•Referências: 14

    Presidential signing statements, especially “constitutional” ones, have been characterized as line‐item vetoes and a general abuse of power. But are signing statements so sinister? We suggest that the popular unilateral powers framework, as applied to signing statements, is inappropriate and that signing statements of all types function more like a dialogue with Congress. Using content analysis of all signing statements from 1977 to 2010, we demo…

  • The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

    Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2017•Citada por: 5•Referências: 16

    In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance …

  • Presidential Signing Statements and the Durability of the Law

    Ian Ostrander, James Sievert et al.•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2014•Citada por: 5•Referências: 37

    Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to unilaterally move policy closer to their own ideal point after Congress has already voted on and passed a particular bill. Congress, however, retains the ability to revisit and amend the law by passing another bill. A presidential signing statement may thus make a law less durable and more likely to be amended in the future. To investigate this relationship, we examine all laws p…

  • Presidential Strategies in Statements of Administration Policy

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2022•Citada por: 4•Referências: 26

    Presidents routinely employ Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) to inform Congress about the executive's thoughts and position on pending legislation. Such statements are used for a variety of purposes, including bill promotion, suggesting changes, issuing veto threats, and addressing perceived threats to traditional powers. While SAPs have been identified as an important vehicle for interbranch communication and a key source of insight in…

  • Prioritizing Judicial Nominations after Presidential Transitions

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 4•Referências: 23

    New presidents now commonly inherit a backlog of judicial vacancies. Lifetime judicial appointments provide presidents with lasting policy influence, but time and energy are rarely more valuable than after transitions while the selection and vetting of new judicial nominations are costly. Attempting to alter the ideological character of the courts could yield opposition that further increases the cost of each nomination. How then do new president…

  • No vacancy

    Open Access•Anthony Madonna, Anthony J Madonna et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2017•Citada por: 3•Referências: 28

    Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a…

  • Oil Crises and Policy Continuity

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, William R Lowry•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy History•2012•Citada por: 2•Referências: 7

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Analyzing arguments in executive veto messages

    Open Access•Joshua Koss, Ian Ostrander et al.•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 23

    The executive veto is one of the most important instruments of presidential power within the legislative arena. Because of constitutional requirements, every regular veto and many pocket vetoes are accompanied by a short letter to Congress from the president describing—often in detail—the reasoning behind the decision to veto. As such, these messages form a unique window into interbranch and partisan conflict over time. While analyses have been c…

  • Presidential Communication During the Legislative Process

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 36

    Objective Presidents routinely employ public statements to inform Congress about their position on pending legislation. Position‐taking is strategic, with presidents choosing whether, how, how often, and when to intervene. We move beyond the traditional dichotomies of issuance and position to explore the timing and frequency of presidential position‐taking during the lawmaking process. Method We use Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)–bill…

  • Coming in the Next Issue

    Open Access•J Robinson, Brett Carter et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2012

    A preview of some of the articles in the April 2012 issue

  • Oil Crises and Policy Continuity

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, William R Lowry•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy History•2012•Citada por: 2•Referências: 7

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • White House Politics and the Environment

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2012

  • What's So Sinister about Presidential Signing Statements

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 8•Referências: 14

    Presidential signing statements, especially “constitutional” ones, have been characterized as line‐item vetoes and a general abuse of power. But are signing statements so sinister? We suggest that the popular unilateral powers framework, as applied to signing statements, is inappropriate and that signing statements of all types function more like a dialogue with Congress. Using content analysis of all signing statements from 1977 to 2010, we demo…

  • Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S . S enate

    Open Access•Stephanie S Smith, Steven S Smith et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 17•Referências: 15

    While the metaphor of H ouse parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the S enate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the S enate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agen…

  • The Logic of Presidential Signing Statements

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2013•Citada por: 22•Referências: 16

    Signing statements constitute a salient executive power that has recently captured scholarly and political attention. Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to gain additional policy concessions from Congress. Evidence of policy motivations are, however, difficult to demonstrate and policy motives fail to explain a wide range of existing statements. The authors propose an additional incentive mechanism based on defending…

  • Presidential Signing Statements and the Durability of the Law

    Ian Ostrander, James Sievert et al.•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2014•Citada por: 5•Referências: 37

    Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to unilaterally move policy closer to their own ideal point after Congress has already voted on and passed a particular bill. Congress, however, retains the ability to revisit and amend the law by passing another bill. A presidential signing statement may thus make a law less durable and more likely to be amended in the future. To investigate this relationship, we examine all laws p…

  • The Value of Time in the US Senate

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2015•Referências: 1

    An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button

  • The Contemporary Presidency

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2015•Citada por: 9•Referências: 10

    While established in the Constitution as a means of filling key posts during long gaps between legislative sessions, recess appointments have recently become a common and essential tool for bypassing procedural hurdles in the Senate and maintaining adequate staffing in federal bureaucracies. Despite being ubiquitous in the past three decades, recess appointments may now be relegated to the status of constitutional relics. This development is due …

  • The Logic of Collective Inaction

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2016•Citada por: 25•Referências: 30

    While most executive nominees are successfully confirmed, this success masks wide variation in how long it takes the Senate to decide. Delay of critical nominees influences the character and effectiveness of agencies while hampering the policy ambitions of presidents. The exact logic of which nominees are targeted for delay and why, however, remains difficult to uncover. Building on prior literature, this project suggests that delay can be used t…

  • Chafetz, Josh. Congress's Constitution

    Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2017

    Chafetz, Josh. Congress's Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers." Congress & the Presidency, 45(1), pp. 111–112

  • Constraining Presidential Ambition

    Open Access•James Sievert, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2017•Citada por: 10•Referências: 30

    Although signing statements have been touted as a powerful addition to the president's toolkit, their use has dropped off considerably in recent years. We argue that this decrease can be explained by the changing costs of using signing statements. In particular, we posit that Congress' response to signing statements, which included committee hearings on the use of signing statements, raised the costs of this tool above any potential benefits. Inv…

  • No vacancy

    Open Access•Anthony Madonna, Anthony J Madonna et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Public Policy•2017•Citada por: 3•Referências: 28

    Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a…

  • The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

    Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2017•Citada por: 5•Referências: 16

    In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance …

  • Presidents Abroad

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, Toby J Rider•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2019•Citada por: 14•Referências: 40

    A president’s most precious commodity is time, and nowhere is this scarcity more apparent than with respect to international travel. Personal presidential involvement in diplomatic relations has proven to yield significant benefits, and yet traveling to engage in face-to-face diplomacy is often prohibitively expensive for American executives in time and attention. Given such restrictions, when and where do presidents choose to travel? We use a da…

  • Prioritizing Judicial Nominations after Presidential Transitions

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 4•Referências: 23

    New presidents now commonly inherit a backlog of judicial vacancies. Lifetime judicial appointments provide presidents with lasting policy influence, but time and energy are rarely more valuable than after transitions while the selection and vetting of new judicial nominations are costly. Attempting to alter the ideological character of the courts could yield opposition that further increases the cost of each nomination. How then do new president…

  • Presidential Communication During the Legislative Process

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Social Science Quarterly•2020•Citada por: 1•Referências: 36

    Objective Presidents routinely employ public statements to inform Congress about their position on pending legislation. Position‐taking is strategic, with presidents choosing whether, how, how often, and when to intervene. We move beyond the traditional dichotomies of issuance and position to explore the timing and frequency of presidential position‐taking during the lawmaking process. Method We use Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs)–bill…

  • Presidential Strategies in Statements of Administration Policy

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander, James Sievert•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2022•Citada por: 4•Referências: 26

    Presidents routinely employ Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) to inform Congress about the executive's thoughts and position on pending legislation. Such statements are used for a variety of purposes, including bill promotion, suggesting changes, issuing veto threats, and addressing perceived threats to traditional powers. While SAPs have been identified as an important vehicle for interbranch communication and a key source of insight in…

  • Analyzing arguments in executive veto messages

    Open Access•Joshua Koss, Ian Ostrander et al.•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 23

    The executive veto is one of the most important instruments of presidential power within the legislative arena. Because of constitutional requirements, every regular veto and many pocket vetoes are accompanied by a short letter to Congress from the president describing—often in detail—the reasoning behind the decision to veto. As such, these messages form a unique window into interbranch and partisan conflict over time. While analyses have been c…

  • Ungoverning

    Open Access•Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2025

  • Anchoring or Expanding? Gender and Judicial Nominations

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Jessica A Schoenherr et al.•ARTICLE•Political Research Quarterly•2025•Citada por: 9•Referências: 63

    Since both parties committed to adding women to the federal bench in the 1970s, Democratic and Republican presidents have sought out qualified women for judgeships. Diversifying the bench offers symbolic and substantive benefits to both parties, but those benefits come at the cost of finding non-traditional nominees. Presidents can take one of two different approaches to diversification: maintain existing diversity by anchoring women to a seat, o…

  • Quick to Judge? Confirmation by Cloture in the Post-Nuclear Senate

    Open Access•Jonathan M King, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2025•Referências: 58

    The 2013 Senate rules change transformed the judicial confirmation process by lowering the effective vote threshold for success. Presidents with supportive Senate majorities may now bypass filibusters and confirm nominees without any minority party votes. The change influences how nominations proceed, the speed of confirmation, success rates, and ultimately the composition of every federal court. We must now reevaluate existing intuitions. Using …

  • President Biden and Diversity in Executive Appointments

    Open Access•Iliya Liampert, Ian Ostrander•ARTICLE•American Politics Research•2026•Referências: 46

    The representativeness of decision-making bodies relative to the population governed is a crucial factor for legitimacy. Most often, this principle is applied to elected bodies, but it equally pertains to appointed public officials. American presidents nominate individuals to lead executive bureaucracies that, in turn, influence and implement policy. However, in order to serve in these positions, nominees must pass through the constitutionally re…

Political science (19 obras) · Law (18 obras) · Politics (18 obras) · Law (16 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (12 obras) · Law and economics (11 obras) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (10 obras) · Presidential system (10 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · Public Administration (9 obras)

Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae