Sebastian M Saiegh
Biographic Data
| ID | 4269668 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sebastian M Saiegh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sebastian M |
| FAMILY NAME | Saiegh |
| SIGNATURE | SAIEGH S M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 379 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Tax havens and income inequality in host countries
The association between tax havens and income distribution in home states of multinational corporations has attracted much attention. However, studies have not empirically investigated whether there is also a relationship between low-tax jurisdictions and income inequality in host countries. Our findings, based on data from 152 countries spanning 1972-2020 and a range of econometric strategies, reveal a robust positive relationship between tax ha…
Executive Constraint and Sovereign Debt: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Argentina During the Baring Crisis
The literature on whether executive constraint improves the credibility of sovereign debt takes the political regime as the unit of analysis, typically computing an average yield or price for each regime, and then relating that average to regime characteristics. In this article, we take the individual bond issue as the unit of analysis, examining quasi-experimental evidence from two Argentine sovereign debts issued in the 1880s. The loans were so…
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other’s project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O’Donnell ( Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an ‘…
Using Joint Scaling Methods to Study Ideology and Representation: Evidence from Latin America
In this article, I use joint scaling methods and similar items from three large-scale surveys to place voters, parties, and politicians from different Latin American countries on a common ideological space. The findings reveal that ideology is a significant determinant of vote choice in Latin America. They also suggest that the success of leftist leaders at the polls reflects the views of the voters sustaining their victories. The location of par…
Introduction to the Virtual Issue: Addressing Measurement Comparability in Survey Research
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Political institutions and sovereign borrowing: Evidence from nineteenth-century Argentina
Fraudulent Democracy? An Analysis of Argentina'sInfamous DecadeUsing Supervised Machine Learning
In this paper, we introduce an innovative method to diagnose electoral fraud using vote counts. Specifically, we use synthetic data to develop and train a fraud detection prototype. We employ a naive Bayes classifier as our learning algorithm and rely on digital analysis to identify the features that are most informative about class distinctions. To evaluate the detection capability of the classifier, we use authentic data drawn from a novel data…
Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from Latin America
I used elite survey data and scaling techniques to estimate the location of political actors (parties, chief executives, and legislators) from nine countries in a common ideological space. The recovered ideological configuration of each country accurately reflects the description of that country's political landscape given by the popular press and in the scholarly literature. My findings demonstrate that data generated by survey responses can be …
Political Prowess or “Lady Luck”? Evaluating Chief Executives’ Legislative Success Rates
How successful should we expect chief executives to be in their relationships with the legislature? Answering this question is key to making judgments about the political prowess and lawmaking abilities of particular rulers. I introduce a standard to compare the actual performances of chief executives around the world based on the notion that variations in chief executives' legislative success rates stem from the unpredictability of legislators' …
Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage: Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign Borrowing
This article examines the effect of political institutions on countries’ risk characteristics and the role that domestic political institutions play in determining the interest rates charged to less developed countries. According to the “democratic advantage” argument, democracies should pay lower interest rates than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. The author argues that such a claim must be revise…
Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out that government coalitions occur in more than one half of the situations in which the pres…
Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out that government coalitions occur in more than one half of the situations in which the pres…
Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from Latin America
I used elite survey data and scaling techniques to estimate the location of political actors (parties, chief executives, and legislators) from nine countries in a common ideological space. The recovered ideological configuration of each country accurately reflects the description of that country's political landscape given by the popular press and in the scholarly literature. My findings demonstrate that data generated by survey responses can be …
Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage: Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign Borrowing
This article examines the effect of political institutions on countries’ risk characteristics and the role that domestic political institutions play in determining the interest rates charged to less developed countries. According to the “democratic advantage” argument, democracies should pay lower interest rates than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. The author argues that such a claim must be revise…
Using Joint Scaling Methods to Study Ideology and Representation: Evidence from Latin America
In this article, I use joint scaling methods and similar items from three large-scale surveys to place voters, parties, and politicians from different Latin American countries on a common ideological space. The findings reveal that ideology is a significant determinant of vote choice in Latin America. They also suggest that the success of leftist leaders at the polls reflects the views of the voters sustaining their victories. The location of par…
Political Prowess or “Lady Luck”? Evaluating Chief Executives’ Legislative Success Rates
How successful should we expect chief executives to be in their relationships with the legislature? Answering this question is key to making judgments about the political prowess and lawmaking abilities of particular rulers. I introduce a standard to compare the actual performances of chief executives around the world based on the notion that variations in chief executives' legislative success rates stem from the unpredictability of legislators' …
