Executive Constraint and Sovereign Debt
Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Argentina During the Baring Crisis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6245239 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gary W Cox (0000-0002-9256-5193, Stanford University, CA, USA), Sebastián Saiegh (0000-0002-7508-7804, University of California San Diego, corresponding author), Sebastian M Saiegh (University of California, San Diego, CA, USA) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Pages | 1504-1525 |
| Publication date | 2018-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Comparative Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010414018774363 |
| OpenAlex | W2800260559 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 23 |
The literature on whether executive constraint improves the credibility of sovereign debt takes the political regime as the unit of analysis, typically computing an average yield or price for each regime, and then relating that average to regime characteristics. In this article, we take the individual bond issue as the unit of analysis, examining quasi-experimental evidence from two Argentine sovereign debts issued in the 1880s. The loans were sought by the same government and offered nearly identical terms to borrowers, except that one was funded and the other was unfunded. The loans sold at virtually the same price until the Baring crisis of November 16, 1890 erupted. Thereafter, their price histories diverged markedly. We analyze the market’s evolving valuation of the two loans before and after the Baring crisis using a difference-in-differences estimator and weekly price data. Our study shows that exposure to executive discretion strongly influences market assessments of value
Constraint (computer-aided design · Credibility · Debt · Economics · Financial economics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · Sovereign debt · Sovereignty · Valuation (finance · Value (mathematics · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
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Domestic Political Unrest and Sovereign Bond Ratings in the Developing World
Coming to Terms
Sovereign Risk and Government Change
Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions and Global Capital Cycles
Economic costs of democratic backsliding
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States of Credit
The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices
Between Revolution and the Ballot Box
Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State
Mostly Harmless Econometrics
Alternative Outcomes of the Latin American Debt Crisis
Political institutions and sovereign borrowing
Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in Nineteenth-Century Peru
Constitutions and Commitment
The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 1890s
Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274–1785
Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders
Political Institutions, Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies
Sovereign Debt and Regime Type
Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage
The Economic Costs of Conflict
The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,4 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |