Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21409024 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jörg Löschke (0000-0003-2378-6766, University of Zurich, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 477-491 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/can.2020.3 |
| OpenAlex | W3013038954 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 62 |
Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism
Consequentialism · Deontological ethics · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Intrinsic value (animal ethics) · Order (exchange) · Positive economics · Relative value · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · War, Ethics, and Justification
Value, Reality, and Desire
Commonsense ConsequentialismWherein Morality Meets Rationality
Confusion of Tongues
The Strike of the Demon
Love as a Moral Emotion
Fittingness First
Defending Associative Duties
Value, reasons and the structure of justification
Why am I My Brother’s Keeper?
The Truth in Particularism
Value, Respect, and Attachment
Explaining Reasons
Slaves of the Passions
What We Owe to Each Other
The Morality of Freedom
A Fault Line in Ethical Theory
Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions
Philosophical explanations
Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy
Virtue, Vice, and Value
Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity
Personal Value
Impassioned Belief
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons
Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences
Fittingness and Idealization
The Rejection of Consequentialism
British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing
The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
Knowing What To Do
Intricate Ethics
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella
Thinking About Reasons
Buck-Passing Accounts of Value
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |