David Hagebölling
Biographic Data
| ID | 4211241 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Hagebölling |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Hagebölling |
| SIGNATURE | HAGEBÖLLING D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Potsdam Hasso Plattner Institute for Digital Engineering Potsdam Germany |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5234-6853 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Centralisation without Independence
Informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) like the G20, the G7, and BRICS have become key pillars of the post-Cold War multilateral system. IIGOs lack a legal foundation and a permanent secretariat or staff—yet states now use them to govern global issues ranging from artificial intelligence to nuclear non-proliferation. This raises a critical question: are IIGOs viable vehicles for supporting sustained and structured state interactions? I …
The Governor's Dilemma and Regime Complexity
States, firms, and other types of governors routinely rely on intermediaries to govern issues on their behalf. Such indirect governance drives regime complexity: governors frequently enlist multiple intermediaries for governing an issue. I theorize that governors foster complexity to maximize utility from indirect governance. When governors enlist intermediaries, they face the governor's dilemma: a tradeoff between the competence they can obtain …
The Design of Informal Intergovernmental Organizations
Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGO s) are institutionally weak: they lack a legal foundation and a permanent secretariat, staff, or headquarters. Yet states’ use of IIGO s like the Group of 7 (G7), Group of 20 (G20), and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group has grown from ad hoc crisis management to the ongoing governance of a variety of critical global issues. How do IIGO s support extensive state interaction …
No prominent works on this page.
The Design of Informal Intergovernmental Organizations
Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGO s) are institutionally weak: they lack a legal foundation and a permanent secretariat, staff, or headquarters. Yet states’ use of IIGO s like the Group of 7 (G7), Group of 20 (G20), and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group has grown from ad hoc crisis management to the ongoing governance of a variety of critical global issues. How do IIGO s support extensive state interaction …
The Governor's Dilemma and Regime Complexity
States, firms, and other types of governors routinely rely on intermediaries to govern issues on their behalf. Such indirect governance drives regime complexity: governors frequently enlist multiple intermediaries for governing an issue. I theorize that governors foster complexity to maximize utility from indirect governance. When governors enlist intermediaries, they face the governor's dilemma: a tradeoff between the competence they can obtain …
Centralisation without Independence
Informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) like the G20, the G7, and BRICS have become key pillars of the post-Cold War multilateral system. IIGOs lack a legal foundation and a permanent secretariat or staff—yet states now use them to govern global issues ranging from artificial intelligence to nuclear non-proliferation. This raises a critical question: are IIGOs viable vehicles for supporting sustained and structured state interactions? I …
Bureaucracy (1 work) · Centralisation (1 work) · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (1 work) · Decentralization (1 work) · Formality (1 work) · Global Security and Public Health (1 work) · International law (1 work) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Negotiation (1 work)