Federico Valenciano
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386099 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Federico Valenciano |
| GIVEN NAMES | Federico |
| FAMILY NAME | Valenciano |
| SIGNATURE | VALENCIANO F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of the Basque Country |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8750-9122 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Core–periphery and nested networks emerging from a simple model of network formation
Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation
Majorities with a quorum
Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…
Bargaining in Committees of Representatives
Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …
Success Versus Decisiveness
In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union
A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes
Success Versus Decisiveness
In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union
Majorities with a quorum
Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…
Bargaining in Committees of Representatives
Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …
A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes
A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes
Success Versus Decisiveness
In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union
Bargaining in Committees of Representatives
Committees are often made up of representatives, each of them acting on behalf of a group of individuals or constituency of different size, who make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations in the committee can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of an `adequate' (in a sense to be specified) voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this article we take …
Majorities with a quorum
Based on a general model of the ‘quaternary’ voting rule, sensitive to voters’ choices between four different options (abstaining, voting ‘yes’, voting ‘no’ and staying at home), we systematically study different types of majority and quorum. The model allows for a precise formulation of majority rules and quorum constraints. For such rules four types of majority can be defined. We also consider four types of quorum. Then we study the possible co…
Unilateral vs. bilateral link-formation
Core–periphery and nested networks emerging from a simple model of network formation
Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Voting (4 works) · Cardinal voting systems (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works)