Simon Kittle
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281734 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon Kittle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon |
| FAMILY NAME | Kittle |
| SIGNATURE | KITTLE S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Leeds |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6056-4970 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Moral responsibility and general ability
It is widely believed that an agent can be morally responsible for something only if they were able to do otherwise. But what kind of ability to do otherwise is needed? Despite the obvious disagreements, incompatibilist and compatibilist leeway theorists tend to agree that, at the very least, an agent needs the ‘general’ ability to do otherwise. Cyr and Swenson [Cyr, T. W., and P. Swenson. 2019. “Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.” The…
On General and Non‐General Abilities
I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn't entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘general’ and ‘generic’, respectively – produce two orthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of gener…
Mindfulness and Agential Control
Mindfulness meditation seems to generate the following puzzle: On one hand, mindfulness reveals to the meditator that many of their thoughts are outside of their control and leads to a diminished sense of self; on the other, regular mindfulness practice is supposed to lead to greater self-awareness and self-control. In this article, the author develops an agent-causal account of agential control that explains both claims. It is suggested that the…
God is (Probably) a Cause among Causes: Why the Primary/Secondary Cause Distinction Doesn’t Help in Developing Non-interventionist Accounts of Special Divine Action
Several recent authors have suggested that much of the discussion on divine action is flawed since it presupposes that divine and human agency compete. Such authors advocate a re-appropriation of the Scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation which, it is suggested, solves many problems in the theology of divine action. This article critiques defences of the primary/secondary cause distinction based on appeals to analogical pr…
How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will
This essay is an investigation into the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent functional specification of the relevant sense of ‘able’ is flawed, and that explicating the powers involved in free will shall likely require paying detailed attention to the semantics and pragmatics of ‘can’ and ‘able’. Further, I argue that van Inwagen's promise…
Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices
Sennett (1999) and Pawl and Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom . Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this article I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl and Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show…
Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic …
Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic …
Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic …
Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices
Sennett (1999) and Pawl and Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom . Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this article I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl and Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show…
God is (Probably) a Cause among Causes: Why the Primary/Secondary Cause Distinction Doesn’t Help in Developing Non-interventionist Accounts of Special Divine Action
Several recent authors have suggested that much of the discussion on divine action is flawed since it presupposes that divine and human agency compete. Such authors advocate a re-appropriation of the Scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation which, it is suggested, solves many problems in the theology of divine action. This article critiques defences of the primary/secondary cause distinction based on appeals to analogical pr…
How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will
This essay is an investigation into the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent functional specification of the relevant sense of ‘able’ is flawed, and that explicating the powers involved in free will shall likely require paying detailed attention to the semantics and pragmatics of ‘can’ and ‘able’. Further, I argue that van Inwagen's promise…
On General and Non‐General Abilities
I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn't entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘general’ and ‘generic’, respectively – produce two orthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of gener…
Mindfulness and Agential Control
Mindfulness meditation seems to generate the following puzzle: On one hand, mindfulness reveals to the meditator that many of their thoughts are outside of their control and leads to a diminished sense of self; on the other, regular mindfulness practice is supposed to lead to greater self-awareness and self-control. In this article, the author develops an agent-causal account of agential control that explains both claims. It is suggested that the…
Moral responsibility and general ability
It is widely believed that an agent can be morally responsible for something only if they were able to do otherwise. But what kind of ability to do otherwise is needed? Despite the obvious disagreements, incompatibilist and compatibilist leeway theorists tend to agree that, at the very least, an agent needs the ‘general’ ability to do otherwise. Cyr and Swenson [Cyr, T. W., and P. Swenson. 2019. “Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.” The…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Compatibilism (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Generality (2 works)