The demand for elections under autocracy
Regime approval and the elimination of local elections in Russia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19217046 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Quintin H Beazer (Florida State University, corresponding author), Noah Buckley (0000-0002-4641-6664, Trinity College Dublin), Ora John Reuter (0000-0002-2576-3018, University School of Milwaukee) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-06-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.70060 |
| OpenAlex | W7163527638 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 34 |
Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections? If so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in contemporary Russia, examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are eliminated. Over the past 25 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed executives. This paper uses the largest data set on public opinion ever assembled on Russia—over 400,000 responses drawn from two decades by Russia's top polling agencies—to analyze how the elimination of elections in Russia's large cities has affected public attitudes toward the authorities. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that election cancellation reduces support for President Vladimir Putin. This effect is stronger in settings with histories of robust electoral competition. This suggests that the public is more likely to punish incumbents for eliminating elections when individuals have experience with competitive elections
Autocracy · Opinion poll · Polling · Public opinion · Public support · Set (abstract data type) · Value (mathematics) · Political Conflict and Governance · Russia and Soviet political economy · Soviet and Russian History
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |