Allyson Lucinda Benton
Biographic Data
| ID | 4160381 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Allyson Lucinda Benton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Allyson Lucinda |
| FAMILY NAME | Benton |
| SIGNATURE | BENTON A L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2685-4114 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 162 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Taking Variance Seriously: Visualizing the Statistical and Substantive Significance of ARCH-GARCH Models
Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalized ARCH (GARCH) models allow users to estimate the conditional mean and conditional error variance of a time series process. Although simulation methods exist to disaggregate the short- and long-run effects of covariate shocks to the conditional mean, scholars’ inferences about the conditional error variance are currently limited to tabular interpretation. We propose a novel method…
Does the @realDonaldTrump Really Matter to Financial Markets
Does the @realDonaldTrump really matter to financial markets? Research shows that new information about the likely future policy direction of government affects financial markets. In contrast, we argue that new information can also arise about the likely future government's resolve in following through with its policy goals, affecting financial markets as well. We test our argument using data on U.S. President Donald J. Trump's Mexico‐related pol…
Party Leader or Party Reputation Concerns? How Vertical Partisan Alignment Reins in Subnational Fiscal Profligacy
Some scholars argue that party leader considerations drive governors copartisan with presidents toward fiscal discipline, while others argue that party reputation concerns guide their behavior. To demonstrate how to assess whether either of these mechanisms is at work, I extend this analysis to the municipal level. If mayors aligned with both governors and presidents are more disciplined than mayors aligned with presidents only, copartisan govern…
Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018
Weak economic performance, high inflation, and a devalued peso drew criticism of the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) economic and fiscal policy choices, and kept President Enrique Peña Nieto’s approval ratings low. The incumbent PRI thus entered the 2018 electoral season in a weak position, with reduced chances of defeating its main opposition candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the National Regeneration Movement (MOREN…
Violent Crime and Capital Market Punishment: How Violent Crime Affects the Supply of Debt to Municipal Mexico
The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico
Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials will raise fiscal spending during elections. Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that only left‐leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with right‐leaning parties choosing the reverse. This article assesses which of these competing logics applies to debt policy choices. Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of yearl…
Configuring authority over electoral manipulation in electoral authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Mexico
How do electoral authoritarian autocrats choose strategies for manipulating elections? Most scholars assume that autocrats strategize all electoral manipulation from above, with local regime agents charged with carrying out these top-down strategies. In contrast, a few assume that local regime agents strategize all electoral manipulation from the bottom up. More likely, reality lies in between. To make this point, I build an argument for how auto…
How “Participatory Governance” Strengthens Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Electoral Authoritarian Oaxaca, Mexico
Research on the impact of participatory institutions in Latin America has not yet examined how they work in authoritarian settings. National autocrats in Mexico implemented participatory reforms during that country's national electoral authoritarian regime. Building on research on political decentralization in authoritarian regimes, I argue that participatory institutions can be used to channel citizen demands and to incorporate citizens into aut…
Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves
What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina
This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considera…
Do Investors Assess the Credibility of Campaign Commitments: The Case of Mexico's 2006 Presidential Race
Do investors assess the credibility of campaign rhetoric? To answer this question, I develop several alternative arguments for how investors might consider candidates' policy platforms and apply them to Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of polling trends and the Mexican stock market shows that rising electoral uncertainty lowered market performance, while growing support for either the left-leaning Andrés Manuel López Obrador …
The Strategic Struggle for Patronage: Political Careers, State Largesse, and Factionalism in Latin American Parties
Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal and factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the s…
Mexico's (Temporary) Turn to the Left
The shift left during the presidential campaign does not mean that Mexican policy will also shift in that direction after a new administration takes office
Quién está preocupado por López Obrador? Las respuestas del mercado a las tendencias electorales durante la campaña presidencial mexicana del 2006
This article addresses a key issue during the course of Mexico’s 2006 presidential campaign: How did markets react to changes in support for the left-leaning Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD)? To answer this question, I develop a series of alternative arguments for how investors would respond changes in PRD support during the campaign. I evaluate the arguments using a times series GARCH model. The results show that changes in the levels of suppor…
Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters: Economic Hardship, Political Institutions, and Voting Behavior in Latin America
This article examines recent trends in Latin American voting behavior and casts them in terms of sincere (economic) and strategic (electoral) concerns. It argues that thanks to years of economic adversity, Latin Americans have developed long, sophisticated economic memories. Although this has resulted in rising frustration with democratic government, according to recent opinion polls, it has not always led voters to punish all parties responsible…
Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves
Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters: Economic Hardship, Political Institutions, and Voting Behavior in Latin America
This article examines recent trends in Latin American voting behavior and casts them in terms of sincere (economic) and strategic (electoral) concerns. It argues that thanks to years of economic adversity, Latin Americans have developed long, sophisticated economic memories. Although this has resulted in rising frustration with democratic government, according to recent opinion polls, it has not always led voters to punish all parties responsible…
What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina
This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considera…
How “Participatory Governance” Strengthens Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Electoral Authoritarian Oaxaca, Mexico
Research on the impact of participatory institutions in Latin America has not yet examined how they work in authoritarian settings. National autocrats in Mexico implemented participatory reforms during that country's national electoral authoritarian regime. Building on research on political decentralization in authoritarian regimes, I argue that participatory institutions can be used to channel citizen demands and to incorporate citizens into aut…
The Strategic Struggle for Patronage: Political Careers, State Largesse, and Factionalism in Latin American Parties
Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal and factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the s…
The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico
Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials will raise fiscal spending during elections. Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that only left‐leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with right‐leaning parties choosing the reverse. This article assesses which of these competing logics applies to debt policy choices. Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of yearl…
Does the @realDonaldTrump Really Matter to Financial Markets
Does the @realDonaldTrump really matter to financial markets? Research shows that new information about the likely future policy direction of government affects financial markets. In contrast, we argue that new information can also arise about the likely future government's resolve in following through with its policy goals, affecting financial markets as well. We test our argument using data on U.S. President Donald J. Trump's Mexico‐related pol…
Party Leader or Party Reputation Concerns? How Vertical Partisan Alignment Reins in Subnational Fiscal Profligacy
Some scholars argue that party leader considerations drive governors copartisan with presidents toward fiscal discipline, while others argue that party reputation concerns guide their behavior. To demonstrate how to assess whether either of these mechanisms is at work, I extend this analysis to the municipal level. If mayors aligned with both governors and presidents are more disciplined than mayors aligned with presidents only, copartisan govern…
Do Investors Assess the Credibility of Campaign Commitments: The Case of Mexico's 2006 Presidential Race
Do investors assess the credibility of campaign rhetoric? To answer this question, I develop several alternative arguments for how investors might consider candidates' policy platforms and apply them to Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of polling trends and the Mexican stock market shows that rising electoral uncertainty lowered market performance, while growing support for either the left-leaning Andrés Manuel López Obrador …
Violent Crime and Capital Market Punishment: How Violent Crime Affects the Supply of Debt to Municipal Mexico
Configuring authority over electoral manipulation in electoral authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Mexico
How do electoral authoritarian autocrats choose strategies for manipulating elections? Most scholars assume that autocrats strategize all electoral manipulation from above, with local regime agents charged with carrying out these top-down strategies. In contrast, a few assume that local regime agents strategize all electoral manipulation from the bottom up. More likely, reality lies in between. To make this point, I build an argument for how auto…
Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018
Weak economic performance, high inflation, and a devalued peso drew criticism of the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) economic and fiscal policy choices, and kept President Enrique Peña Nieto’s approval ratings low. The incumbent PRI thus entered the 2018 electoral season in a weak position, with reduced chances of defeating its main opposition candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the National Regeneration Movement (MOREN…
Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters: Economic Hardship, Political Institutions, and Voting Behavior in Latin America
This article examines recent trends in Latin American voting behavior and casts them in terms of sincere (economic) and strategic (electoral) concerns. It argues that thanks to years of economic adversity, Latin Americans have developed long, sophisticated economic memories. Although this has resulted in rising frustration with democratic government, according to recent opinion polls, it has not always led voters to punish all parties responsible…
Mexico's (Temporary) Turn to the Left
The shift left during the presidential campaign does not mean that Mexican policy will also shift in that direction after a new administration takes office
Quién está preocupado por López Obrador? Las respuestas del mercado a las tendencias electorales durante la campaña presidencial mexicana del 2006
This article addresses a key issue during the course of Mexico’s 2006 presidential campaign: How did markets react to changes in support for the left-leaning Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD)? To answer this question, I develop a series of alternative arguments for how investors would respond changes in PRD support during the campaign. I evaluate the arguments using a times series GARCH model. The results show that changes in the levels of suppor…
The Strategic Struggle for Patronage: Political Careers, State Largesse, and Factionalism in Latin American Parties
Latin American parties have been regularly plagued by factional disputes. Such rivalries are puzzling given the traditional importance of state largesse for building support; in most countries patronage has kept politicians loyal and factionalism at bay. The article uses a game-theoretic model to examine intra-party politics and political careers. It argues that ensuring successful careers requires rising within parties and thus cultivating the s…
Do Investors Assess the Credibility of Campaign Commitments: The Case of Mexico's 2006 Presidential Race
Do investors assess the credibility of campaign rhetoric? To answer this question, I develop several alternative arguments for how investors might consider candidates' policy platforms and apply them to Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of polling trends and the Mexican stock market shows that rising electoral uncertainty lowered market performance, while growing support for either the left-leaning Andrés Manuel López Obrador …
What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina
This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considera…
Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico's (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves
Configuring authority over electoral manipulation in electoral authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Mexico
How do electoral authoritarian autocrats choose strategies for manipulating elections? Most scholars assume that autocrats strategize all electoral manipulation from above, with local regime agents charged with carrying out these top-down strategies. In contrast, a few assume that local regime agents strategize all electoral manipulation from the bottom up. More likely, reality lies in between. To make this point, I build an argument for how auto…
How “Participatory Governance” Strengthens Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Electoral Authoritarian Oaxaca, Mexico
Research on the impact of participatory institutions in Latin America has not yet examined how they work in authoritarian settings. National autocrats in Mexico implemented participatory reforms during that country's national electoral authoritarian regime. Building on research on political decentralization in authoritarian regimes, I argue that participatory institutions can be used to channel citizen demands and to incorporate citizens into aut…
Violent Crime and Capital Market Punishment: How Violent Crime Affects the Supply of Debt to Municipal Mexico
The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico
Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials will raise fiscal spending during elections. Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that only left‐leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with right‐leaning parties choosing the reverse. This article assesses which of these competing logics applies to debt policy choices. Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of yearl…
Mexico 2017: Incumbent Disadvantage Ahead of 2018
Weak economic performance, high inflation, and a devalued peso drew criticism of the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) economic and fiscal policy choices, and kept President Enrique Peña Nieto’s approval ratings low. The incumbent PRI thus entered the 2018 electoral season in a weak position, with reduced chances of defeating its main opposition candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the National Regeneration Movement (MOREN…
Party Leader or Party Reputation Concerns? How Vertical Partisan Alignment Reins in Subnational Fiscal Profligacy
Some scholars argue that party leader considerations drive governors copartisan with presidents toward fiscal discipline, while others argue that party reputation concerns guide their behavior. To demonstrate how to assess whether either of these mechanisms is at work, I extend this analysis to the municipal level. If mayors aligned with both governors and presidents are more disciplined than mayors aligned with presidents only, copartisan govern…
Does the @realDonaldTrump Really Matter to Financial Markets
Does the @realDonaldTrump really matter to financial markets? Research shows that new information about the likely future policy direction of government affects financial markets. In contrast, we argue that new information can also arise about the likely future government's resolve in following through with its policy goals, affecting financial markets as well. We test our argument using data on U.S. President Donald J. Trump's Mexico‐related pol…
Taking Variance Seriously: Visualizing the Statistical and Substantive Significance of ARCH-GARCH Models
Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalized ARCH (GARCH) models allow users to estimate the conditional mean and conditional error variance of a time series process. Although simulation methods exist to disaggregate the short- and long-run effects of covariate shocks to the conditional mean, scholars’ inferences about the conditional error variance are currently limited to tabular interpretation. We propose a novel method…
Political science (14 works) · Economics (13 works) · Politics (11 works) · Law (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (6 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (6 works) · Public Administration (6 works)