Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21470435 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Salvador Barberà (0000-0001-6586-2398, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona), Dolors Berga (0000-0002-4873-7904, Universitat de Girona, corresponding author), Bernardo Moreno (0000-0003-0651-4427, Universidad de Málaga), Antonio Nicolò (0000-0001-5405-4889, University of Padua) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 309-333 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00355-024-01575-6 |
| OpenAlex | W4406143072 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict)
Arrow · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Economics · International political economy · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Pairwise comparison · Political science · Public finance · Social choice theory · Statistics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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