Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons

Bibliographic Data

ID4352185
AuthorsShlomi Segall (0000-0002-9124-3600, The Program in Politics, Philosophy, & Economics (PPE), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume69
Issue274
Pages142-155
Publication date2019-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqy035
OpenAlexW2887382672
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited16

Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while inequality as such does not matter, what does matter is that all individuals meet some adequate threshold (say, of well-being). It is often taken for granted that sufficientarianism does not violate the separateness of persons. In this paper, I seek to show that that is not the case. The main challenge, however, proves to be formulating an accurate understanding of what the separateness of persons precisely means. I offer several interpretations and argue that sufficientarianism, surprisingly, violates them all. Sufficientarianism, just like utilitarianism does not respect the separateness of persons.

Distributive property · Economics · Epistemology · Interpersonal communication · Intrapersonal communication · Law and economics · Positive economics · Sociology · Utilitarianism · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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