Fraudulent Democracy? An Analysis of Argentina'sInfamous DecadeUsing Supervised Machine Learning
In this paper, we introduce an innovative method to diagnose electoral fraud using vote counts. Specifically, we use synthetic data to develop and train a fraud detection prototype. We employ a naive Bayes classifier as our learning algorithm and rely on digital analysis to identify the features that are most informative about class distinctions. To evaluate the detection capability of the classifier, we use authentic data drawn from a novel data…
Executive Constraint and Sovereign Debt: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Argentina During the Baring Crisis
The literature on whether executive constraint improves the credibility of sovereign debt takes the political regime as the unit of analysis, typically computing an average yield or price for each regime, and then relating that average to regime characteristics. In this article, we take the individual bond issue as the unit of analysis, examining quasi-experimental evidence from two Argentine sovereign debts issued in the 1880s. The loans were so…
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other’s project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O’Donnell ( Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an ‘…
Political institutions and sovereign borrowing: Evidence from nineteenth-century Argentina
Introduction to the Virtual Issue: Addressing Measurement Comparability in Survey Research
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
Are government coalitions less frequent under presidentialism than under parliamentarism? Do legislative deadlocks occur when presidents do not form majoritarian governments? Are presidential democracies more brittle when they are ruled by minorities? We answer these questions observing almost all democracies that existed between 1946 and 1999. It turns out that government coalitions occur in more than one half of the situations in which the pres…
Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage: Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign Borrowing
This article examines the effect of political institutions on countries’ risk characteristics and the role that domestic political institutions play in determining the interest rates charged to less developed countries. According to the “democratic advantage” argument, democracies should pay lower interest rates than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. The author argues that such a claim must be revise…
Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from Latin America
I used elite survey data and scaling techniques to estimate the location of political actors (parties, chief executives, and legislators) from nine countries in a common ideological space. The recovered ideological configuration of each country accurately reflects the description of that country's political landscape given by the popular press and in the scholarly literature. My findings demonstrate that data generated by survey responses can be …
Political Prowess or “Lady Luck”? Evaluating Chief Executives’ Legislative Success Rates
How successful should we expect chief executives to be in their relationships with the legislature? Answering this question is key to making judgments about the political prowess and lawmaking abilities of particular rulers. I introduce a standard to compare the actual performances of chief executives around the world based on the notion that variations in chief executives' legislative success rates stem from the unpredictability of legislators' …
Fraudulent Democracy? An Analysis of Argentina'sInfamous DecadeUsing Supervised Machine Learning
In this paper, we introduce an innovative method to diagnose electoral fraud using vote counts. Specifically, we use synthetic data to develop and train a fraud detection prototype. We employ a naive Bayes classifier as our learning algorithm and rely on digital analysis to identify the features that are most informative about class distinctions. To evaluate the detection capability of the classifier, we use authentic data drawn from a novel data…
Political institutions and sovereign borrowing: Evidence from nineteenth-century Argentina
Using Joint Scaling Methods to Study Ideology and Representation: Evidence from Latin America
In this article, I use joint scaling methods and similar items from three large-scale surveys to place voters, parties, and politicians from different Latin American countries on a common ideological space. The findings reveal that ideology is a significant determinant of vote choice in Latin America. They also suggest that the success of leftist leaders at the polls reflects the views of the voters sustaining their victories. The location of par…
Introduction to the Virtual Issue: Addressing Measurement Comparability in Survey Research
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
An empirical stochastic model of Argentina’s Impossible Game (1955–1966)
Argentine politics from 1955 to 1966 was characterized by the conflict between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists. While each camp could veto the other’s project, neither could advance their own agenda. In his canonical interpretation, O’Donnell ( Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973) concluded that party democracy during this era was tantamount to an ‘…
Executive Constraint and Sovereign Debt: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Argentina During the Baring Crisis
The literature on whether executive constraint improves the credibility of sovereign debt takes the political regime as the unit of analysis, typically computing an average yield or price for each regime, and then relating that average to regime characteristics. In this article, we take the individual bond issue as the unit of analysis, examining quasi-experimental evidence from two Argentine sovereign debts issued in the 1880s. The loans were so…
Tax havens and income inequality in host countries
The association between tax havens and income distribution in home states of multinational corporations has attracted much attention. However, studies have not empirically investigated whether there is also a relationship between low-tax jurisdictions and income inequality in host countries. Our findings, based on data from 152 countries spanning 1972-2020 and a range of econometric strategies, reveal a robust positive relationship between tax ha…
Political science (9 works) · Politics (9 works) · Economics (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Democracy (4 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works)