Michael Suk‐young Chwe
Biographic Data
| ID | 4178827 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Suk‐young Chwe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael Suk‐young |
| FAMILY NAME | Chwe |
| SIGNATURE | CHWE M S Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 150 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Google Scholar
Google Scholar (GS) is an important tool that faculty, administrators, and external reviewers use to evaluate the scholarly impact of candidates for jobs, tenure, and promotion. This article highlights both the benefits of GS—including the reliability and consistency of its citation counts and its platform for disseminating scholarship and facilitating networking—and its pitfalls. GS has biases because citation is a social and political process t…
Confronting Hate Collectively
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Jane Austen, Game Theorist
Game theory—the study of how people make choices while interacting with others—is one of the most popular technical approaches in social science today. But as this book reveals, Jane Austen explored game theory's core ideas in her six novels roughly 200 years ago—over a century before its mathematical development during the Cold War. The book shows how this beloved writer theorized choice and preferences, prized strategic thinking, and analyzed w…
Jane Austen, Game Theorist
How the works of Jane Austen show that game theory is present in all human behavior Game theory—the study of how people make choices while interacting with others—is one of the most popular technical approaches in social science today. But as Michael Chwe reveals in his insightful new book, Jane Austen explored game theory's core ideas in her six novels roughly two hundred years ago—over a century before its mathematical development during the Co…
The May 1 Marchers in Los Angeles
In this article, we study protest participants in the May 2006 immigration rights marches in Los Angeles. Analysis of original survey data of 876 march participants yields five main results. First, despite substantial dispute among organizers on how to frame the marches, we find protest participants were similar across march locations organized by different coalitions. Second, we find Spanish-English bilingual participants seemed to benefit from …
Rational Ritual
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form “comm…
Rational Ritual
List of Figures and Tables ix Preface xiii 1. Introduction What This Book Is Good For 3 The Argument 8 Coordination Problems 11 Common Knowledge 13 Where the Argument Comes From 16 2. Applications 19 Ceremonies and Authority 19 How Do Rituals Work? 25 Imward-Facing Circles 30 On the Waterfront 33 Believe the Hype 37 The Price of Publicity 49 Strong Links and Weak Links 61 The Chapel in the Panopticon 66 3. Elaborations 74 Competing Explanations 7…
Anonymous Procedures for Condorcet’s Model
In Condorcet’s model of information aggregation, a group of people decides among two alternatives a and b, with each person getting an independent bit of evidence about which alternative is objectively superior. I consider anonymous procedures, in which the group’s decision depends only on the number of people who report a or b, not their identities. A procedure is called incentive compatible for a person if she wants to report truthfully given t…
Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare
I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for themajorityallows the minority to "enforce" its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. "Special" voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corrobora…
Structure and Strategy in Collective Action
This article considers both structural and strategic influences on collective action. Each person in a group wants to participate only if the total number taking part is at least her threshold; people use a network to communicate their thresholds. People are strategically rational in that they are completely rational and also take into account that others are completely rational. The model shows first that network position is much more important …
Culture, Circles, and Commercials
This paper applies a game theoretic argument, that common knowledge is necessary for `solving' coordination problems, to a variety of cultural practices. This argument helps in understanding how cultural practices such as mass ceremonies constitute power, how talking in inward-facing circles helps coordination, and why `social' goods tend to be advertised on popular and expensive television shows. The main conclusion is that cultural practices, u…
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model
Journal Article Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model Get access Michael Suk-Young Chwe Michael Suk-Young Chwe Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 403, 1 December 1990, Pages 1109–1121, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233961 Published: 01 December 1990
Structure and Strategy in Collective Action
This article considers both structural and strategic influences on collective action. Each person in a group wants to participate only if the total number taking part is at least her threshold; people use a network to communicate their thresholds. People are strategically rational in that they are completely rational and also take into account that others are completely rational. The model shows first that network position is much more important …
Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model
Journal Article Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model Get access Michael Suk-Young Chwe Michael Suk-Young Chwe Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 403, 1 December 1990, Pages 1109–1121, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233961 Published: 01 December 1990
Culture, Circles, and Commercials
This paper applies a game theoretic argument, that common knowledge is necessary for `solving' coordination problems, to a variety of cultural practices. This argument helps in understanding how cultural practices such as mass ceremonies constitute power, how talking in inward-facing circles helps coordination, and why `social' goods tend to be advertised on popular and expensive television shows. The main conclusion is that cultural practices, u…
Rational Ritual
List of Figures and Tables ix Preface xiii 1. Introduction What This Book Is Good For 3 The Argument 8 Coordination Problems 11 Common Knowledge 13 Where the Argument Comes From 16 2. Applications 19 Ceremonies and Authority 19 How Do Rituals Work? 25 Imward-Facing Circles 30 On the Waterfront 33 Believe the Hype 37 The Price of Publicity 49 Strong Links and Weak Links 61 The Chapel in the Panopticon 66 3. Elaborations 74 Competing Explanations 7…
Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare
I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for themajorityallows the minority to "enforce" its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. "Special" voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corrobora…
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Google Scholar
Google Scholar (GS) is an important tool that faculty, administrators, and external reviewers use to evaluate the scholarly impact of candidates for jobs, tenure, and promotion. This article highlights both the benefits of GS—including the reliability and consistency of its citation counts and its platform for disseminating scholarship and facilitating networking—and its pitfalls. GS has biases because citation is a social and political process t…
The May 1 Marchers in Los Angeles
In this article, we study protest participants in the May 2006 immigration rights marches in Los Angeles. Analysis of original survey data of 876 march participants yields five main results. First, despite substantial dispute among organizers on how to frame the marches, we find protest participants were similar across march locations organized by different coalitions. Second, we find Spanish-English bilingual participants seemed to benefit from …
Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model
Journal Article Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model Get access Michael Suk-Young Chwe Michael Suk-Young Chwe Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 403, 1 December 1990, Pages 1109–1121, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233961 Published: 01 December 1990
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
Culture, Circles, and Commercials
This paper applies a game theoretic argument, that common knowledge is necessary for `solving' coordination problems, to a variety of cultural practices. This argument helps in understanding how cultural practices such as mass ceremonies constitute power, how talking in inward-facing circles helps coordination, and why `social' goods tend to be advertised on popular and expensive television shows. The main conclusion is that cultural practices, u…
Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare
I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for themajorityallows the minority to "enforce" its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. "Special" voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corrobora…
Structure and Strategy in Collective Action
This article considers both structural and strategic influences on collective action. Each person in a group wants to participate only if the total number taking part is at least her threshold; people use a network to communicate their thresholds. People are strategically rational in that they are completely rational and also take into account that others are completely rational. The model shows first that network position is much more important …
Anonymous Procedures for Condorcet’s Model
In Condorcet’s model of information aggregation, a group of people decides among two alternatives a and b, with each person getting an independent bit of evidence about which alternative is objectively superior. I consider anonymous procedures, in which the group’s decision depends only on the number of people who report a or b, not their identities. A procedure is called incentive compatible for a person if she wants to report truthfully given t…
Rational Ritual
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form “comm…
Rational Ritual
List of Figures and Tables ix Preface xiii 1. Introduction What This Book Is Good For 3 The Argument 8 Coordination Problems 11 Common Knowledge 13 Where the Argument Comes From 16 2. Applications 19 Ceremonies and Authority 19 How Do Rituals Work? 25 Imward-Facing Circles 30 On the Waterfront 33 Believe the Hype 37 The Price of Publicity 49 Strong Links and Weak Links 61 The Chapel in the Panopticon 66 3. Elaborations 74 Competing Explanations 7…
Jane Austen, Game Theorist
Game theory—the study of how people make choices while interacting with others—is one of the most popular technical approaches in social science today. But as this book reveals, Jane Austen explored game theory's core ideas in her six novels roughly 200 years ago—over a century before its mathematical development during the Cold War. The book shows how this beloved writer theorized choice and preferences, prized strategic thinking, and analyzed w…
Jane Austen, Game Theorist
How the works of Jane Austen show that game theory is present in all human behavior Game theory—the study of how people make choices while interacting with others—is one of the most popular technical approaches in social science today. But as Michael Chwe reveals in his insightful new book, Jane Austen explored game theory's core ideas in her six novels roughly two hundred years ago—over a century before its mathematical development during the Co…
The May 1 Marchers in Los Angeles
In this article, we study protest participants in the May 2006 immigration rights marches in Los Angeles. Analysis of original survey data of 876 march participants yields five main results. First, despite substantial dispute among organizers on how to frame the marches, we find protest participants were similar across march locations organized by different coalitions. Second, we find Spanish-English bilingual participants seemed to benefit from …
Confronting Hate Collectively
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Google Scholar
Google Scholar (GS) is an important tool that faculty, administrators, and external reviewers use to evaluate the scholarly impact of candidates for jobs, tenure, and promotion. This article highlights both the benefits of GS—including the reliability and consistency of its citation counts and its platform for disseminating scholarship and facilitating networking—and its pitfalls. GS has biases because citation is a social and political process t…
Computer Science (11 works) · Political science (10 works) · Economics (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works)