The Value-Based Theory of Reasons
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8093497 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Barry Maguire (0000-0001-5184-5669, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2016 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Fascículo | 20201214 |
| Data de publicação | 2016-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014 |
| Editora | Michigan Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.009 |
| OpenAlex | W2510340800 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 37 |
| Referências citadas | 10 |
This paper develops the Value-Based Theory of Reasons in some detail. The central part of the paper introduces a number of theoretically puzzling features of normative reasons. These include weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons. i argue that the Value-Based Theory of Reasons elegantly accounts for these features. This paper is programmatic. its goal is to put the promising but surprisingly overlooked Value-Based Theory of Reasons on the table in discussions of normative reasons, and to draw attention to a number of areas for fruitful further research
Economics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Sociology · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Fittingness
The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism
There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Normative Reasons
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good
A Case for Contingent Absurdity
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses
Normativity in Contemporary (and the History of) Ethics
Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation
Towards an account of basic final value
We have reason to think there are reasons for affective attitudes
Explaining Real-Life Practical Argumentation on the Basis of Empirical Data Regarding Cultural Value Priorities
Why Normative Risk Matters for What We Should Do Morally
The weight of reasons
Making space for the normativity of coherence
Explaining normative reasons
Interlocking content and attitude
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
One goodness, many goodnesses, and the Divine Ideas Imitation Theory
Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism about Reasons
All Reasons Are Fundamentally for Attitudes
Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons
The Fit-Based Definition of Recognition Respect
The Deliberative Significance of Moral Obligations
A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons
Value Conservatism and its Challenge to Consequentialism
Against Exclusionary Reasons as Only Razian Facts
Simple Probabilistic Promotion
The Authority of Formality
Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions
Normative metaphysics for accountants
The Normative and the Evaluative
Constructing Practical Reasons
The Moral Universe
The deliberative constraint on reasons
| Obras citantes distintas | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3,36 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 35 |