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Amoz Katsa

Biographic Data

ID4371313
NAMEAmoz Katsa
GIVEN NAMESAmoz
FAMILY NAMEKatsa
SIGNATUREKATSA A
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS2
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1977
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1977
H-INDEX1
  • More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes

    Open Access•Amoz Katsa, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•1977•Cited by: 2•References: 3

    An attempt to rationalize policy outcomes in voting bodies has been made by Rae and Taylor (this Journal, 1 (1971), 71–90). In that work the assumption is made that all voters' preferences are representable by ‘city block’ type utility functions. The principal result obtained in that case by the writers is that for an odd number of voters there is always a unique equilibrium point under simple majority rule, independent of the distribution of ind…

  • More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes

    Open Access•Amoz Katsa, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•1977•Cited by: 2•References: 3

    An attempt to rationalize policy outcomes in voting bodies has been made by Rae and Taylor (this Journal, 1 (1971), 71–90). In that work the assumption is made that all voters' preferences are representable by ‘city block’ type utility functions. The principal result obtained in that case by the writers is that for an odd number of voters there is always a unique equilibrium point under simple majority rule, independent of the distribution of ind…

  • More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes

    Open Access•Amoz Katsa, Shmuel Nitzan•ARTICLE•British Journal of Political…•1977•Cited by: 2•References: 3

    An attempt to rationalize policy outcomes in voting bodies has been made by Rae and Taylor (this Journal, 1 (1971), 71–90). In that work the assumption is made that all voters' preferences are representable by ‘city block’ type utility functions. The principal result obtained in that case by the writers is that for an odd number of voters there is always a unique equilibrium point under simple majority rule, independent of the distribution of ind…

Combinatorics (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Dimension (graph theory (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (1 work) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 work) · Keynesian economics (1 work) · Law (1 work)

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