On the Weights of Nations
Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10180686 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Salvador Barberà (0000-0001-6586-2398, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona), Matthew O Jackson (0000-0001-9846-4249, California Institute of Technology) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 114 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 317-339 |
| Publication date | 2006-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/501172 |
| OpenAlex | W2132523251 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 16 |
We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents' preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution
Constitution · Democracy · Economics · European union · International trade · Political science · Politics · Population · Public economics · Sociology · Status quo · Treaty · Voting · Demography · Economic Policies and Impacts · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
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Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union
Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair
Is it Better to Be Powerful or Lucky
Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after the Next Enlargement
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| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1.5 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |