Hugo Omar Seleme
Biographic Data
| ID | 4186089 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hugo Omar Seleme |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hugo Omar |
| FAMILY NAME | Seleme |
| SIGNATURE | SELEME H O |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro Científico Tecnológico - Córdoba |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0658-0512 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Jorge F. Malem Seña (2017), Pobreza, corrupción, (in)seguridad jurídica
Dworkin on external skepticism and moral permissions
This article discusses Ronald Dworkin’s first objection against what he calls external moral skepticism, the view that denies truth-value to moral judgments. According to that objection, an external skeptic denies that substantive moral judgments can be true. But, at the same time, the objection goes, what follows from the skeptical view is that all actions are morally permissible, which is in itself a substantive moral judgment. We call this ‘th…
Un nuevo adversario de la libertad como no-dominación
Philip Pettit has used Isaiah Berlin's positive and negative freedom for two different purposes. First, the distinction is employed to elaborate a third distinguishable ideal of freedom as non-domination that contains elements of both the negative and the positive freedom. Second, Pettit contends that freedom as non-domination is more attractive than the negative freedom defended by Berlin -freedom as non-interference -and a variant of positive f…
God without Religion
Relevancia normativa en la justificación de las decisiones judiciales
Puede el utilitarismo ser deontológico? Una respuesta a Kymlicka
En Teoría de la justicia, Rawls sostiene que los defectos normativos que contienen algunas concepciones de justicia, como el utilitarismo y el perfeccionismo, se deben a que, por su carácter teleológico, no otorgan prioridad a lo correcto en relación con lo bueno. Kymlicka ha cuestionado esta afirmación siguiendo la estrategia de brindar una interpretación del utilitarismo que respete la prioridad de lo correcto. Esto mostraría que los defectos n…
Dworkin on external skepticism and moral permissions
This article discusses Ronald Dworkin’s first objection against what he calls external moral skepticism, the view that denies truth-value to moral judgments. According to that objection, an external skeptic denies that substantive moral judgments can be true. But, at the same time, the objection goes, what follows from the skeptical view is that all actions are morally permissible, which is in itself a substantive moral judgment. We call this ‘th…
Puede el utilitarismo ser deontológico? Una respuesta a Kymlicka
En Teoría de la justicia, Rawls sostiene que los defectos normativos que contienen algunas concepciones de justicia, como el utilitarismo y el perfeccionismo, se deben a que, por su carácter teleológico, no otorgan prioridad a lo correcto en relación con lo bueno. Kymlicka ha cuestionado esta afirmación siguiendo la estrategia de brindar una interpretación del utilitarismo que respete la prioridad de lo correcto. Esto mostraría que los defectos n…
Relevancia normativa en la justificación de las decisiones judiciales
God without Religion
Un nuevo adversario de la libertad como no-dominación
Philip Pettit has used Isaiah Berlin's positive and negative freedom for two different purposes. First, the distinction is employed to elaborate a third distinguishable ideal of freedom as non-domination that contains elements of both the negative and the positive freedom. Second, Pettit contends that freedom as non-domination is more attractive than the negative freedom defended by Berlin -freedom as non-interference -and a variant of positive f…
Dworkin on external skepticism and moral permissions
This article discusses Ronald Dworkin’s first objection against what he calls external moral skepticism, the view that denies truth-value to moral judgments. According to that objection, an external skeptic denies that substantive moral judgments can be true. But, at the same time, the objection goes, what follows from the skeptical view is that all actions are morally permissible, which is in itself a substantive moral judgment. We call this ‘th…
Jorge F. Malem Seña (2017), Pobreza, corrupción, (in)seguridad jurídica
Philosophy (4 works) · Political science (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Humanities (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 work) · Biblical Studies and Interpretation (1 work)