Mitchel A Sollenberger
Biographic Data
| ID | 4124054 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mitchel A Sollenberger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mitchel A |
| FAMILY NAME | Sollenberger |
| SIGNATURE | SOLLENBERGER M A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Michigan–Dearborn |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Congressional Investigations and Presidential Power – An Assessment of Executive Privilege During Donald Trump’s First Term
Opposing Congress: Alternative Ways to Benefit from Executive Privilege Protections
In the U.S. constitutional system, Congress and the executive branch balance each other in exercising power from appointments to vetoes. That balance is never perfect nor is it consistent, with both Congress and the president, at times, trying to dominate. At no time is this truer than when Congress seeks executive branch information to conduct investigations. Presidents occasionally employ executive privilege to shield information from Congress …
The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government
The Law: The Unitary Executive Theory and President Donald J. Trump
The unitary executive theory first went mainstream during the George W. Bush administration as the president's justification for exercising broad executive powers. Barack Obama did not explicitly embrace the unitary executive theory, but he followed in Bush's footsteps by expanding and augmenting presidential power in new and questionable ways. President Donald J. Trump's campaign rhetoric, coupled with an early, controversial executive order on …
The Law Presidential Studies, Behavioralism, and Public Law
Since the rise of the behavioralist revolution in the 1950s and 1960s the political science discipline has struggled to find agreement on a uniform vision of the study of politics, particularly as it relates to the employment of methods. This article addresses behavioralism's influence on the decline of public law analysis in the field of presidential studies. Specifically, it focuses on the work of presidential scholars E dward C orwin and R ich…
The Origins and Development of Executive Branch Czars
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Law: President O bama's Signing Statements and the Expansion of Executive Power
Barack O bama campaigned for president of the U nited S tates on a promise of fidelity to the C onstitution and stated that he would not issue any signing statements to revise legislative intent. His vision of the presidency stood in marked contrast to President G eorge W . B ush's actions and seemed to suggest a reversal of the trend toward increased executive powers. We will analyze how and why President O bama has largely continued the unilate…
Louis Fisher: Government and the Academy
A dozen years before this PS symposium, several political scientists came together in a similar manner to honor Louis Fisher's scholarship and highlight his contributions to the discipline (Spitzer 2000). Many wonderful insights and observations were made to shed light on Fisher's versatility and impact. However, that effort missed an opportunity to highlight a key contribution of Fisher's work: a revival of pre-behavioral era functions and conce…
Obama's Executive Branch Czars: The Constitutional Controversy and a Legislative Solution
The increasingly common practice of presidential appointment of so-called executive branch czars has become especially contentious in the Obama era. Much of that controversy unfortunately is highly partisan-oriented and misses the core constitutional issues at stake. In this article, we describe and analyze the Obama-era executive branch czars controversy from a constitutional analysis framework. In so doing, we offer a working definition of exec…
The Law: Prerogative Power and Executive Branch Czars: President Obama's Signing Statement
In his April 15, 2011, signing statement President Barack Obama implied that, as president, he may suspend laws, or portions of laws, and that he is not controlled by statutory language that interferes with his ability to receive advice from White House aides or other executive branch officials. This article analyzes the claim that presidents have the prerogative to wall themselves and their aides off from statutory direction and controls, and co…
The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009
The blue-slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee is a critical part of the appointment process that gives senators a say in the evaluation of federal judicial nominations. For much of its history, a blue slip could be used by senators to stop committee action on nominations originating from their home states. However, since the late 1970s there have been various modifications to the way blue slips function that have affected their stability…
The Contemporary Presidency Executive Privilege and the U.S. Attorneys Firings
Political observers have debated whether George W. Bush's exercises of secrecy have shielded him from accountability for many of his administration's actions. In particular, the president's use of executive privilege to conceal information about the U.S. attorneys firings set off a firestorm of protest, especially among members of Congress who sought documents and testimony from White House aides. This essay describes and analyzes the president's…
The Law: The President “Shall Nominate”: Exclusive or Shared Constitutional Power
The power to nominate has often been a delicate issue to analyze. No doubt the Constitution gives to the president the ability to make formal nominations, but the question lingers as to whether or not the Senate can involve itself before that decision is made. This article examines the advice and consent clause through a constitutional, historical, and institutional perspective to address this question. Saying that the president has the final jud…
The Law: Must the Senate Take a Floor Vote on a Presidential Judicial Nominee
