Shlomi Segall
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281689 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shlomi Segall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shlomi |
| FAMILY NAME | Segall |
| SIGNATURE | SEGALL S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9124-3600 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
To be (disadvantaged) or not to be? An egalitarian guide for creating new people
Derek Parfit held that in evaluating the future, we should ignore the difference between necessary persons and merely possible persons. In this article, I look at one of the most prominent alternatives to Parfit's view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘shortfall complaints’ view. In that view, we aggregate future persons’ well-being and deduct intrapersonal shortfall complaints, giving extra weight to the complaints of necessary persons. I…
Equality or priority about competing claims
According to the Competing Claims View (CCV) we decide between alternatives by looking at the competing claims held by affected individuals. The strength of these claims is a function of two features: how much they stand to benefit (or lose) by each alternative, and how badly off they would be in its absence. The view can be, and is, endorsed by both egalitarians and prioritarians. For the former the second condition will concern looking at how b…
Why We Should be Negative about Positive Egalitarianism
The article assesses recent attempts to deflect two persistent objections to Positive Egalitarianism (PE), the view that equality adds to the goodness of a state of affairs. The first says that PE entails bringing into existence individuals who are equal to each other in leading horrible lives, such that they are worth not living. I assess three strategies for deflecting this objection: offering a restricted version of PE; biting the bullet; and …
Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons
Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while ineq…
Why inequality matters
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value
Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or …
Incas and Aliens: The Truth in Telic Egalitarianism
The paper seeks to defend Telic Egalitarianism (TE) by distinguishing two distinct categories into which typical objections to it fall. According to one category of objections (for example, levelling down) TE is groundless . That is, there is simply no good reason to think that inequality as such is bad. The other type of objections to TE focuses on its counterintuitive implications: it is forced to condemn inequalities between ourselves and long…
Equality for Inegalitarians
A favourite New Yorker cartoon shows two drifters shooting the breeze, and one telling the other: ‘Good news: I hear the paradigm is shifting’. George Sher's most recent book provides, perhaps despite itself, evidence for such a paradigm shift in egalitarian thinking. It abandons the decades-long preoccupation with Rawlsianism and focuses exclusively on luck egalitarianism. Put simply, whatever other distinctions it might have, this book may stic…
What is the Point of Sufficiency
Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it…
In defense of priority (and equality)
In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of (some of) its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attra…
Equality and Opportunity
Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in egalitarian thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments in egalitarian theory and offers a comprehensive account of 'radical equality of opportunity'
Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality
Should the Best Qualified Be Appointed?
The paper examines the view that individuals have a claim to the jobs for which they are the best qualified. It seeks to show this view to be groundless, and to offer, instead, a luck egalitarian account of justice in hiring. That account consists of three components: monism, non-meritocracy, and non-discrimination. To demonstrate the coherence of this view, two particular internal conflicts are addressed. First, luck egalitarian monism (the view…
What's so Bad about Discrimination
The article argues that discrimination is bad as such when and because it undermines equality of opportunity. It shows, first, that other accounts, such as those concerning intent, efficiency, false representation, prejudice, respect and desert cannot account for the badness of discrimination as such. The inequality of opportunity account, in contrast, captures everything that is bad about discrimination. The article then addresses some counter-e…
If you’re a luck egalitarian, how come you read bedtime stories to your children
We now know that intimate forms of parental partiality, such as bedtime storytelling, may entrench socio‐economic inequalities. Egalitarians will differ on how it is proper to handle the equality‐upsetting effect of intimate parental partiality. Rawlsians propose mitigating the resulting inequalities in nurtured skills (that is, prevent them from translating into social and political advantages later in life). Luck egalitarians, in contrast, prop…
Health, Luck, and Justice
"Luck egalitarianism"--the idea that justice requires correcting disadvantages resulting from brute luck--has gained ground in recent years and is now the main rival to John Rawls's theory of distributive justice. Health, Luck, and Justice is the first attempt to systematically apply luck egalitarianism to the just distribution of health and health care. Challenging Rawlsian approaches to health policy, Shlomi Segall develops an account of just h…
In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism
Is Health Care (Still) Special
Unconditional welfare benefits and the principle of reciprocity
Stuart White and others claim that providing welfare benefits to citizens who do not, and are not willing to, work breaches the principle of reciprocity. This, they argue, justifies placing a minimum work requirement on welfare recipients. This article seeks to rebut their claim. It begins by rejecting the attempt to ground the work requirement on a civic obligation to work. The article then explores the principle of reciprocity, and argues that …
Political Participation as an Engine of Social Solidarity: A Sceptical View
Political theorists sometimes advocate the intensification of citizens' participation in politics, on the grounds that this serves as an engine for the cultivation of social solidarity and civic virtue. I argue against such an initiative and set out the case for a more nuanced examination of the effect of particular modes of political participation on social solidarity, in light of recent empirical literature. Against the assertions of the theori…
Unconditional welfare benefits and the principle of reciprocity
Stuart White and others claim that providing welfare benefits to citizens who do not, and are not willing to, work breaches the principle of reciprocity. This, they argue, justifies placing a minimum work requirement on welfare recipients. This article seeks to rebut their claim. It begins by rejecting the attempt to ground the work requirement on a civic obligation to work. The article then explores the principle of reciprocity, and argues that …
Political Participation as an Engine of Social Solidarity: A Sceptical View
Political theorists sometimes advocate the intensification of citizens' participation in politics, on the grounds that this serves as an engine for the cultivation of social solidarity and civic virtue. I argue against such an initiative and set out the case for a more nuanced examination of the effect of particular modes of political participation on social solidarity, in light of recent empirical literature. Against the assertions of the theori…
What is the Point of Sufficiency
Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it…
What's so Bad about Discrimination
The article argues that discrimination is bad as such when and because it undermines equality of opportunity. It shows, first, that other accounts, such as those concerning intent, efficiency, false representation, prejudice, respect and desert cannot account for the badness of discrimination as such. The inequality of opportunity account, in contrast, captures everything that is bad about discrimination. The article then addresses some counter-e…
If you’re a luck egalitarian, how come you read bedtime stories to your children
We now know that intimate forms of parental partiality, such as bedtime storytelling, may entrench socio‐economic inequalities. Egalitarians will differ on how it is proper to handle the equality‐upsetting effect of intimate parental partiality. Rawlsians propose mitigating the resulting inequalities in nurtured skills (that is, prevent them from translating into social and political advantages later in life). Luck egalitarians, in contrast, prop…
Is Health Care (Still) Special
In defense of priority (and equality)
In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of (some of) its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attra…
To be (disadvantaged) or not to be? An egalitarian guide for creating new people
Derek Parfit held that in evaluating the future, we should ignore the difference between necessary persons and merely possible persons. In this article, I look at one of the most prominent alternatives to Parfit's view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘shortfall complaints’ view. In that view, we aggregate future persons’ well-being and deduct intrapersonal shortfall complaints, giving extra weight to the complaints of necessary persons. I…
Unconditional welfare benefits and the principle of reciprocity
Stuart White and others claim that providing welfare benefits to citizens who do not, and are not willing to, work breaches the principle of reciprocity. This, they argue, justifies placing a minimum work requirement on welfare recipients. This article seeks to rebut their claim. It begins by rejecting the attempt to ground the work requirement on a civic obligation to work. The article then explores the principle of reciprocity, and argues that …
Political Participation as an Engine of Social Solidarity: A Sceptical View
Political theorists sometimes advocate the intensification of citizens' participation in politics, on the grounds that this serves as an engine for the cultivation of social solidarity and civic virtue. I argue against such an initiative and set out the case for a more nuanced examination of the effect of particular modes of political participation on social solidarity, in light of recent empirical literature. Against the assertions of the theori…
In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism
Is Health Care (Still) Special
Health, Luck, and Justice
"Luck egalitarianism"--the idea that justice requires correcting disadvantages resulting from brute luck--has gained ground in recent years and is now the main rival to John Rawls's theory of distributive justice. Health, Luck, and Justice is the first attempt to systematically apply luck egalitarianism to the just distribution of health and health care. Challenging Rawlsian approaches to health policy, Shlomi Segall develops an account of just h…
If you’re a luck egalitarian, how come you read bedtime stories to your children
We now know that intimate forms of parental partiality, such as bedtime storytelling, may entrench socio‐economic inequalities. Egalitarians will differ on how it is proper to handle the equality‐upsetting effect of intimate parental partiality. Rawlsians propose mitigating the resulting inequalities in nurtured skills (that is, prevent them from translating into social and political advantages later in life). Luck egalitarians, in contrast, prop…
Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality
Should the Best Qualified Be Appointed?
The paper examines the view that individuals have a claim to the jobs for which they are the best qualified. It seeks to show this view to be groundless, and to offer, instead, a luck egalitarian account of justice in hiring. That account consists of three components: monism, non-meritocracy, and non-discrimination. To demonstrate the coherence of this view, two particular internal conflicts are addressed. First, luck egalitarian monism (the view…
What's so Bad about Discrimination
The article argues that discrimination is bad as such when and because it undermines equality of opportunity. It shows, first, that other accounts, such as those concerning intent, efficiency, false representation, prejudice, respect and desert cannot account for the badness of discrimination as such. The inequality of opportunity account, in contrast, captures everything that is bad about discrimination. The article then addresses some counter-e…
Equality and Opportunity
Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in egalitarian thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments in egalitarian theory and offers a comprehensive account of 'radical equality of opportunity'
What is the Point of Sufficiency
Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it…
In defense of priority (and equality)
In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of (some of) its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attra…
Equality for Inegalitarians
A favourite New Yorker cartoon shows two drifters shooting the breeze, and one telling the other: ‘Good news: I hear the paradigm is shifting’. George Sher's most recent book provides, perhaps despite itself, evidence for such a paradigm shift in egalitarian thinking. It abandons the decades-long preoccupation with Rawlsianism and focuses exclusively on luck egalitarianism. Put simply, whatever other distinctions it might have, this book may stic…
Why inequality matters
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value
Equality is a key concept in our moral and political vocabulary. There is wide agreement on its instrumental value and its favourable impact on many aspects of society, but less certainty over whether it has a non-instrumental or intrinsic value that can be demonstrated. In this project, Shlomi Segall explores and defends the view that it does. He argues that the value of equality is not reducible to a concern we might have for the worse off, or …
Incas and Aliens: The Truth in Telic Egalitarianism
The paper seeks to defend Telic Egalitarianism (TE) by distinguishing two distinct categories into which typical objections to it fall. According to one category of objections (for example, levelling down) TE is groundless . That is, there is simply no good reason to think that inequality as such is bad. The other type of objections to TE focuses on its counterintuitive implications: it is forced to condemn inequalities between ourselves and long…
Why We Should be Negative about Positive Egalitarianism
The article assesses recent attempts to deflect two persistent objections to Positive Egalitarianism (PE), the view that equality adds to the goodness of a state of affairs. The first says that PE entails bringing into existence individuals who are equal to each other in leading horrible lives, such that they are worth not living. I assess three strategies for deflecting this objection: offering a restricted version of PE; biting the bullet; and …
Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons
Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while ineq…
Equality or priority about competing claims
According to the Competing Claims View (CCV) we decide between alternatives by looking at the competing claims held by affected individuals. The strength of these claims is a function of two features: how much they stand to benefit (or lose) by each alternative, and how badly off they would be in its absence. The view can be, and is, endorsed by both egalitarians and prioritarians. For the former the second condition will concern looking at how b…
To be (disadvantaged) or not to be? An egalitarian guide for creating new people
Derek Parfit held that in evaluating the future, we should ignore the difference between necessary persons and merely possible persons. In this article, I look at one of the most prominent alternatives to Parfit's view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘shortfall complaints’ view. In that view, we aggregate future persons’ well-being and deduct intrapersonal shortfall complaints, giving extra weight to the complaints of necessary persons. I…
Sociology (18 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (17 works) · Political science (16 works) · Law (15 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Economics (10 works) · Politics (10 works) · Positive economics (10 works) · Egalitarianism (9 works)