Pular para o conteúdo principal

ETHNOS_APP

Início • Busca • Periódicos • Lista 0

The Value-Based Theory of Reasons

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8093497
AutoresBarry Maguire (0000-0001-5184-5669, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Volume3
Fascículo20201214
Data de publicação2016-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoErgo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014
EditoraMichigan Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.009
OpenAlexW2510340800
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas37
Referências citadas10

This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. i argue that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of Reasons on the table in discussions of normative reasons, and to draw attention to a number of areas for fruitful further research

Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Sociology · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy

  • Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

    Jessica Brown, Mona Simion•Reasons, Justification, and Defeat•2021

  • Fittingness

    Open Access•Clifford Howard•Philosophy Compass•2018

  • The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism

    Calvin C Baker, Barry Maguire•Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism•2020

  • There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

    Open Access•Barry Maguire•Mind•2018

  • Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

    Jessica Brown, Mona Simion•Reasons, Justification, and Defeat•2021

  • Normative Reasons

    Open Access•Artūrs Logins•Normative Reasons•2022

  • Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good

    Open Access•Kael McCormack•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2023

  • A Case for Contingent Absurdity

    Open Access•Thom Hamer•European Journal of Philosophy•2026

  • Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses

    Open Access•Jörg Löschke•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2020

  • Normativity in Contemporary (and the History of) Ethics

    Open Access•Stephen Darwall•Philosophy•2025

  • Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation

    Open Access•Jörg Löschke•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • Towards an account of basic final value

    Timothy Perrine•Inquiry•2023

  • We have reason to think there are reasons for affective attitudes

    Shane Ward•Inquiry•2024

  • Explaining Real-Life Practical Argumentation on the Basis of Empirical Data Regarding Cultural Value Priorities

    Open Access•Hristo Valchev•Argumentation•2026

  • Why Normative Risk Matters for What We Should Do Morally

    Open Access•Xintong Wei•Erkenntnis•2025

  • The weight of reasons

    Open Access•Daniel Fogal, Olle Risberg•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • Making space for the normativity of coherence

    Open Access•Alex Worsnip•Noûs•2022

  • Explaining normative reasons

    Open Access•Daniel Fogal, Olle Risberg•Noûs•2023

  • Interlocking content and attitude

    VÍCTOR M VERDEJO, Javier González De Prado Salas et al.•Inquiry•2021

  • A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality

    Open Access•Matthew Kopec•Synthese•2018

  • One goodness, many goodnesses, and the Divine Ideas Imitation Theory

    Open Access•Anne Jeffrey, Thomas M Ward•Religious Studies•2025

  • Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism about Reasons

    Eden Lin•The Philosophical Review•2020

  • All Reasons Are Fundamentally for Attitudes

    Open Access•Jonathan Way, Conor Mchugh•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2022

  • Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons

    Open Access•Eric Sampson•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2015

  • The Fit-Based Definition of Recognition Respect

    Open Access•Reuben Sass•Erkenntnis•2026

  • The Deliberative Significance of Moral Obligations

    Open Access•Lukas Naegeli•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2026

  • A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons

    Open Access•Stephen Finlay•Philosophical Perspectives•2019

  • Value Conservatism and its Challenge to Consequentialism

    Open Access•Reuben Sass•Utilitas•2021

  • Against Exclusionary Reasons as Only Razian Facts

    Open Access•Carlos Gálvez Bermúdez•International Journal for the…•2024

  • Simple Probabilistic Promotion

    Open Access•Eden Lin•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2016

  • The Authority of Formality

    Russ Shafer-Landau, Jack Wood et al.•Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13•2018

  • Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions

    Open Access•Andrés G Garcia, Jakob Green Werkmäster•philoSOPHIA•2019

  • Normative metaphysics for accountants

    Open Access•Barry Maguire, Justin Snedegar•Philosophical Studies•2020

  • The Normative and the Evaluative

    Richard Rowland, Rach Cosker-Rowland•Normative and the Evaluative•2019

  • Constructing Practical Reasons

    Andréas Müller•Constructing Practical Reasons•2020

  • The Moral Universe

    John Bengson, Terence Cuneo et al.•The Moral Universe•2024

  • The deliberative constraint on reasons

    Open Access•Conner Schultz•Philosophy Compass•2024

  • Slaves of the Passions

    Mark Schroeder•Slaves of the Passions•2007

  • The Moralistic Fallacy

    Justin D’arms, R D Jacobson et al.•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2000

  • Simple Probabilistic Promotion

    Open Access•Eden Lin•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2016

  • Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality

    Open Access•Thomas Kelly•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003

  • Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions

    Selim Berker•The Philosophical Review•2013

  • The Nature of Intrinsic Value

    Michael J Zimmerman•Nature of Intrinsic Value•2001

  • Reasons as explanations

    Open Access•John Brunero•Philosophical Studies•2012

  • Contrastive Reasons and Promotion

    Justin Snedegar•Ethics•2014

Obras citantes distintas37
Citações por ano3,36
Intervalo de citações2015 - 2026 (12)
Velocidade de citaçãocurrent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 35
Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae