Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3393394 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Michael Suk‐young Chwe (University of Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 93 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 85-97 |
| Publication date | 1999-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2585762 |
| OpenAlex | W2107489400 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 23 |
I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for themajorityallows the minority to "enforce" its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. "Special" voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of Lani Guinier's arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation, benefitting everyone
Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Condorcet method · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Majority rule · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Voting · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Deliberative Politics in Action
Forms of new democracy
Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information
Annual Selected Bibliography Mapping Asian America
Fair Play in Assemblies
Anonymous Procedures for Condorcet’s Model
Minorities and Storable Votes
Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition
Get Rid of Unanimity Rule
Colorblind” Policy in Black and White
The Potential of Cumulative Voting To Yield Fair Representation
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining
Information, Participation, and Choice
Considerations on representative government.
Behind the Mule
Agreeing to Disagree
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality
Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies
The Value of Biased Information
Optimal Voting Rules
Behind the Mule
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
Pluralism and Social Choice
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,44 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2024 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |