Emiel Awad
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371827 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emiel Awad |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emiel |
| FAMILY NAME | Awad |
| SIGNATURE | AWAD E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Princeton University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3442-5002 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Learning by lobbying
Effective lobbying requires understanding politicians' preferences, while the act of lobbying itself can reveal those preferences. How does this link between lobbying and learning shape relationships between interest groups and politicians? We develop a game‐theoretic model where an interest group can lobby a politician while learning about their ideological alignment. Our analysis highlights strategic tensions where interest groups balance infor…
Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections
The inflow of money into politics and the influence of interest groups on policies are well‐documented, but the monetary value of accessing policymakers is less well‐understood. As a result, it is unclear what inferences researchers can draw from lobbying expenditures about interest groups' strategies and their ideological alignment with policymakers. We study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision‐making body and endogenous…
Designing Political Order
Social scientists and political philosophers believe that the existence of a sovereign agent endowed with a monopoly of coercive force is the foundation of political order. In this article, the authors develop a formal model of anarchic competition and show that whenever it is possible to construct a peaceful political order based on a monopoly of force, it is also possible to construct one in which multiple agents maintain coercive abilities. Wh…
International Cooperation, Information Transmission, and Delegation
Do international organizations (IOs) help states to solve coordination problems over policy choices? We analyze a formal model of coordinated adaptation in which states use costly signals to transmit information about their preferences. We show that states only delegate to IOs if states are sufficiently aligned and face little uncertainty about each other’s preferences. Although states gain from delegation by achieving more policy coordination, t…
Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure
Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them rather than opponents. The choice of whom to lobby affects both what information becomes available to legislators and how much influence special interest groups exert on policies. However, the conditions under which aligned legislators are targeted are not well understood. We investigate how the pressure to conclude policies quickly affects the strategic decision of whom to lobby. We de…
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade‐off: Lobbying aligned legisla…
Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade‐off: Lobbying aligned legisla…
Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure
Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them rather than opponents. The choice of whom to lobby affects both what information becomes available to legislators and how much influence special interest groups exert on policies. However, the conditions under which aligned legislators are targeted are not well understood. We investigate how the pressure to conclude policies quickly affects the strategic decision of whom to lobby. We de…
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade‐off: Lobbying aligned legisla…
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
International Cooperation, Information Transmission, and Delegation
Do international organizations (IOs) help states to solve coordination problems over policy choices? We analyze a formal model of coordinated adaptation in which states use costly signals to transmit information about their preferences. We show that states only delegate to IOs if states are sufficiently aligned and face little uncertainty about each other’s preferences. Although states gain from delegation by achieving more policy coordination, t…
Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure
Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them rather than opponents. The choice of whom to lobby affects both what information becomes available to legislators and how much influence special interest groups exert on policies. However, the conditions under which aligned legislators are targeted are not well understood. We investigate how the pressure to conclude policies quickly affects the strategic decision of whom to lobby. We de…
Learning by lobbying
Effective lobbying requires understanding politicians' preferences, while the act of lobbying itself can reveal those preferences. How does this link between lobbying and learning shape relationships between interest groups and politicians? We develop a game‐theoretic model where an interest group can lobby a politician while learning about their ideological alignment. Our analysis highlights strategic tensions where interest groups balance infor…
Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections
The inflow of money into politics and the influence of interest groups on policies are well‐documented, but the monetary value of accessing policymakers is less well‐understood. As a result, it is unclear what inferences researchers can draw from lobbying expenditures about interest groups' strategies and their ideological alignment with policymakers. We study a model of informational lobbying with a collective decision‐making body and endogenous…
Designing Political Order
Social scientists and political philosophers believe that the existence of a sovereign agent endowed with a monopoly of coercive force is the foundation of political order. In this article, the authors develop a formal model of anarchic competition and show that whenever it is possible to construct a peaceful political order based on a monopoly of force, it is also possible to construct one in which multiple agents maintain coercive abilities. Wh…
Political science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Public relations (4 works) · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works)