Salvador Barberà
Biographic Data
| ID | 1456881 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Salvador Barberà |
| GIVEN NAMES | Salvador |
| FAMILY NAME | Barberà |
| SIGNATURE | BARBERÀ S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6586-2398 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules d…
(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns
Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenome…
Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
Information disclosure with many alternatives
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries’ ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution’s success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogene…
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
Équilibrer l'information et l'analyse
Indifferences and Domain Restrictions
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which allowing for individuals to be indifferent among alternatives may alter the qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory when domain restrictions are defined on profiles of linear orders. The general message is that indifferences require attention and careful treatment, because the translation of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents may be i…
On the Weights of Nations
We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the populati…
On coalition formation
Notas sobre incertidumbre, flexibilidad, y ordenaciones de conjuntos
Muchas de nuestras decisiones nos cierran algunas puertas, dejando otras abiertas. Aunque en ocasiones podamos prever con certeza los resultados de cada accion posible, en otras es mas adecuado definir la naturaleza de nuestros actos como secuencias de decisiones que van alterando nuestros margenes de actuacion futura. Naturalmente, todo es cuestion del ambito de decisiones que estemos considerando, y del horizonte a tener en cuenta. Segun que op…
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
On the Relationship between Economic Development and Political Democracy
Until the mid 1970s, with the notable exceptions of India and Costa Rica, only highly developed economies enjoyed political democracy. Many theories have been proposed to explain this apparent relationship between development and democracy. I think they can be divided into two groups. The first consists of those theories based upon the growth of the power of a class, or the formation of a coalition of classes, in whose interests democracy, or ext…
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
On the Weights of Nations
We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the populati…
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries’ ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution’s success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogene…
Indifferences and Domain Restrictions
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which allowing for individuals to be indifferent among alternatives may alter the qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory when domain restrictions are defined on profiles of linear orders. The general message is that indifferences require attention and careful treatment, because the translation of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents may be i…
(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns
Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenome…
On coalition formation
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
On the Relationship between Economic Development and Political Democracy
Until the mid 1970s, with the notable exceptions of India and Costa Rica, only highly developed economies enjoyed political democracy. Many theories have been proposed to explain this apparent relationship between development and democracy. I think they can be divided into two groups. The first consists of those theories based upon the growth of the power of a class, or the formation of a coalition of classes, in whose interests democracy, or ext…
Notas sobre incertidumbre, flexibilidad, y ordenaciones de conjuntos
Muchas de nuestras decisiones nos cierran algunas puertas, dejando otras abiertas. Aunque en ocasiones podamos prever con certeza los resultados de cada accion posible, en otras es mas adecuado definir la naturaleza de nuestros actos como secuencias de decisiones que van alterando nuestros margenes de actuacion futura. Naturalmente, todo es cuestion del ambito de decisiones que estemos considerando, y del horizonte a tener en cuenta. Segun que op…
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
On coalition formation
On the Weights of Nations
We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district's vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the populati…
Indifferences and Domain Restrictions
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which allowing for individuals to be indifferent among alternatives may alter the qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory when domain restrictions are defined on profiles of linear orders. The general message is that indifferences require attention and careful treatment, because the translation of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents may be i…
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
Équilibrer l'information et l'analyse
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
A collective action or revolt succeeds only if sufficiently many people participate. We study how potential revolutionaries’ ability to coordinate is affected by what they learn from different sources. We first examine how people learn about the likelihood of a revolution’s success by talking to those around themselves, which can either work in favor or against the success of an uprising, depending on the prior beliefs of the agents, the homogene…
Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
Information disclosure with many alternatives
(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns
Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenome…
Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules d…
Computer Science (10 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (10 works) · Economics (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works)