Jörg Löschke
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4137800 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jörg Löschke |
| PRENOMES | Jörg |
| SOBRENOME | Löschke |
| ASSINATURA | LÖSCHKE J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2378-6766 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Collegial Relationships
Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exh…
Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation
What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character concept
Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘c…
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses
Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value response…
Universeller Zugang zur Sozialversicherung – einige ethische Überlegungen
Dieser Artikel diskutiert die Frage, ob sich aus ethischer Perspektive ein eingeschränkter Zugang zur Sozialversicherung rechtfertigen lässt. Es werden vier Begründungsfiguren für sozialstaatliche Regelungen daraufhin untersucht, ob sich ihrer Logik nach ein nicht-universeller Zugang zur Sozialversicherung rechtfertigen lässt, nämlich libertäre, gerechtigkeitsbasierte, kantianische und konsequentialistische Argumente, und es wird argumentiert, da…
Friendship, Value and Interpretation
A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so‐called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associ…
The Value of Caring
This article responds to Barry Maguire's recent attempt to justify partiality within a consequentialist framework
Relationships as Indirect Intensifiers
Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account fo…
Solidarität als moralische Arbeitsteilung
Was ist Solidarität? Welchen Platz sollte der Begriff in unserem moralischen Vokabular haben? Gibt es eine moralische Pflicht zur Solidarität? Oder ist solidarisches Handeln supererogatorisch – also löblich und gut, ohne von Personen eingefordert werden zu können? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, entwickelt dieses Buch ausgehend von den Theorien von Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth und Richard Rorty eine Solidaritätsauffassung, in der der Solidarität…
Partiality, Agent-Relative Reasons, and the Individuals View
The paper offers a critical discussion of Simon Keller’s individuals view concerning the grounds of special obligations. It is argued that the view offers a misleading account of agent-relative reasons, which leads to problems with the arguments Keller offers for his view – the Kantian, consequentialist, particularistic argument. Furthermore, it argues that Keller’s argument from phenomenology suffers from not distinguishing between reasons for p…
Vernunft und Freiheit
Relationships as Indirect Intensifiers
Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account fo…
Vernunft und Freiheit
Partiality, Agent-Relative Reasons, and the Individuals View
The paper offers a critical discussion of Simon Keller’s individuals view concerning the grounds of special obligations. It is argued that the view offers a misleading account of agent-relative reasons, which leads to problems with the arguments Keller offers for his view – the Kantian, consequentialist, particularistic argument. Furthermore, it argues that Keller’s argument from phenomenology suffers from not distinguishing between reasons for p…
Solidarität als moralische Arbeitsteilung
Was ist Solidarität? Welchen Platz sollte der Begriff in unserem moralischen Vokabular haben? Gibt es eine moralische Pflicht zur Solidarität? Oder ist solidarisches Handeln supererogatorisch – also löblich und gut, ohne von Personen eingefordert werden zu können? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, entwickelt dieses Buch ausgehend von den Theorien von Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth und Richard Rorty eine Solidaritätsauffassung, in der der Solidarität…
Friendship, Value and Interpretation
A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so‐called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associ…
The Value of Caring
This article responds to Barry Maguire's recent attempt to justify partiality within a consequentialist framework
Relationships as Indirect Intensifiers
Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account fo…
Universeller Zugang zur Sozialversicherung – einige ethische Überlegungen
Dieser Artikel diskutiert die Frage, ob sich aus ethischer Perspektive ein eingeschränkter Zugang zur Sozialversicherung rechtfertigen lässt. Es werden vier Begründungsfiguren für sozialstaatliche Regelungen daraufhin untersucht, ob sich ihrer Logik nach ein nicht-universeller Zugang zur Sozialversicherung rechtfertigen lässt, nämlich libertäre, gerechtigkeitsbasierte, kantianische und konsequentialistische Argumente, und es wird argumentiert, da…
What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character concept
Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘c…
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses
Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value response…
Collegial Relationships
Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exh…
Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation
Epistemology (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Mathematics (3 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 obras)