President George W. Bush has frequently urged the Senate to fulfill its constitutional duty and vote on his nominations to the federal courts. The administration argues that the Senate must hold up‐or‐down floor votes on all judicial nominees. Senate Democrats counter that the president is trying to short‐circuit the procedural steps of the confirmation process. Currently, both sides are waging an ideological and institutional battle over the jud…
The Law: The Unitary Executive Theory and President Donald J. Trump
The unitary executive theory first went mainstream during the George W. Bush administration as the president's justification for exercising broad executive powers. Barack Obama did not explicitly embrace the unitary executive theory, but he followed in Bush's footsteps by expanding and augmenting presidential power in new and questionable ways. President Donald J. Trump's campaign rhetoric, coupled with an early, controversial executive order on …
The Law: President O bama's Signing Statements and the Expansion of Executive Power
Barack O bama campaigned for president of the U nited S tates on a promise of fidelity to the C onstitution and stated that he would not issue any signing statements to revise legislative intent. His vision of the presidency stood in marked contrast to President G eorge W . B ush's actions and seemed to suggest a reversal of the trend toward increased executive powers. We will analyze how and why President O bama has largely continued the unilate…
The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009
The blue-slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee is a critical part of the appointment process that gives senators a say in the evaluation of federal judicial nominations. For much of its history, a blue slip could be used by senators to stop committee action on nominations originating from their home states. However, since the late 1970s there have been various modifications to the way blue slips function that have affected their stability…
Obama's Executive Branch Czars: The Constitutional Controversy and a Legislative Solution
The increasingly common practice of presidential appointment of so-called executive branch czars has become especially contentious in the Obama era. Much of that controversy unfortunately is highly partisan-oriented and misses the core constitutional issues at stake. In this article, we describe and analyze the Obama-era executive branch czars controversy from a constitutional analysis framework. In so doing, we offer a working definition of exec…
The Law Presidential Studies, Behavioralism, and Public Law
Since the rise of the behavioralist revolution in the 1950s and 1960s the political science discipline has struggled to find agreement on a uniform vision of the study of politics, particularly as it relates to the employment of methods. This article addresses behavioralism's influence on the decline of public law analysis in the field of presidential studies. Specifically, it focuses on the work of presidential scholars E dward C orwin and R ich…
The Law: The President “Shall Nominate”: Exclusive or Shared Constitutional Power
The power to nominate has often been a delicate issue to analyze. No doubt the Constitution gives to the president the ability to make formal nominations, but the question lingers as to whether or not the Senate can involve itself before that decision is made. This article examines the advice and consent clause through a constitutional, historical, and institutional perspective to address this question. Saying that the president has the final jud…
Opposing Congress: Alternative Ways to Benefit from Executive Privilege Protections
In the U.S. constitutional system, Congress and the executive branch balance each other in exercising power from appointments to vetoes. That balance is never perfect nor is it consistent, with both Congress and the president, at times, trying to dominate. At no time is this truer than when Congress seeks executive branch information to conduct investigations. Presidents occasionally employ executive privilege to shield information from Congress …
Louis Fisher: Government and the Academy
A dozen years before this PS symposium, several political scientists came together in a similar manner to honor Louis Fisher's scholarship and highlight his contributions to the discipline (Spitzer 2000). Many wonderful insights and observations were made to shed light on Fisher's versatility and impact. However, that effort missed an opportunity to highlight a key contribution of Fisher's work: a revival of pre-behavioral era functions and conce…
The Law: Prerogative Power and Executive Branch Czars: President Obama's Signing Statement
In his April 15, 2011, signing statement President Barack Obama implied that, as president, he may suspend laws, or portions of laws, and that he is not controlled by statutory language that interferes with his ability to receive advice from White House aides or other executive branch officials. This article analyzes the claim that presidents have the prerogative to wall themselves and their aides off from statutory direction and controls, and co…
The Contemporary Presidency Executive Privilege and the U.S. Attorneys Firings
Political observers have debated whether George W. Bush's exercises of secrecy have shielded him from accountability for many of his administration's actions. In particular, the president's use of executive privilege to conceal information about the U.S. attorneys firings set off a firestorm of protest, especially among members of Congress who sought documents and testimony from White House aides. This essay describes and analyzes the president's…
The Law: Must the Senate Take a Floor Vote on a Presidential Judicial Nominee
President George W. Bush has frequently urged the Senate to fulfill its constitutional duty and vote on his nominations to the federal courts. The administration argues that the Senate must hold up‐or‐down floor votes on all judicial nominees. Senate Democrats counter that the president is trying to short‐circuit the procedural steps of the confirmation process. Currently, both sides are waging an ideological and institutional battle over the jud…
The Law: Must the Senate Take a Floor Vote on a Presidential Judicial Nominee
President George W. Bush has frequently urged the Senate to fulfill its constitutional duty and vote on his nominations to the federal courts. The administration argues that the Senate must hold up‐or‐down floor votes on all judicial nominees. Senate Democrats counter that the president is trying to short‐circuit the procedural steps of the confirmation process. Currently, both sides are waging an ideological and institutional battle over the jud…
The Law: The President “Shall Nominate”: Exclusive or Shared Constitutional Power
The power to nominate has often been a delicate issue to analyze. No doubt the Constitution gives to the president the ability to make formal nominations, but the question lingers as to whether or not the Senate can involve itself before that decision is made. This article examines the advice and consent clause through a constitutional, historical, and institutional perspective to address this question. Saying that the president has the final jud…
The Contemporary Presidency Executive Privilege and the U.S. Attorneys Firings
Political observers have debated whether George W. Bush's exercises of secrecy have shielded him from accountability for many of his administration's actions. In particular, the president's use of executive privilege to conceal information about the U.S. attorneys firings set off a firestorm of protest, especially among members of Congress who sought documents and testimony from White House aides. This essay describes and analyzes the president's…
The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009
The blue-slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee is a critical part of the appointment process that gives senators a say in the evaluation of federal judicial nominations. For much of its history, a blue slip could be used by senators to stop committee action on nominations originating from their home states. However, since the late 1970s there have been various modifications to the way blue slips function that have affected their stability…
The Law: Prerogative Power and Executive Branch Czars: President Obama's Signing Statement
In his April 15, 2011, signing statement President Barack Obama implied that, as president, he may suspend laws, or portions of laws, and that he is not controlled by statutory language that interferes with his ability to receive advice from White House aides or other executive branch officials. This article analyzes the claim that presidents have the prerogative to wall themselves and their aides off from statutory direction and controls, and co…
Obama's Executive Branch Czars: The Constitutional Controversy and a Legislative Solution
The increasingly common practice of presidential appointment of so-called executive branch czars has become especially contentious in the Obama era. Much of that controversy unfortunately is highly partisan-oriented and misses the core constitutional issues at stake. In this article, we describe and analyze the Obama-era executive branch czars controversy from a constitutional analysis framework. In so doing, we offer a working definition of exec…
The Origins and Development of Executive Branch Czars
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Law: President O bama's Signing Statements and the Expansion of Executive Power
Barack O bama campaigned for president of the U nited S tates on a promise of fidelity to the C onstitution and stated that he would not issue any signing statements to revise legislative intent. His vision of the presidency stood in marked contrast to President G eorge W . B ush's actions and seemed to suggest a reversal of the trend toward increased executive powers. We will analyze how and why President O bama has largely continued the unilate…
Louis Fisher: Government and the Academy
A dozen years before this PS symposium, several political scientists came together in a similar manner to honor Louis Fisher's scholarship and highlight his contributions to the discipline (Spitzer 2000). Many wonderful insights and observations were made to shed light on Fisher's versatility and impact. However, that effort missed an opportunity to highlight a key contribution of Fisher's work: a revival of pre-behavioral era functions and conce…
The Law Presidential Studies, Behavioralism, and Public Law
Since the rise of the behavioralist revolution in the 1950s and 1960s the political science discipline has struggled to find agreement on a uniform vision of the study of politics, particularly as it relates to the employment of methods. This article addresses behavioralism's influence on the decline of public law analysis in the field of presidential studies. Specifically, it focuses on the work of presidential scholars E dward C orwin and R ich…
The Law: The Unitary Executive Theory and President Donald J. Trump
The unitary executive theory first went mainstream during the George W. Bush administration as the president's justification for exercising broad executive powers. Barack Obama did not explicitly embrace the unitary executive theory, but he followed in Bush's footsteps by expanding and augmenting presidential power in new and questionable ways. President Donald J. Trump's campaign rhetoric, coupled with an early, controversial executive order on …
The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government
Congressional Investigations and Presidential Power – An Assessment of Executive Privilege During Donald Trump’s First Term
Opposing Congress: Alternative Ways to Benefit from Executive Privilege Protections
In the U.S. constitutional system, Congress and the executive branch balance each other in exercising power from appointments to vetoes. That balance is never perfect nor is it consistent, with both Congress and the president, at times, trying to dominate. At no time is this truer than when Congress seeks executive branch information to conduct investigations. Presidents occasionally employ executive privilege to shield information from Congress …
Political science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Politics (11 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (6 works) · Law, Rights, and Freedoms (6 works) · Presidential system (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Executive branch (5 works) · Power (physics (5 works)