Joshua A Strayhorn
Biographic Data
| ID | 4180392 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joshua A Strayhorn |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joshua A |
| FAMILY NAME | Strayhorn |
| SIGNATURE | STRAYHORN J A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6808-4608 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Making the other side mad
I present a formal model of candidate evaluation in a context where voters within some group or political party learn information about to what extent various in‐group candidates (such as a slate of primary candidates) are disliked by an out‐group or opposing party. Thus, a voter's candidate evaluation is based in part on how they process information about which of their own candidates provoke particularly strong distaste from the out‐group. I sh…
Lower Courts in Interbranch Conflict
Do inferior courts play a meaningful role in interbranch disputes between the judicial and other branches? In interbranch conflicts involving the judiciary, lower courts move first and may shape the direction of conflict before high courts intervene directly. This paper explores how this organizational feature affects the judiciary’s ability and willingness to constrain other branches, developing a formal model of an interbranch dispute involving…
Repugnant Laws
Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy
Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed …
Strategic Anticipation and En Banc Oversight Procedures in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
The U.S. Courts of Appeals must ordinarily convene en banc to overturn circuit law. However, roughly half of the circuit courts have adopted an alternative, less costly procedure, the informal en banc, where three-judge panels may overturn precedent with approval of the full circuit. This article leverages variation in adoption and implementation of this institution to analyze the implications of ex post oversight mechanisms for ex ante panel dec…
Plausible deniability
One explanation for why voters sometimes fail to hold elected officials accountable for corruption is failure to correctly attribute blame. Yet existing theories of how voters attribute responsibility do not consider how voters assessments may be shaped by the possibility that politicians can strategically delegate corrupt activity. This paper develops a formal model of an electoral accountability environment where politicians can pursue malfeasa…
Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy
Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigan…
When Will States Strike First? Battlefield Advantages and Rationalist War
Previous research suggests that first-strike advantages can create commitment problems that lead rational leaders to opt for war, even when both sides are perfectly informed. In this article, we develop a formal model that extends upon this work. We include a more detailed account of war processes in order to determine what factors are most likely to cause first-strike advantages that lead to war. In particular, we decompose first-strike advantag…
Time constraints and the opportunity costs of oversight
In a principal–agent relationship, how should principals budget time for oversight when oversight activity is not instantaneous? We develop a formal model of resource allocation by a principal monitoring multiple agents, where the principal faces a dynamic budgeting problem. Our model reveals a tension between the value of holding resources in reserve to maintain the threat of an audit and the direct policy gains of monitoring activity. We show t…
When Will States Strike First? Battlefield Advantages and Rationalist War
Previous research suggests that first-strike advantages can create commitment problems that lead rational leaders to opt for war, even when both sides are perfectly informed. In this article, we develop a formal model that extends upon this work. We include a more detailed account of war processes in order to determine what factors are most likely to cause first-strike advantages that lead to war. In particular, we decompose first-strike advantag…
Time constraints and the opportunity costs of oversight
In a principal–agent relationship, how should principals budget time for oversight when oversight activity is not instantaneous? We develop a formal model of resource allocation by a principal monitoring multiple agents, where the principal faces a dynamic budgeting problem. Our model reveals a tension between the value of holding resources in reserve to maintain the threat of an audit and the direct policy gains of monitoring activity. We show t…
Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy
Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed …
Plausible deniability
One explanation for why voters sometimes fail to hold elected officials accountable for corruption is failure to correctly attribute blame. Yet existing theories of how voters attribute responsibility do not consider how voters assessments may be shaped by the possibility that politicians can strategically delegate corrupt activity. This paper develops a formal model of an electoral accountability environment where politicians can pursue malfeasa…
Making the other side mad
I present a formal model of candidate evaluation in a context where voters within some group or political party learn information about to what extent various in‐group candidates (such as a slate of primary candidates) are disliked by an out‐group or opposing party. Thus, a voter's candidate evaluation is based in part on how they process information about which of their own candidates provoke particularly strong distaste from the out‐group. I sh…
Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy
Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigan…
Time constraints and the opportunity costs of oversight
In a principal–agent relationship, how should principals budget time for oversight when oversight activity is not instantaneous? We develop a formal model of resource allocation by a principal monitoring multiple agents, where the principal faces a dynamic budgeting problem. Our model reveals a tension between the value of holding resources in reserve to maintain the threat of an audit and the direct policy gains of monitoring activity. We show t…
When Will States Strike First? Battlefield Advantages and Rationalist War
Previous research suggests that first-strike advantages can create commitment problems that lead rational leaders to opt for war, even when both sides are perfectly informed. In this article, we develop a formal model that extends upon this work. We include a more detailed account of war processes in order to determine what factors are most likely to cause first-strike advantages that lead to war. In particular, we decompose first-strike advantag…
Strategic Anticipation and En Banc Oversight Procedures in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
The U.S. Courts of Appeals must ordinarily convene en banc to overturn circuit law. However, roughly half of the circuit courts have adopted an alternative, less costly procedure, the informal en banc, where three-judge panels may overturn precedent with approval of the full circuit. This article leverages variation in adoption and implementation of this institution to analyze the implications of ex post oversight mechanisms for ex ante panel dec…
Plausible deniability
One explanation for why voters sometimes fail to hold elected officials accountable for corruption is failure to correctly attribute blame. Yet existing theories of how voters attribute responsibility do not consider how voters assessments may be shaped by the possibility that politicians can strategically delegate corrupt activity. This paper develops a formal model of an electoral accountability environment where politicians can pursue malfeasa…
Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy
Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigan…
Repugnant Laws
Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy
Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed …
Lower Courts in Interbranch Conflict
Do inferior courts play a meaningful role in interbranch disputes between the judicial and other branches? In interbranch conflicts involving the judiciary, lower courts move first and may shape the direction of conflict before high courts intervene directly. This paper explores how this organizational feature affects the judiciary’s ability and willingness to constrain other branches, developing a formal model of an interbranch dispute involving…
Making the other side mad
I present a formal model of candidate evaluation in a context where voters within some group or political party learn information about to what extent various in‐group candidates (such as a slate of primary candidates) are disliked by an out‐group or opposing party. Thus, a voter's candidate evaluation is based in part on how they process information about which of their own candidates provoke particularly strong distaste from the out‐group. I sh…
Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Law and economics (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (4 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer security (2 works)