Bargaining in Committees of Representatives
The `Neutral' Voting Rule
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298372 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Annick Laruelle (0000-0002-7065-7070, UFR Sciences Economiques et Gestion, Université de Caen, Esplanade de la Paix, F-14032 Caen Cedex, France, annick.laruelle@ anicaen.fr), Federico Valenciano (0000-0001-8750-9122, Departamento de Economia Aplicada IV, Unversidad del Pais Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, E-48015 Bibao, Spain) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 93-106 |
| Publication date | 2008-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629807084041 |
| OpenAlex | W1997338699 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 26 |
Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place `in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of consensus. That is, a general agreement is sought, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement. In this context, the notion of a `neutral' voting rule, based on the compromise between equitableness and efficiency (or egalitarianism and utilitarianism) represented by the Nash bargaining solution, is founded, yielding a recommendation that differs from previous ones
Approval voting · Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Compromise · Context (archaeology · Economics · Egalitarianism · Group Decision Making · Law and economics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Shadow (psychology · Voting · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Psychology
The Measurement of Voting Power
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting
The Bargaining Problem
A group bargaining solution
Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair
On the Weights of Nations
Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union
Is it Better to Be Powerful or Lucky
Success Versus Decisiveness
Political Theory and Political Science
Bargaining in Legislatures
Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.21 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2017 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |