Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231818 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Emiel Awad (0000-0002-3442-5002, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 938-951 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12523 |
| OpenAlex | W3013973568 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 35 |
Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade‐off: Lobbying aligned legislators is advantageous as they are more willing to endorse the group's preferred policy, but those who are too aligned cannot persuade a majority of their peers. The model illustrates how intermediaries are especially valuable if interest groups cannot persuade a majority themselves. Counter to previous work, the results demonstrate how a legislature's ideological composition determines the use of intermediaries. Groups may lobby intermediaries even if access to legislators is free and unrestricted
Business · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Ideology · Interest group · Intermediary · Law and economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public interest · Public relations · Social science · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Work (physics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Marketing · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Lobbying and rotating leadership
Show and tell advocacy
Empirical approaches to the study of access
Lobbying from the Outside
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
Echo chamber? Lobbying at the failed Chilean constitutional convention
The public affairs plan
Lobbying on multiple routes to influence national legislation
When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems
Intermediating climate change
Learning by lobbying
Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections
Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation
Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making
Lobbyists as Gatekeepers
On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests’ Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress
Mobilization and Strategies
Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence
How Lobbying Matters
Persuasion in veto bargaining
Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure
Why Do Politicians Overestimate Richer Voters' Opinions? Social Background and Interest Group Influence
Lobbying and Policy Change
Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Consensus Building
The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion
Institutional constraints on legislative lobbying
Influencing Connected Legislators
Who to lobby and when
The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee
Legislative Experts and Outsiders
Partners in Advocacy
What Happens After the Alarm? Interest Group Subsidies to Legislative Overseers
The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence
Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying
Inviting Friends to Lobby
Counteractive Lobbying
"The Multiple Ambiguities of "Counteractive Lobbying
Buying Supermajorities
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Buying Time
Legislators and Interest Groups
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Campaign Contributions and Access
| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,67 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |