Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12228751 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alex Voorhoeve (0000-0003-3240-3835, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author), Marc Fleurbaey (0000-0002-5342-8065, Princeton University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 381-398 |
| Publication date | 2012-08-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820812000040 |
| OpenAlex | W2070111050 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 34 |
| References cited | 18 |
The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intra personal trade-offs to making inter personal trade-offs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that a view which is concerned with both outcome inequality and with the unfairness of inequality in individuals’ expected utilities can account for this shift. Finally, we limn an alternative view, on which such inequalities are not intrinsically bad, but nonetheless determine the strength of individuals’ competing claims. We argue that this ‘Competing Claims View’ can also account for the shift
Economics · Egalitarianism · Inequality · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Welfare economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law · Mathematics · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 34 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,83 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 34 |