Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5000273 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Simon Kittle (0000-0002-6056-4970, Sheffield Industrial Museums Trust, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 260 |
| Pages | 372-380 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqu097 |
| OpenAlex | W1982997389 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 13 |
Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not.
Epistemology · Intrinsic motivation · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |