Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232380 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith E Schnakenberg (0000-0001-6997-5656, University of Kentucky, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 129-145 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12249 |
| OpenAlex | W2346290365 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 66 |
| References cited | 34 |
I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access to legislators is costly, then interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to persuade less sympathetic legislators. The model reconciles informational theories of lobbying with empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups predominantly lobby those who already agree with them. The model also makes new predictions about the welfare effects of interest group influence: From an ex ante perspective, informational lobbying negatively affects the welfare of legislators. The results highlight the need for more theories of persuasion that take collective choice institutions into account
Craft · Economics · Information transmission · Interest group · Legislature · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Outcome (game theory · Persuasion · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Special Interest Group · Voting · Welfare · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Social Workers’ Impact on Policy Through Regulations
Lobbying y medios de comunicación. Análisis de la cobertura periodística de los lobbies en España
Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters
Lobbying
Influence-seeking in the Federal Bureaucracy
Datafied corporate political activity
Anti-Scientific Americans
What drives participatory policy processes
Financiamiento de campañas y cabildeo
Influence of lobbying in EU policy process phases
The diffusion of anti-protest bills across US states
Lobbyists in Spain
The Limits of Lobbying
Strategies, access and influence
Empirical approaches to the study of access
Understanding influence in informational lobbying
Echo chamber? Lobbying at the failed Chilean constitutional convention
Lobbying venue selection under separation of powers and resource constraints
Reward of legislating
Domestic Groups’ Testimonies at US Foreign Aid Hearings from 1980 to 2020
Interest Groups and Legislative Ideology
How shared ideas may hinder lobbying success
When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems
Learning by lobbying
Persuasive lobbying and the value of connections
The downsides of information transmission and voting
Lobbying, political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax
Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation
Issue Specialization and Effective Lawmaking in the U.S. Congress
How foreign information campaigns shape US public pronouncements about civil wars
Sowing the Seeds of a Future Crisis
Discovering the prize
Shifting social norms through endorsements
Theme parks, labor, and the Dark Lord
Cities in the Statehouse
Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making
Lobbyists as Gatekeepers
Slicing and Bundling
Prioritized Interests
Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections
A foot out the door
Interest group lobbying and partisan polarization in the United States
Does Lobbying Affect Bill Advancement? Evidence from Three State Legislatures
The Influence of Cause and Sectional Group Lobbying on Government Responsiveness
All of the Above
Advocacy groups, policy subsidies, and policy change
On Whose Door to Knock? Organized Interests’ Strategic Pursuit of Access to Members of Congress
Legislative capacity limits interest group influence
Persuading policy-makers
Lobbying, learning and policy reinvention
Restoring Legitimacy
Information, politicization, and reputation
What makes a good lobbyist for the government? Explaining intergovernmental lobbying success
Informational demand across the globe
Mobilization and Strategies
Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence
How Lobbying Matters
Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
Persuasion in veto bargaining
Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure
Interest Group Influence and the Two Faces of Power
I Don't Know
Strategic Legislative Subsidies
Signaling with Reform
How Are Politicians Informed? Witnesses and Information Provision in Congress
Exit Strategy
The governmental process
Lobbying and Policy Change
The Business of America is Lobbying
Bayesian Persuasion
Strategic Information Transmission
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Consensus Building
Lobbying and asymmetric information
Lobbying Legislatures
The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee
Partners in Advocacy
A Jamming Theory of Politics
Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons
Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches
Life in a Niche
The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence
The Inside View
Inviting Friends to Lobby
Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract
Counteractive Lobbying
Buying Supermajorities
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Legislators and Interest Groups
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Campaign Contributions and Access
Gaining Access
| Unique citing works | 66 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7,33 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 66 |