Julia Langkau
Biographic Data
| ID | 4315528 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julia Langkau |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julia |
| FAMILY NAME | Langkau |
| SIGNATURE | LANGKAU J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8351-1284 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Experiential imagination and norms of literary engagement
When engaging imaginatively with a work of literary fiction, readers do more than reconstruct what is fictionally true — they also engage in richer forms of imagining. While the reconstruction of fictional truth must comply, at least to some extent, with the author’s intention, experiential imagining is often considered too subjective to be normatively constrained. This paper challenges this assumption by arguing that, although experiential imagi…
Empathizing across sensibilities
Empathic perspective taking involves a phenomenally rich reaction to another’s mental state, in an attempt to understand the other by feeling with them. But can we take just any perspective, even if the person we aim to understand seems fundamentally different from us? In this paper, we will explore the possibility of empathically understanding others that are different from us with respect to one aspect of their mental life: their sensibility
The Philosophy of Fiction
Two Kinds of Imaginative Vividness
This paper argues that we should distinguish two different kinds of imaginative vividness: vividness of mental images and vividness of imaginative experiences. Philosophy has focussed on mental images, but distinguishing more complex vivid imaginative experiences from vivid mental images can help us understand our intuitions concerning the notion as well as the explanatory power of vividness. In particular, it can help us understand the epistemic…
On Imagining Being Someone Else
In philosophical and psychological literature, it is common to distinguish two kinds of perspective-taking: imagining oneself in another person’s situation, in-their-shoes perspective-shifting; and imagining being the other person in their situation, empathetic perspective-shifting. Peter Goldie has cast doubt on the distinction and argues that empathetic perspective-shifting is conceptually impossible. This chapter first presents Goldie’s view a…
The empathic skill fiction can’t teach us
This paper argues that a crucial skill needed to empathize with others cannot be trained by reading fiction: the skill of reading the evidence for the other person’s state of mind and, thus, empathically getting their mental state right. While the evidence for a fictional character’s mental state is merely propositional, the evidence for a person’s mental state in a typical real-life situation is often experiential. Because the kind of evidence i…
New Perspectives on Concepts
Founded in 1683 in Leiden, the Netherlands, Brill is a leading international academic publisher in the Humanities, Social Sciences, International Law, and Biology. With offices in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, the USA and Asia, Brill today publishes more than 360 journals and 2,000 new books and reference works each year as well as a large number of databases and primary source research collections.
No prominent works on this page.
New Perspectives on Concepts
Founded in 1683 in Leiden, the Netherlands, Brill is a leading international academic publisher in the Humanities, Social Sciences, International Law, and Biology. With offices in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, the USA and Asia, Brill today publishes more than 360 journals and 2,000 new books and reference works each year as well as a large number of databases and primary source research collections.
The empathic skill fiction can’t teach us
This paper argues that a crucial skill needed to empathize with others cannot be trained by reading fiction: the skill of reading the evidence for the other person’s state of mind and, thus, empathically getting their mental state right. While the evidence for a fictional character’s mental state is merely propositional, the evidence for a person’s mental state in a typical real-life situation is often experiential. Because the kind of evidence i…
Two Kinds of Imaginative Vividness
This paper argues that we should distinguish two different kinds of imaginative vividness: vividness of mental images and vividness of imaginative experiences. Philosophy has focussed on mental images, but distinguishing more complex vivid imaginative experiences from vivid mental images can help us understand our intuitions concerning the notion as well as the explanatory power of vividness. In particular, it can help us understand the epistemic…
On Imagining Being Someone Else
In philosophical and psychological literature, it is common to distinguish two kinds of perspective-taking: imagining oneself in another person’s situation, in-their-shoes perspective-shifting; and imagining being the other person in their situation, empathetic perspective-shifting. Peter Goldie has cast doubt on the distinction and argues that empathetic perspective-shifting is conceptually impossible. This chapter first presents Goldie’s view a…
The Philosophy of Fiction
Empathizing across sensibilities
Empathic perspective taking involves a phenomenally rich reaction to another’s mental state, in an attempt to understand the other by feeling with them. But can we take just any perspective, even if the person we aim to understand seems fundamentally different from us? In this paper, we will explore the possibility of empathically understanding others that are different from us with respect to one aspect of their mental life: their sensibility
Experiential imagination and norms of literary engagement
When engaging imaginatively with a work of literary fiction, readers do more than reconstruct what is fictionally true — they also engage in richer forms of imagining. While the reconstruction of fictional truth must comply, at least to some extent, with the author’s intention, experiential imagining is often considered too subjective to be normatively constrained. This paper challenges this assumption by arguing that, although experiential imagi…
Art (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Empathy (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)