Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351671 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sungho Choi (0000-0001-7936-1842, Seoul National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 220 |
| Pages | 495-503 |
| Publication date | 2005-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00413.x |
| OpenAlex | W2153025816 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 7 |
Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his ‘conditional conditionals’, which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's ‘conditional conditionals’
Categorical imperative · Categorical variable · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Statistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
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Unfinkable dispositions
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Dispositional realism without dispositional essences
Powers Opposed and Intrinsic Finks
The power to tolerate
Intrinsic Finks
The Metaphysics of Desire and Dispositions
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,72 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2025 (18) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |