Andreas Bengtson
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281795 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andreas Bengtson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andreas |
| FAMILY NAME | Bengtson |
| SIGNATURE | BENGTSON A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9224-8756 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 32 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 32 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Having enough of a say
Political Equality is the view that, in political matters, everyone should have an equal say. Political Sufficiency is the view that, in political matters, everyone should have enough of a say. Whereas Political Equality is concerned with relativities, Political Sufficiency is a matter of absolutes. It is natural to assume that, to justify ‘one person, one vote’, we must appeal to Political Equality. We argue that this is not the case. If Politic…
Finding a fundamental principle of democratic inclusion: Related, not affected or subjected
The question of who should be included in democratic decision-making is known as the boundary problem in democratic theory. I identify two requirements that a satisfactory solution to the boundary problem must satisfy, i.e. the Considered Judgment Requirement and the Value Requirement. I argue that the two most prominent solutions to the boundary problem—the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle—fail to satisfy these requirements…
Politics and Foreign Donations
The (potentially) disturbing role of money in politics has received quite a lot of attention in both scholarly and public debate. But these discussions typically focus on domestic contexts. Sometimes, as in the case of the Dutch billionaire Steven Schuurman, wealthy individuals donate money to politics abroad. In this article, we ask: Is there anything distinctively wrongful about billionaires and other wealthy individuals using their financial r…
Can Relational Egalitarians Supply Both an Account of Justice and an Account of the Value of Democracy or Must They Choose Which
Construed as a theory of justice, relational egalitarianism says that justice requires that people relate as equals. Construed as a theory of what makes democracy valuable, it says that democracy is a necessary, or constituent, part of the value of relating as equals. Typically, relational egalitarians want their theory to provide both an account of what justice requires and an account of what makes democracy valuable. We argue that relational eg…
Is Self-Discrimination Disrespectful
Victims of oppressive (e.g., sexist, racist or ableist) structures sometimes internalize the unjust norms that prevail in society. This can cause these victims to develop preferences or make decisions that seem bad for them. Focusing on such cases, we ask: is self-discrimination disrespectful? We show that some of the most sophisticated respect theories fail to provide any clear guidance. Specifically, we show that the widely recognized view that…
Unjust equal relations
According to relational egalitarianism, justice requires equal relations. In this paper, I ask the question: can equal relations be unjust according to relational egalitarianism? I argue that while on some conceptions of relational egalitarianism, equal relations cannot be unjust, there are conceptions in which equal relations can be unjust. Surprisingly, whether equal relations can be unjust cuts across the distinction between responsibility-sen…
Am I Socially Related to Myself
According to relational egalitarianism, justice requires equal relations. The theory applies to those who stand in the relevant social relations. In this paper, I distinguish four different accounts of what it means to be socially related and argue that in all of them, self-relations—how a person relates to themselves—fall within the scope of relational egalitarianism. I also point to how this constrains what a person is allowed to do to themselv…
One person, one vote and the importance of baseline
‘One person, one vote’ is wedded to the idea of democracy to such an extent that many would hesitate to refer to a system, which deviated from this, as a democracy. In this paper, I show why this assumption is hard to defend. I do so by pointing to the importance of baseline in justifying a system of ‘one person, one vote'. The investigation will show that the reasons underlying the most prominent views on democratic inclusion cannot justify ‘one…
Democratic Failures and the Ethics of Democracy
Affirmative action without competition
Affirmative action is standardly pursued in relation to admissions to prestigious universities, in hiring for prestigious jobs, and when it comes to being elected to parliament. Central to these forms of affirmative action is that they have to do with competitive goods. A good is competitive when, if we improve A's chances of obtaining the good, we reduce B's chances of obtaining the good. I call this Competitive Affirmative Action. I distinguish…
Consensual discrimination
What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect, and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account
The intergenerational justice dilemma for relational egalitarians
Relational egalitarianism is a prominent theory of justice according to which justice requires equal relations. However, relational egalitarianism faces a central problem, i.e. the problem of intergenerational justice: the view is silent when it comes to relations between non-overlapping generations. In this paper, I want to explore whether relational egalitarians may escape the problem by adopting a different view of what it means to be relevant…
Doxastic Affirmative Action
According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of th…
Wrongful discrimination against non-pregnant people
A critical take on procreative justice
Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the princip…
What Relational Egalitarians Should (Not) Believe
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up 1
Ambivalent Stereotypes
People often discriminate based on negative or positive stereotypes about others. Important examples of this are highlighted by the theory of ambivalent sexism. This theory distinguishes sexist stereotypes that are negative (hostile sexism) from those that are positive (benevolent sexism). While both forms of sexism are considered wrong toward women, hostile sexism seems intuitively worse than benevolent sexism. In this article, we ask whether th…
Positive and negative affirmative action
Affirmative action continues to divide. My aim in this article is to present participants in the debate with a new distinction, namely one between negative and positive affirmative action. Whereas positive affirmative action has to do with certain goods, such as a place at a prestigious university or a job at a prestigious company, negative affirmative action has to do with certain bads, such as a firing or a sentence. I then argue that some of t…
Affirmative Action in the Political Domain
This article has two parts. First, I argue that three prominent arguments in favour of affirmative action – the mitigating discrimination argument, the equality of opportunity argument and the diversity argument – may be based on a relational egalitarian theory of justice, as opposed to a distributive understanding of justice. Second, I argue that basing these arguments in favour of affirmative action on relational egalitarianism has an interesti…
Affirmative Action, Paternalism, and Respect
This article investigates the hitherto under-examined relations between affirmative action, paternalism, and respect. We provide three main arguments. First, we argue that affirmative action initiatives are typically paternalistic and thus disrespectful towards intended beneficiaries who oppose them. Second, we argue that not introducing affirmative action can be disrespectful towards these potential beneficiaries because such inaction involves a…
Relational Egalitarianism, Paternalism, Adults and Children: A Puzzle
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. However, not just any inegalitarian relation is unjust, i.e., the fact that parents do not relate as equals to their children is not unjust. Whereas an adult treating another adult paternalistically is objectionable from the point of view of relational egalitarianism, parent-child paternalism is not. What may explain this difference in judgment? I re…
The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should all Votes Count the Same
In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenera…
Animals and Relational Egalitarianism(s)
According to relational egalitarianism, a society is just insofar as the relations in that society are equal. Exclusively, relational egalitarians have been concerned with why humans, in particular adults, must relate as equals. This is unfortunate since relational egalitarians claim to be in line with the concerns of real‐life egalitarians; but real‐life egalitarians, such as vegans and vegetarians, clearly care about injustices committed agains…
Relational Justice: Egalitarian and Sufficientarian
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. In this article, we develop relational sufficientarianism – a view of justice according to which people must relate as sufficients. We distinguish between three versions of this ideal, one that is incompatible with relational egalitarianism and two that are not. Building on this, we argue that relational theorists have good reason to support a plural…
Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals
When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an "egalitarian plateau".1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception …
Differential Voting Weights and Relational Egalitarianism
Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as …
Affirmative Action in the Political Domain
This article has two parts. First, I argue that three prominent arguments in favour of affirmative action – the mitigating discrimination argument, the equality of opportunity argument and the diversity argument – may be based on a relational egalitarian theory of justice, as opposed to a distributive understanding of justice. Second, I argue that basing these arguments in favour of affirmative action on relational egalitarianism has an interesti…
Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals
When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an "egalitarian plateau".1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception …
The All-Affected Principle and the Question of Asymmetry
As a solution to the boundary problem, the question of who should take part in making democratic decisions, the all-affected principle has gained widespread support. An unexplored issue in relation to the all-affected principle is whether there is an asymmetry between being affected negatively and positively. Is it the case that only being negatively affected, and not positively affected, by a decision generates a claim to inclusion under the all…
Where Democracy Should Be: On the Site(s) of the All-Subjected Principle
In this paper, I set out to defend the claim that a central principle in democratic theory, the all-subjected principle, applies not only when one is subject to a rule by a state but also when one is subject to a rule by a ‘non-state’ unit. I argue that self-government is the value underlying the all-subjected principle that explains why a subjected individual should be included because she is subjected. Given this, it is unfounded to limit the p…
Affirmative Action, Paternalism, and Respect
This article investigates the hitherto under-examined relations between affirmative action, paternalism, and respect. We provide three main arguments. First, we argue that affirmative action initiatives are typically paternalistic and thus disrespectful towards intended beneficiaries who oppose them. Second, we argue that not introducing affirmative action can be disrespectful towards these potential beneficiaries because such inaction involves a…
Differential Voting Weights and Relational Egalitarianism
Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as …
Why the All-Affected Principle Is Groundless
The all-affected principle is a widely accepted solution to the problem of constituting the demos. Despite its popularity, a basic question in relation to the principle has not received much attention: why does the fact that an individual is affected by a certain decision ground a right to inclusion in democratic decision-making about that matter? An answer to this question must include a reason that explains why an affected individual should be …
The Problem(s) of Constituting the Demos: A (Set of) Solution(s)
When collective decisions should be made democratically, which people form the relevant demos? Many theorists think this question is an embarrassment to democratic theory: (1) because any decision about who forms the demos must be made democratically by the right demos, which itself must be democratically constituted and so on ad infinitum; and (2) because neither the concept of democracy, nor (3) our reasons for caring about democracy, determine…
Where Democracy Should Be: On the Site(s) of the All-Subjected Principle
In this paper, I set out to defend the claim that a central principle in democratic theory, the all-subjected principle, applies not only when one is subject to a rule by a state but also when one is subject to a rule by a ‘non-state’ unit. I argue that self-government is the value underlying the all-subjected principle that explains why a subjected individual should be included because she is subjected. Given this, it is unfounded to limit the p…
The All-Affected Principle and the Question of Asymmetry
As a solution to the boundary problem, the question of who should take part in making democratic decisions, the all-affected principle has gained widespread support. An unexplored issue in relation to the all-affected principle is whether there is an asymmetry between being affected negatively and positively. Is it the case that only being negatively affected, and not positively affected, by a decision generates a claim to inclusion under the all…
The Morality of Party Switching
Party switching by members of Parliament is a common phenomenon in democracies. Despite several empirical investigations of this phenomenon, party switching has not yet been investigated from a moral point of view. This article aims to fill this gap. By analyzing party switching from the point of view of relational egalitarianism, the article argues that party switching may be wrong because (i) the politician thereby acts on selfish interests whi…
Republicanism and/or Relational Egalitarianism
What is the relationship between republicanism and relational egalitarianism? According to Andreas Schmidt, republicanism, in particular Pettit’s theory of republicanism, is able to capture some relations as objectionable which relational egalitarianism cannot, to wit, relations of mutual domination. This shows that relational egalitarianism is inadequate. In this paper, I explore the relationship between republicanism and relational egalitariani…
Relational Egalitarianism, Paternalism, Adults and Children: A Puzzle
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. However, not just any inegalitarian relation is unjust, i.e., the fact that parents do not relate as equals to their children is not unjust. Whereas an adult treating another adult paternalistically is objectionable from the point of view of relational egalitarianism, parent-child paternalism is not. What may explain this difference in judgment? I re…
The Voting Rights of Senior Citizens: Should all Votes Count the Same
In 1970, Stewart advocated disenfranchising everyone reaching retirement age or age 70, whichever was earlier. The question of whether senior citizens should be disenfranchised has recently come to the fore due to votes on issues such as Brexit and climate change. Indeed, there is a growing literature which argues that we should increase the voting power of non-senior citizens relative to senior citizens, for reasons having to do with intergenera…
Animals and Relational Egalitarianism(s)
According to relational egalitarianism, a society is just insofar as the relations in that society are equal. Exclusively, relational egalitarians have been concerned with why humans, in particular adults, must relate as equals. This is unfortunate since relational egalitarians claim to be in line with the concerns of real‐life egalitarians; but real‐life egalitarians, such as vegans and vegetarians, clearly care about injustices committed agains…
Relational Justice: Egalitarian and Sufficientarian
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. In this article, we develop relational sufficientarianism – a view of justice according to which people must relate as sufficients. We distinguish between three versions of this ideal, one that is incompatible with relational egalitarianism and two that are not. Building on this, we argue that relational theorists have good reason to support a plural…
Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals
When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an "egalitarian plateau".1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception …
Doxastic Affirmative Action
According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of th…
Wrongful discrimination against non-pregnant people
A critical take on procreative justice
Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the princip…
What Relational Egalitarians Should (Not) Believe
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up 1
Ambivalent Stereotypes
People often discriminate based on negative or positive stereotypes about others. Important examples of this are highlighted by the theory of ambivalent sexism. This theory distinguishes sexist stereotypes that are negative (hostile sexism) from those that are positive (benevolent sexism). While both forms of sexism are considered wrong toward women, hostile sexism seems intuitively worse than benevolent sexism. In this article, we ask whether th…
Positive and negative affirmative action
Affirmative action continues to divide. My aim in this article is to present participants in the debate with a new distinction, namely one between negative and positive affirmative action. Whereas positive affirmative action has to do with certain goods, such as a place at a prestigious university or a job at a prestigious company, negative affirmative action has to do with certain bads, such as a firing or a sentence. I then argue that some of t…
Affirmative Action in the Political Domain
This article has two parts. First, I argue that three prominent arguments in favour of affirmative action – the mitigating discrimination argument, the equality of opportunity argument and the diversity argument – may be based on a relational egalitarian theory of justice, as opposed to a distributive understanding of justice. Second, I argue that basing these arguments in favour of affirmative action on relational egalitarianism has an interesti…
Affirmative Action, Paternalism, and Respect
This article investigates the hitherto under-examined relations between affirmative action, paternalism, and respect. We provide three main arguments. First, we argue that affirmative action initiatives are typically paternalistic and thus disrespectful towards intended beneficiaries who oppose them. Second, we argue that not introducing affirmative action can be disrespectful towards these potential beneficiaries because such inaction involves a…
Can Relational Egalitarians Supply Both an Account of Justice and an Account of the Value of Democracy or Must They Choose Which
Construed as a theory of justice, relational egalitarianism says that justice requires that people relate as equals. Construed as a theory of what makes democracy valuable, it says that democracy is a necessary, or constituent, part of the value of relating as equals. Typically, relational egalitarians want their theory to provide both an account of what justice requires and an account of what makes democracy valuable. We argue that relational eg…
Is Self-Discrimination Disrespectful
Victims of oppressive (e.g., sexist, racist or ableist) structures sometimes internalize the unjust norms that prevail in society. This can cause these victims to develop preferences or make decisions that seem bad for them. Focusing on such cases, we ask: is self-discrimination disrespectful? We show that some of the most sophisticated respect theories fail to provide any clear guidance. Specifically, we show that the widely recognized view that…
Unjust equal relations
According to relational egalitarianism, justice requires equal relations. In this paper, I ask the question: can equal relations be unjust according to relational egalitarianism? I argue that while on some conceptions of relational egalitarianism, equal relations cannot be unjust, there are conceptions in which equal relations can be unjust. Surprisingly, whether equal relations can be unjust cuts across the distinction between responsibility-sen…
Am I Socially Related to Myself
According to relational egalitarianism, justice requires equal relations. The theory applies to those who stand in the relevant social relations. In this paper, I distinguish four different accounts of what it means to be socially related and argue that in all of them, self-relations—how a person relates to themselves—fall within the scope of relational egalitarianism. I also point to how this constrains what a person is allowed to do to themselv…
One person, one vote and the importance of baseline
‘One person, one vote’ is wedded to the idea of democracy to such an extent that many would hesitate to refer to a system, which deviated from this, as a democracy. In this paper, I show why this assumption is hard to defend. I do so by pointing to the importance of baseline in justifying a system of ‘one person, one vote'. The investigation will show that the reasons underlying the most prominent views on democratic inclusion cannot justify ‘one…
Law (26 works) · Political science (26 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (25 works) · Sociology (24 works) · Politics (20 works) · Philosophy (17 works) · Law and economics (16 works) · Psychology (16 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (14 works)