Spatial Models, Cognitive Metrics, and Majority Rule Equilibria
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6227600 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Humphreys (0000-0001-7029-2326, Columbia University), Macartan Humphreys, Michael Laver (0000-0001-7515-9831) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 11-30 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123409990263 |
| OpenAlex | W2043059238 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 42 |
Long-standing results demonstrate that, if policy choices are defined in spaces with more than one dimension, majority-rule equilibrium fails to exist for a general class of smooth preference profiles. This article shows that if agents perceive political similarity and difference in ‘city block’ terms, then the dimension-by-dimension median can be a majority-rule equilibrium even in spaces with an arbitrarily large number of dimensions and it provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium. This is important because city block preferences accord more closely with empirical research on human perception than do many smooth preferences. It implies that, if empirical research findings on human perceptions of similarity and difference extend also to perceptions ofpoliticalsimilarity and difference, then the possibility of equilibrium under majority rule re-emerges
Block (permutation group theory · Class (philosophy · Combinatorics · Dimension (graph theory · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Perception · Political science · Politics · Preference · Pure mathematics · Similarity (geometry · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Psychology
Modeling the effects of changing issue salience in two-party competition
Filling a Void
Utility Representations of Risk Neutral Preferences in Multiple Dimensions
Reconciling participatory and evidence-based policymaking in the EU Better Regulation policy
Do voters prefer logrolling to compromise in parliamentary democracies
Cognitive dissonance, political participation, and changes in policy preferences
Inequity aversion and the stability of majority rule
Left-Authoritarians and Policy Representation in Western Europe
Intergovernmental cooperation networks, national policy positions and partisan ideologies
Mapping the policy space of public consultations
Measuring Policy Positions in Political Space
Heterogeneous preferences in multidimensional spatial voting models
Testing theories of party competition
Arguments-Based Collective Choice
Incommensurability and Issue Voting
Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in mixed-member proportional systems
Why Vote-seeking Parties May Make Voters Miserable
The shape of utility functions and voter attitudes towards risk
Making and Breaking Governments
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
Toward a Universal Law of Generalization for Psychological Science
Utility Representations of Risk Neutral Preferences in Multiple Dimensions
Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models
Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
A Comparison of Two Distance Metrics Through Regression Diagnostics of a Model of Relative Candidate Evaluation
Specification Issues in Proximity Models of Candidate Evaluation (with Issue Importance)
Equilibrium in the Spatial ‘Valence’ Model of Politics
Stability in Spatial Voting Games with Restricted Preference Maximizing
Valence Competition in the Spatial Stochastic Model
Dominant players and minimum size coalitions
Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes
More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes
An Experimental Study of Individual and Collective Decision-making
Distance versus Direction
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
Convergence and Restricted Preference Maximizing under Simple Majority Rule
| Citations per year | 0.95 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |