Quintin H Beazer
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371500 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Quintin H Beazer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Quintin H |
| FAMILY NAME | Beazer |
| SIGNATURE | BEAZER Q H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Florida State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 124 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
The demand for elections under autocracy
Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections? If so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in contemporary Russia, examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are eliminated. Over the past 25 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed executives. This paper uses the…
When Do Private Actors Engage in Censorship? Evidence From a Correspondence Experiment with Russian Private Media Firms
In authoritarian regimes, repression encourages private actors to censor not only themselves, but also other private actors—a behavior we call “regime-induced private censorship.” We present the results of a correspondence experiment conducted in Russia that investigates the censorship behavior of private media firms. We find that such firms censor third-party advertisements that include anti-regime language, calls for political or non-political …
Do Authoritarian Elections Help the Poor? Evidence from Russian Cities
Do local elections under autocracy help the poor? We argue that local appointees in electoral authoritarian regimes have political incentives that undermine public service provision; regime leaders' preoccupation with national electoral control encourages them to overlook local governance problems if subnational officials can still deliver requisite votes in national elections. Using geographic and temporal variation across Russian cities (2002–1…
Risk Is Relative
Are economic actors equally sensitive to institutional conditions? While existing research recognizes that institutions can have varying effects on actors’ interests, the implicit assumption is that actors are homogeneous in how sensitive they are to their institutional environment. We investigate this assumption in the context of foreign direct investment, arguing that actors from countries with weaker institutions will be less affected by infor…
Who Is to Blame? Political Centralization and Electoral Punishment under Authoritarianism
Does decentralization affect how voters attribute blame for poor economic performance? This question is particularly important in authoritarian regimes, where economic performance legitimacy is a key source of regime stability. Using political and economic data from large Russian cities for 2003–12, we investigate how replacing direct mayoral elections with appointments affects the way voters attribute blame for economic outcomes. We find that th…
The Conditional Nature of Political Risk
What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that fir…
IMF Conditionality, Government Partisanship, and the Progress of Economic Reforms
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic p…
Political Centralization and Economic Performance
What determines whether political centralization helps or hurts economic performance? This article identifies preexisting patterns of political competition as a critical factor in determining the impact of political centralization on subnational economies. In competitive regions, political centralization undermines economic performance by removing a functioning electoral mechanism that makes leaders responsive to a wide range of economic concerns…
Bureaucratic Discretion, Business Investment, and Uncertainty
What determines whether policy environments attract or deter investment? Scholars worried about the vulnerability of market-supporting institutions to political manipulation have identified delegation to independent actors as way to increase policy environments' predictability. Extant arguments, however, risk overgeneralizing from the experience of developed democracies. I argue that investors' response to bureaucratic discretion—agents' leeway t…
The Conditional Nature of Political Risk
What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that fir…
IMF Conditionality, Government Partisanship, and the Progress of Economic Reforms
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic p…
Who Is to Blame? Political Centralization and Electoral Punishment under Authoritarianism
Does decentralization affect how voters attribute blame for poor economic performance? This question is particularly important in authoritarian regimes, where economic performance legitimacy is a key source of regime stability. Using political and economic data from large Russian cities for 2003–12, we investigate how replacing direct mayoral elections with appointments affects the way voters attribute blame for economic outcomes. We find that th…
Do Authoritarian Elections Help the Poor? Evidence from Russian Cities
Do local elections under autocracy help the poor? We argue that local appointees in electoral authoritarian regimes have political incentives that undermine public service provision; regime leaders' preoccupation with national electoral control encourages them to overlook local governance problems if subnational officials can still deliver requisite votes in national elections. Using geographic and temporal variation across Russian cities (2002–1…
Political Centralization and Economic Performance
What determines whether political centralization helps or hurts economic performance? This article identifies preexisting patterns of political competition as a critical factor in determining the impact of political centralization on subnational economies. In competitive regions, political centralization undermines economic performance by removing a functioning electoral mechanism that makes leaders responsive to a wide range of economic concerns…
When Do Private Actors Engage in Censorship? Evidence From a Correspondence Experiment with Russian Private Media Firms
In authoritarian regimes, repression encourages private actors to censor not only themselves, but also other private actors—a behavior we call “regime-induced private censorship.” We present the results of a correspondence experiment conducted in Russia that investigates the censorship behavior of private media firms. We find that such firms censor third-party advertisements that include anti-regime language, calls for political or non-political …
Bureaucratic Discretion, Business Investment, and Uncertainty
What determines whether policy environments attract or deter investment? Scholars worried about the vulnerability of market-supporting institutions to political manipulation have identified delegation to independent actors as way to increase policy environments' predictability. Extant arguments, however, risk overgeneralizing from the experience of developed democracies. I argue that investors' response to bureaucratic discretion—agents' leeway t…
Risk Is Relative
Are economic actors equally sensitive to institutional conditions? While existing research recognizes that institutions can have varying effects on actors’ interests, the implicit assumption is that actors are homogeneous in how sensitive they are to their institutional environment. We investigate this assumption in the context of foreign direct investment, arguing that actors from countries with weaker institutions will be less affected by infor…
Bureaucratic Discretion, Business Investment, and Uncertainty
What determines whether policy environments attract or deter investment? Scholars worried about the vulnerability of market-supporting institutions to political manipulation have identified delegation to independent actors as way to increase policy environments' predictability. Extant arguments, however, risk overgeneralizing from the experience of developed democracies. I argue that investors' response to bureaucratic discretion—agents' leeway t…
Political Centralization and Economic Performance
What determines whether political centralization helps or hurts economic performance? This article identifies preexisting patterns of political competition as a critical factor in determining the impact of political centralization on subnational economies. In competitive regions, political centralization undermines economic performance by removing a functioning electoral mechanism that makes leaders responsive to a wide range of economic concerns…
IMF Conditionality, Government Partisanship, and the Progress of Economic Reforms
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic p…
The Conditional Nature of Political Risk
What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that fir…
Who Is to Blame? Political Centralization and Electoral Punishment under Authoritarianism
Does decentralization affect how voters attribute blame for poor economic performance? This question is particularly important in authoritarian regimes, where economic performance legitimacy is a key source of regime stability. Using political and economic data from large Russian cities for 2003–12, we investigate how replacing direct mayoral elections with appointments affects the way voters attribute blame for economic outcomes. We find that th…
Risk Is Relative
Are economic actors equally sensitive to institutional conditions? While existing research recognizes that institutions can have varying effects on actors’ interests, the implicit assumption is that actors are homogeneous in how sensitive they are to their institutional environment. We investigate this assumption in the context of foreign direct investment, arguing that actors from countries with weaker institutions will be less affected by infor…
When Do Private Actors Engage in Censorship? Evidence From a Correspondence Experiment with Russian Private Media Firms
In authoritarian regimes, repression encourages private actors to censor not only themselves, but also other private actors—a behavior we call “regime-induced private censorship.” We present the results of a correspondence experiment conducted in Russia that investigates the censorship behavior of private media firms. We find that such firms censor third-party advertisements that include anti-regime language, calls for political or non-political …
Do Authoritarian Elections Help the Poor? Evidence from Russian Cities
Do local elections under autocracy help the poor? We argue that local appointees in electoral authoritarian regimes have political incentives that undermine public service provision; regime leaders' preoccupation with national electoral control encourages them to overlook local governance problems if subnational officials can still deliver requisite votes in national elections. Using geographic and temporal variation across Russian cities (2002–1…
The demand for elections under autocracy
Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections? If so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in contemporary Russia, examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are eliminated. Over the past 25 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed executives. This paper uses the…
Political science (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Economic system (4 works) · Authoritarianism (3 works) · Business (3 works)