More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6228170 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amoz Katsa, Shmuel Nitzan (0000-0002-5523-7350) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 419-422 |
| Publication date | 1977-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123400001071 |
| OpenAlex | W2035260371 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
An attempt to rationalize policy outcomes in voting bodies has been made by Rae and Taylor (this Journal, 1 (1971), 71–90). In that work the assumption is made that all voters' preferences are representable by ‘city block’ type utility functions. The principal result obtained in that case by the writers is that for an odd number of voters there is always a unique equilibrium point under simple majority rule, independent of the distribution of individual optimal points and independent of the dimension of the policy space. Unfortunately, the Rae and Taylor result is not correct. In particular their result holds for a one or two dimensional policy space but not in cases where the policy space has three or more dimensions. The proof given by Rae and Taylor is correct for n = 2 but is false for n ≥ 3
Combinatorics · Dimension (graph theory · Economics · Epistemology · Keynesian economics · Majority rule · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical economics · Monetary policy · Point (geometry · Political science · Politics · Principal (computer security · Simple (philosophy · Space (punctuation) · Taylor rule · Taylor series · Voting · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.07 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1980 - 2014 (35) |
| Highly cited | No |