Kenneth E Friend
Biographic Data
| ID | 4179050 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenneth E Friend |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenneth E |
| FAMILY NAME | Friend |
| SIGNATURE | FRIEND K E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Graduate School of Business University of Chicago |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1977 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Stress at Work. C. L. Cooper , R. Payne
Contending “signals” in coalition choice
During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e…
Bargaining Processes and Coalition Outcomes: An Integration
This paper discusses a theory of bargaining processes in three-person coalition games and investigates the relation between these processes and the outcome of bargaining. The bargaining theory uses an information-processing approach to model each of the three player's cognitive processes and interrelates three such models to predict who says what to whom next in the bargaining for coalition partners and payoff allocations. The theory succeeds in …
Bargaining Processes and Coalition Outcomes: An Integration
This paper discusses a theory of bargaining processes in three-person coalition games and investigates the relation between these processes and the outcome of bargaining. The bargaining theory uses an information-processing approach to model each of the three player's cognitive processes and interrelates three such models to predict who says what to whom next in the bargaining for coalition partners and payoff allocations. The theory succeeds in …
Contending “signals” in coalition choice
During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e…
Bargaining Processes and Coalition Outcomes: An Integration
This paper discusses a theory of bargaining processes in three-person coalition games and investigates the relation between these processes and the outcome of bargaining. The bargaining theory uses an information-processing approach to model each of the three player's cognitive processes and interrelates three such models to predict who says what to whom next in the bargaining for coalition partners and payoff allocations. The theory succeeds in …
Contending “signals” in coalition choice
During negotiations for coalitions, each actor presumably searches his decision environment for organizing principles—signals—which, if present, would turn the negotiations in his favor. With only one prominent signal, we expect it to determine the nature of agreements, but things may be different with multiple signals. Data from four studies of a weighted‐majority game, two using only relative status of winnings in the game as the incentive (i.e…
Stress at Work. C. L. Cooper , R. Payne
Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Process (computing (2 works) · Rank (graph theory (2 works) · Bargaining problem (1 works)