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Annick Laruelle

Biographic Data

ID4270838
NAMEAnnick Laruelle
GIVEN NAMESAnnick
FAMILY NAMELaruelle
SIGNATURELARUELLE A
AFFILIATIONSIkerbasque
ORCID0000-0002-7065-7070
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS37
AUTHOR COUNT10
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1998
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX3
  • Queen Elisabeth competition

    Open Access•Sébastien Courtin, Marin Gohard et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Cultural Economics•2026

  • Independent collective identity functions as voting rules

    Open Access•José Carlos R Alcantud, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Theory and Decision•2020

  • Multi-dimensional rules

    Open Access•Sébastien Courtin, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Proficiency, Attitude, and Conventions in Minority Languages

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Noemí Navarro et al.•ARTICLE•Sociological Methods & Research•2019•References: 5

    In this article, we study a simple mathematical model of a bilingual community in which all agents are fluent in the majority language but only a fraction of the population has some degree of proficiency in the minority language. We investigate how different distributions of proficiency, combined with the speakers' attitudes toward or against the minority language, may influence its use in pair conversations

  • Collective identity functions with status quo

    Open Access•José Carlos R Alcantud, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2018•References: 13

  • Majorities with a quorum

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 10

    Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…

  • Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2008•Cited by: 2•References: 26

    Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …

  • Success Versus Decisiveness

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Ricardo Martínez et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 23

    In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union

  • A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 2•References: 32

  • Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Mika Widgrèn•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1998•Cited by: 24•References: 9

  • Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Mika Widgrèn•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1998•Cited by: 24•References: 9

  • Success Versus Decisiveness

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Ricardo Martínez et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 23

    In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union

  • Majorities with a quorum

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 10

    Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…

  • Multi-dimensional rules

    Open Access•Sébastien Courtin, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2008•Cited by: 2•References: 26

    Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …

  • A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 2•References: 32

  • Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Mika Widgrèn•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1998•Cited by: 24•References: 9

  • A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 2•References: 32

  • Success Versus Decisiveness

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Ricardo Martínez et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 23

    In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union

  • Bargaining in Committees of Representatives

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2008•Cited by: 2•References: 26

    Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …

  • Majorities with a quorum

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 10

    Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…

  • Collective identity functions with status quo

    Open Access•José Carlos R Alcantud, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2018•References: 13

  • Proficiency, Attitude, and Conventions in Minority Languages

    Open Access•Annick Laruelle, Noemí Navarro et al.•ARTICLE•Sociological Methods & Research•2019•References: 5

    In this article, we study a simple mathematical model of a bilingual community in which all agents are fluent in the majority language but only a fraction of the population has some degree of proficiency in the minority language. We investigate how different distributions of proficiency, combined with the speakers' attitudes toward or against the minority language, may influence its use in pair conversations

  • Independent collective identity functions as voting rules

    Open Access•José Carlos R Alcantud, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Theory and Decision•2020

  • Multi-dimensional rules

    Open Access•Sébastien Courtin, Annick Laruelle•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2020•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Queen Elisabeth competition

    Open Access•Sébastien Courtin, Marin Gohard et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Cultural Economics•2026

Game Theory and Voting Systems (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Voting (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works)

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