What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina

Bibliographic Data

ID6375573
AuthorsAllyson Lucinda Benton (0000-0002-2685-4114, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume39
Issue4
Pages651-676
Publication date2009-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublius The Journal of Federalism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5950 • E-ISSN: 1747-7107
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/publius/pjn032
OpenAlexW2012191784
LanguageEN
Citations received21
References cited9

This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considerable provincial and congressional opposition, implying that federalism is strong. To resolve this puzzle, I recast federalism in terms of its economic context. I argue that economic growth renders presidential-provincial relations positive-sum, leading to intergovernmental cooperation and the appearance of weak federalism. Economic decline turns presidential-provincial relations zero-sum, raising intergovernmental conflict, and the appearance of strong federal institutions. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press

Context (archaeology · Cooperative federalism · Decentralization · Dual federalism · Economics · Federalism · fiscal federalism · Geography · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Politics and Society in Latin America · Law

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