Ron Gurantz
Biographic Data
| ID | 4134737 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ron Gurantz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ron |
| FAMILY NAME | Gurantz |
| SIGNATURE | GURANTZ R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Air War College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Symbolic Communication and Cross-Domain Deterrence
New military technologies in space and cyberspace have led to an interest in cross-domain deterrence, the threat of one type of attack to deter an attack of a different type. However, fundamental questions remain unanswered. Previous studies do not explain why threats often default to in-domain or “in-kind” retaliations or why cross-domain threats often lack credibility. In this article, I argue that “in-kind” retaliation is essentially a symboli…
The Return of Crisis Diplomacy
Does punishment work? Selection effects in air power theory
Air power theory initially proposed that punitive attacks against civilian targets could force enemies to surrender. The current literature, however, has largely concluded that conventional bombing is ineffective as punishment. I argue that this is the result of a selection effect. By focusing only on high-profile bombing campaigns, the theory has drawn its conclusions from cases where punishment is likely to fail. This contrasts with deterrence …
Was Airpower “Misapplied” in the Vietnam War? Reassessing Signaling in Operation Rolling Thunder
Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure has been widely blamed on the strategy of using force to send “signals.” It discredited the associated theory of coercion among a generation of military officers and scholars. In this paper I show that, whatever its other failures, Operation Rolling Thunder did successfully signal a threat. I rely on the latest research to demonstrate that Hanoi believed the bombing would eventually inflict massive destruction.…
Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence
Governments often fear the future intentions of their adversaries. In this article we show how this fear can make deterrent threats credible under seemingly incredible circumstances. We consider a model in which a defender seeks to deter a transgression with both intrinsic and military value. We examine how the defender’s fear of the challenger’s future belligerence affects his willingness to respond to the transgression with war. We derive condi…
Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence
Governments often fear the future intentions of their adversaries. In this article we show how this fear can make deterrent threats credible under seemingly incredible circumstances. We consider a model in which a defender seeks to deter a transgression with both intrinsic and military value. We examine how the defender’s fear of the challenger’s future belligerence affects his willingness to respond to the transgression with war. We derive condi…
Was Airpower “Misapplied” in the Vietnam War? Reassessing Signaling in Operation Rolling Thunder
Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure has been widely blamed on the strategy of using force to send “signals.” It discredited the associated theory of coercion among a generation of military officers and scholars. In this paper I show that, whatever its other failures, Operation Rolling Thunder did successfully signal a threat. I rely on the latest research to demonstrate that Hanoi believed the bombing would eventually inflict massive destruction.…
Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence
Governments often fear the future intentions of their adversaries. In this article we show how this fear can make deterrent threats credible under seemingly incredible circumstances. We consider a model in which a defender seeks to deter a transgression with both intrinsic and military value. We examine how the defender’s fear of the challenger’s future belligerence affects his willingness to respond to the transgression with war. We derive condi…
Was Airpower “Misapplied” in the Vietnam War? Reassessing Signaling in Operation Rolling Thunder
Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure has been widely blamed on the strategy of using force to send “signals.” It discredited the associated theory of coercion among a generation of military officers and scholars. In this paper I show that, whatever its other failures, Operation Rolling Thunder did successfully signal a threat. I rely on the latest research to demonstrate that Hanoi believed the bombing would eventually inflict massive destruction.…
Does punishment work? Selection effects in air power theory
Air power theory initially proposed that punitive attacks against civilian targets could force enemies to surrender. The current literature, however, has largely concluded that conventional bombing is ineffective as punishment. I argue that this is the result of a selection effect. By focusing only on high-profile bombing campaigns, the theory has drawn its conclusions from cases where punishment is likely to fail. This contrasts with deterrence …
The Return of Crisis Diplomacy
Symbolic Communication and Cross-Domain Deterrence
New military technologies in space and cyberspace have led to an interest in cross-domain deterrence, the threat of one type of attack to deter an attack of a different type. However, fundamental questions remain unanswered. Previous studies do not explain why threats often default to in-domain or “in-kind” retaliations or why cross-domain threats often lack credibility. In this article, I argue that “in-kind” retaliation is essentially a symboli…
Political science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Criminology (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Deterrence (psychology (2 works) · Deterrence theory (2 works)