Symbolic Communication and Cross-Domain Deterrence

Bibliographic Data

ID13020232
AuthorsRon Gurantz (Johns Hopkins University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume9
Issue4
Publication date2024-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Global Security Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2057-3189 • E-ISSN: 2057-3189
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jogss/ogae041
OpenAlexW4403747347
LanguageEN
References cited23

New military technologies in space and cyberspace have led to an interest in cross-domain deterrence, the threat of one type of attack to deter an attack of a different type. However, fundamental questions remain unanswered. Previous studies do not explain why threats often default to in-domain or “in-kind” retaliations or why cross-domain threats often lack credibility. In this article, I argue that “in-kind” retaliation is essentially a symbolic act. In its resemblance or relationship to the original attack, it communicates its purpose as a retaliation for that attack. I also argue that cross-domain threats can sometimes be imbued with the same symbolic meaning and be redefined as an “in-kind” response, and I explore mechanisms through which this can be done

Computer security · Criminology · Deterrence (psychology · Domain (mathematical analysis · Mathematical analysis · Political science · Computer Science · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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